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This study compares subnational immigration programmes for economic immigrants in 
Canada and Australia. Whereas for the first four or five decades in the post-WWII era Australian 
and Canadian national governments had total control over immigration policies and programs, 
during the most recent three to four decades the sub-national governments have become 
increasingly involved in the selection of some categories of immigrants destined for their 
respective territories. During the same time the national “Immigration Points System” has been 
converted into a policy instrument that helps subnational levels of government to select specific 
immigrants to live and work in their territories. The change has occurred because the national 
merit-based point system was not very useful in addressing the pressing needs for particular 
types of immigrants to Canadian and Australian territories. This has evolved into what is known 
as “immigration federalism,” which is a relatively new approach to formulating and 
implementing immigration policies through processes and agreements negotiated between the 
national and sub-national governments in these two countries. Using Hall’s “Paradigm Model”, 
this study investigates how in the past twenty-five years immigration federalism has altered 
immigration policy in Saskatchewan (SK) and Western Australia (WA). First, this research 
explores how policy instruments, policy goals and the political discourse of immigration 
federalism have changed in the last quarter century in Canada and Australia. Secondly, this 
research compares differences in the ways in which Canada and Australia have selected highly 
skilled individuals to immigrate to their countries, highlighting the differing roles of subnational 
governments in each. The study confirmed that in both Canada and Australia, the immigration 
programmes for economic immigrants are considerably different due to structural factors such as 
dependence and vulnerability, and institutional factors like constitutional mandate, nature of 
immigration agreements and integration. Finally, Hoppe’s three drivers—puzzling, powering and 
participation—are used to demonstrate that policy paradigms have changed immigration policy 
in the same way in both countries. This case constitutes a third order of change as the 
immigration point-system, multiculturalism policy, nature of agreements and the nature of 
residency all have evolved. Moreover, a second order of change occurred in response, with new 
roles for applicants, firms and credential agencies. This study is the first to compare policy 
paradigms across Canadian and Australian subnational jurisdictions, revealing how cities have 






immigration federalism; provincial/state immigration role; national/sub-national power 
distribution; regional immigration agreements; policy puzzling and policy powering; provincial 
nominee programs; skilled workers; asymmetric vs symmetric immigration policy systems; 
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CHAPTER I:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.    Introduction  
 
 In the last 25 years, political actors have debated the economic and political advantages 
of federated systems of governance (Boushell & Gruetke, 2007; McKay 2001; Radin & Boase, 
2000). Federalism studies generally examine two distinct claims about confederated power 
distribution. First, some assert that federalism reconciles the costs of regional commerce by 
decreasing transaction costs in the flow of labour and goods across state lines. Second, others see 
federalism as inherently a question of political power-sharing with a range of minority 
organizations at the provincial and local levels. These two threads—the efficiency-based 
argument and the normative policy imperative—co-exist in immigration policy.  
 Boushell and Gruetke (2007) assert that immigration is a key policy for nations: “as 
government policy, immigration programs shape both the economic performance and the ethnic 
composition of politics. Immigration policies recruit and distribute labour across all federations, 
and in doing so inevitably change the demographic composition of subnational units” (p. 207). 
Immigration policies are framed in the context of both national security and economic 
development, sometimes framed as control versus integration (Hammar 1985, 1990; Money 
1990). While immigration control policies deal with keeping out unwanted immigrants, 
immigrant integration policy deals with the recruitment, selection, settlement and retention of 
desired immigrants.  
 Immigration is one strategic policy over which national governments have maintained 
control for many years. According to Boushell and Gruetke (2007), the high costs and 
deficiencies associated with maintaining immigration control policy at the subnational level lead 
to centralized systems. Despite having been dominated by national governments for decades, 
other aspects of immigration are now being shared. There are two main reasons why national 
governments have been decentralizing some of their immigration policies, one structural and one 
institutional. First, the specific structure and nature of the regions requires a different number and 
type of immigrants in different parts of continental economies. The level of development, the 





most of the time, national governments do not have sufficient knowledge or control of all the 
information necessary to issue regulations consistent with the realities in each state, province or 
city. This does not mean that all aspects of regulation need to be discussed locally (e.g., the 
maximum quota of economic immigrants).  
 At root, the debate about the appropriate design of immigration policy is a specific case 
of the general theory of fiscal federalism. Tiebout (1956) suggests that public goods are best or 
optimally delivered when they fit most people, which usually requires subnational delivery. 
Differing levels of delivery then trigger people to vote with their feet, moving to the region with 
the best fit of policies with their needs and interests. While mobility is limited for most residents 
due to high moving costs, it fits the immigrants who are already mobile and searching for where 
to settle.  
 Subnational officials possess better information on “both local preferences and cost 
conditions than a central agency is unlikely to have” (Oates, 1999, p. 1123). Also, “there are 
typically political pressures … that limit the capacity of central governments to provide higher 
levels of public services in some jurisdictions than in others” (Oates, 1999, p. 1123). Centralized 
systems often are not resilient enough to find a balance between subnational governments 
(Boushell & Gruetke, 2007). For all these reasons, governments in large heterogeneous countries 
have been exploring alternative delivery mechanisms. 
 Some political scientists have attempted to measure what degree of decentralization is 
appropriate to govern immigration through sub-national governments, especially in federal 
countries that traditionally attract large flows of immigrants (Caplan et al., 2000; Faguet et al., 
2014; Wiginton, 2013). One common concern is to explore the conditions that lead political 
actors in federal systems to decentralize immigration policy.  
 The governments of Canada and Australia have been experimenting with alternate 
designs for immigration policies, giving their regions more opportunities to manage immigration 
regulations. This thesis seeks to sort through the policy dynamics in the two countries and search 
for paradigm shifts (i.e., the radical and simultaneous modification of policy instruments, policy 







2.    The Problem 
 
 The world exists in what the American political scientist Mark Miller and the Australian 
sociologist Stephen Castles named “the era of migration” (Brown-Gort, 2016). The large-scale 
and extensive geographical reach of international migration over the past quarter-century has 
been substantial, if not wholly unparalleled by historical criteria. The number of foreign 
immigrants for the world as a whole — people living in a country other than where they were 
born — reached 244 million in 2015, up 41 percent over levels in 2000, according to the UN 
(UN, 2015).  
  Some developed nations, including governments, businesses and public opinion polling, 
want economic immigrants who will create wealth and consume goods, thereby increasing the 
country’s growth. Countries expect to attract individuals in society who will contribute to the 
nation’s economic stability. Similarly, people want to live in countries where they can get jobs, 
develop businesses, and be economically secure. Finding the right policy to attract the migrants 
most needed who will also want to live and work in that country is the overriding challenge.  
 “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” a report written by The 
National Academy of Sciences in the US, investigates how harmful US immigration policy can 
be. The paper notes that, on average, the first generation of immigrants to the US are the costliest 
to governments, particularly to national and local authorities. However, immigrants’ descendants 
– the next generations – are among the most influential economic and fiscal providers in society 
(National Academies Press, 2017).  
 According to Andrew (2003), Australia (AUS) and Canada (CA) are the most receptive 
to immigration among western nations. Immigration is generally viewed as not harmful by itself. 
Two factors make immigration a critical success for both economies. First, efforts to integrate 
the best highly skilled immigrants into the economy and society are vital. Second, a process is 
needed to distribute migrants within provinces/states and locales.  
 Immigration is a core socio-economic policy for both Canada and Australia. These two 
OECD countries use a points-based system to attract millions of immigrants. The points-based 
tool, first developed by Canada, is an innovative instrument that countries are increasingly using 





and a range of other countries are exploring it for their use, including the US (Doherty, 2017) 
and Germany, Sweden, and Norway, as each attempts to implement merit-based strategies to 
attract appropriate workers for their economies (Bauer et al., 2000). Australia and Canada, in 
particular, appreciate and value the talents, qualifications, and experiences of immigrants and 
both have been on the vanguard of designing more appropriate policies and processes to select 
and integrate immigrants. 
  
3.    Background 
 
 This thesis explores the applications and use of immigration federalization in two similar 
jurisdictions: Saskatchewan, a small province in the Great Plains of Western Canada, and 
Western Australia, the western, most remote state in Australia. In many ways, they are 
doppelgangers, both governed through constitutional monarchies from the British world and 
generally producing and selling into global markets many similar goods and services. Changes in 
federal regulations in both nations created opportunities for both jurisdictions to more 
aggressively use immigration policy. Canada and Australia have changed immigration policies to 
attract skilled immigrants so that immigration processes have played a significant role in both 
places. The two jurisdictions have similar yet divergent basic governance and immigration 
contexts. 
 
3.1 Saskatchewan, Canada (SK) 
 
 Saskatchewan is an active actor in immigration. In its early years, the province attracted 
almost a million migrants in just 30 years, only to see a continued outflow from about 1930 until 
the early 2000s, as the economy lagged in other provinces. Overall, an estimated 500,000 
Saskatchewan-born people migrated to other provinces. Since 2001, Saskatchewan has increased 
its number of economic immigrants (“SK’s fast-track,” 2015) in response to fast growth in its 
economy (Latimer, 2017). In fact, the agri-food industry, petroleum, and gas production have 
massively expanded the number of markets that are the basis of the provincial economy.  
     The opportunity for change emerged from changing national policy. A key factor in this 





Citizenship and Immigration with vast powers. The ministry can use Orders in Council to set the 
particular rules and procedures of immigration policy. Historically, this has meant that 
immigration policies have not been deliberated very openly, for the last fifty years, either in the 
House of Commons or among the public. In 1994, the Canadian Department of Human 
Resources and Skills Development (HRSDC) described the purpose of its skill-related programs 
as follows: “New and updated skills are critical to the global competitiveness of the industry. 
Developed skills initiatives support worker jobs, simplify career development, and guarantee that 
businesses have the skills they need to meet competitive options” (Canada, 1994c). This 
foundation was used to justify a renewed immigration policy for the 21st century: “Canada needs 
people who are entrepreneurial, literate and able to adjust to a rapidly-changing labour market ... 
The suggested changes [in immigration policy] seek to enhance the skills, flexibility, and 
diversity of the Canadian workforce responding to Canada’s new, emerging economy” (Canada, 
1994b).  
     This policy involved a number of innovations, including the development and 
implementation of a points-based, merit system for selecting applicants and a range of federal-
provincial nominee programs (PNP), allowing provinces to have a more significant role in 
selecting and resettling economic migrants that most fit with local needs.  
 The benefits of the “SK Immigration Nominee Program” (SINP) could include faster 
federal processing of permanent residence (PR) applications and a new avenue for businesses 
looking to fill critical labour market shortages by recruiting foreign workers. The SINP includes 
some categories. For example, through the “SK Express Entry” category, potential migrants who 
have been accepted into the federal “Express Entry” pool can submit applications to the SINP for 
a provincial nomination. Those who obtain a designation will receive additional “Express Entry” 
benefits in the ranking process, which will result in them obtaining an invitation to apply to 
become a PR, providing that federal processing targets have not been met.  
 Immigration in Saskatchewan continues to play a critical role in developing 
Saskatchewan’s labour market and in growing the provincial economy. New nominees need to 
have had post-secondary education and to be classified as highly skilled workers, as well as other 





 The resulting “Saskatchewan Immigrant Nominee Program” (SINP), signed in 1998, 
began to be used in 2001 to select and bring in economic migrants. More than 62,000 migrants 
were attracted between 2001 and 2017, which equals about 150,000 migrants (including family). 
Saskatchewan is one of the most aggressive users of the provincial nominee programs, with 
about 90% of its skilled immigrants coming through that mechanism. Only Manitoba is a more 
prominent user. In contrast, provinces like Ontario, Alberta and BC use it selectively, with only 
7%, 36% and 30% of migrants nominated by the respective provinces. 
 
3.2 Western Australia (WA) 
 
     In Australia, the motivation of the Migration Program had been reformed since 1945, 
when the first federal immigration program began. What started as a narrowly targeted program 
considered to increase the country’s population after World War II, has evolved into a more 
extensive, more open set of policies intended chiefly to meet the economic needs of the 
Australian economy. Over the past 65 years, the focus has shifted from simply attracting 
migrants to increase Australia’s population, mostly from the United Kingdom, to attracting 
workers and temporary (skilled) migrants from a greater range of countries to meet the skilled 
labour needs of the economy. Australia’s Migration Program has changed over the years under 
the economic, political, and social regulations of the governments and the country’s history. 
 These changes are reproduced in the changing ethnic configuration of immigrants to 
Australia and the shift between the economic and family streams of immigration programs 
(Spinks, 2010).  
 Western Australia (WA) has received a significant number of economic immigrants in 
the last 15 years, at least partly driven by a mining boom. WA began a period of major economic 
growth in 2004, albeit with some dips due to market cycles (e.g. from 2015 to 2017) (Trigger, 
2017). The composition of immigration in WA is more heavily skewed towards skilled workers 
than in other States. Almost 60 percent of the permanent additions to the state’s population in 
2004-05 came from the Skills Stream of the Australian Government’s Migration Program 
(Trigger, 2017), and more than 40 percent of employed immigrants in WA are “Professionals.” 
Engineers, information technology professionals, and health professionals account for a large 





high skilled immigrants. The limited data on overseas migration by industry indicate that, 
relative to the structure of the state’s labour market, immigration to WA is concentrated in the 
business services, hospitality, health, and mining sectors.  
 Emigration from WA has accelerated sharply since the mid-1990s, consistent with the 
national trend. Therefore, the concern this occasionally generates about the “brain drain” (i.e., 
the emigration of highly trained or intelligent people from a specific country) is almost certainly 
unwarranted. WA consistently attracts a large net inflow of young, skilled workers.  
     Net long-term migration in WA has expanded substantially over the past decade, 
reflecting an increase in overseas students and, to a lesser extent, a rise in the number of 
extended-stay business visas being issued. Some studies present a breakdown of the number of 
permanent settlers in WA by visa type and highlight a robust compositional change in favour of 
skilled migrants, since the early 1990s (in line with policy settings at the national level). Skilled 
migrants arriving in WA increased from about 1,800 people or 28 percent of the migration 
program in 1993-4 to a level of approximately 12,000 people or 65 percent of the migration 
program in 2004-5. Over the same period, the share of settlers arriving in WA under the family 
stream has fallen from 54 percent to 24 percent (Trigger, 2017). WA has a successful track 
record in attracting skilled migrants from the national migration program. For example, in 2004-
5, WA captured 15 percent of the national pool of skilled migrations, compared to its population 
share of only 10 percent. 
 This study describes economic immigrant processes and programs in both Canada and 
Australia and how those economic immigrants are tied to the economic cycle and contribute to 
both societies. However, there are substantial questions to answer. What factors related to 
immigrants’ programs changed the flow of immigration to Saskatchewan and WA? Have those 
factors increased the number of economic immigrants to both provinces? An additional question 
is essential: Which country or province has managed the best economic immigration policies? 
Consistently, what are the political and economic effects of economic immigrants in 
Saskatchewan and WA? Most likely, some factors are more crucial than others in determining 







4.    Thesis objective 
 
 One of the most significant changes to immigration processes pertains to “immigration 
federalization” or “immigration federalism.” These terms are associated with new immigration 
regulation that coordinates federal and provincial/state governments and their efforts to manage 
the immigration selection process jointly. Western Australia and Saskatchewan provide crucial 
cases to examine the relationship between federal and provincial/state government policy.  
The central objective of this thesis is to use Peter Hall’s (1993) concepts of “policy paradigm” 
and “social learning” to explore the theoretical and cognitive processes in the social-political and 
economic systems that led to the development and implementation of immigration federalism in 
Canada and Australia.  
 The thesis uses an institutional analysis and comparative case studies of Saskatchewan 
and Western Australia. This framing offers insights into the drivers for policy and institutional 
change among the different levels of government in both Australia and Canada and offers lessons 
for other jurisdictions pursuing similar goals.  
 
5.    Organization and structure of thesis 
 
 The rest of the thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter II explores the literature, 
focusing on concepts and definitions related to immigration and immigration federalism. It 
critically assesses the immigration federalism concept in theory and practice. Chapter III 
identifies the methodology and method, and explains the mix of frames (e.g., Document Analysis 
Method, Comparative Case Study, Hoppe’s Governance Problems Theory and Hall’s Paradigm 
Model) and how they are applied to provide insight into the outcomes of immigration policy 
change from a multi-level governance perspective. Chapter IV compares Canada-SK, and 
Australia-WA over the past 25 years from a structural, historical, and institutional viewpoint. 
Chapter V explores the similarities and differences within and between policy innovation in both 
countries and sub-national regions, focusing on the institutional changes and multi-governance 
contributions. Chapter VI demonstrates how the second-order of change and the paradigm shift 





in Canada-Saskatchewan and Australia-Western Australia. Chapter VII lays out some findings, 










 The literature review emphasizes how important it is to understand international 
immigration approaches and the immigration federalism perspective (i.e., in the US, Canada, and 
Australia). State and local governments are sometimes called sub-national governments and are 
increasingly important in some of these evolving systems.  
     Public policy analysis currently investigates the immigration policies of individual 
receiving countries. However, the immigration policy approach lacks, for the most part, debates 
linking various schools of thought and divergent approaches in different countries.  
The objectives of this chapter are to explain the major approaches of the field of immigration 
policy and explore the concept of immigration federalism, highlighting explanations about what 
each approach means, and examining the influence of theories of comparative politics, 
international relations (e.g., International Political Economy) and sociology on immigration 
policy analysis. The seven general models are Marxism (i.e., socioeconomic class theory), 
Realism (e.g., humanitarian immigration), Liberalism (i.e., immigration federalism role and 
international institutions), the “National Identity” approach (i.e., a historical perspective), 
Domestic Politics (e.g., interest group politics, followers and elites), Institutionalism (e.g., the 
European Union’s institutions and cooperation), and the worldwide immigration policy theory 
(i.e., Globalization Theory).  
     Immigration produces a significant impact on the demography, culture, market, and 
governance of a nation. Immigration can contribute positively to population stability or growth, 
especially in several western societies, or undermine socioeconomic stability in source countries. 
A nation’s immigration policy (e.g., access and control) is a crucial element in determining 
immigration patterns: given a large number of people who would like to migrate to industrialized 
nations for economic or political reasons, and the limited possibilities to do so, immigration 
programs broadly define the scope of migration worldwide, including illegal migration. 





potential receivers decide whether the movement can take place. Also, receivers determine what 
kind of movement is allowed, using a wide range of programs targeted for temporary or 
permanent recruitment. Another aspect is the impacts and opportunities offered to potential 
immigrants. 
     In spite of widespread legal migration, illegal immigration continues, notwithstanding 
constraints. Developed countries, in particular, make great efforts to restrict unauthorized 
migration considerably. The massive illegal migration to the US, for example, has been 
facilitated by limited resources available for border control, as well as partisan efforts by pro-
migration interest groups. Consequently, allowing legal entry and permitting illegal migrants is 
necessary for every country’s immigration policy. Getting the balance right is core to 
socioeconomic development and effective security and defence. 
      Many schools of thought on immigration focus on political approaches. This stream 
assesses the political rationale for immigration, evaluating the main strengths and weaknesses of 
different processes and coalitions. Research strategies in this domain focus on 1) immigration 
law (i.e., the precepts adopted by immigrants and access of foreign citizens), and 2) the 
requirements governing resident migrants’ conditions, welfare arrangements and educations 
(1985). The literature also includes a range of other approaches (e.g., Nation Building, Realism, 
and Idealism) that explain choices about access, control and integration. This study is explicitly 
directed to exploring immigration policies related to locating and relocating skilled immigrants, 
including a range of immigration processes (i.e., preferment, selection, attraction, settle and 
integration). Policy involves the admission of permanent migrants and temporary migrant 
workers, both for domestic development purposes and to attempt to reduce unauthorized 
immigration. Illegal immigration and asymmetric legal immigrants (i.e., unbalanced number of 
types of immigrants between Family Reunification Immigrants and Skilled Immigrants) can and 
do create unbalanced outcomes. While empirical investigations show the policymaking process, 
this study concentrates on the role of the various approaches in defining nation-states’ strategies 
to admit specific migrants—e.g. which ones (e.g., ethnicity), where (e.g., western cities), when 
(e.g., economic periods) and of which type (i.e., temporary migrant workers, or permanent 
economic immigrants). The distinction between the types of immigration is often distorted and a 
source of conflict. For example, many “temporary migrant workers” stay in the country of 





migrants sometimes end up returning to their country of origin. Complicating, this is the practical 
reality that political refugees are often difficult to separate from economic migrants. 
     This study primarily focuses on Australia and Canada. However, the theories are 
universal and have been applied widely, offering lessons for this study. Comparative analysis 
offers new insights. This review illustrates approaches to comparative politics, which improve on 
understanding of immigration federalism policies. This study focuses predominantly on the five 
main approaches to immigration federalism: Domestic Politics, Institutionalism, Realism, 
Liberalism, and Globalization Theory. 
 
2.    Domestic Politics, Interest Groups and Partisan Politics 
 
      Models of domestic politics (or “society-centred approaches”) accept that the state works 
as an impartial arena for societal interests, including interest groups and parties and sometimes 
subnational units such as provinces/states and cities. Policymaking is the result of bargaining and 
compromises between these interests; sometimes, policymaking reveals that one or more of these 
actors has prospered in capturing the state (Meyers, 2000).  
     According to (Meyers, 2000) many scientists of immigration policies, including those of 
Divine (1957), Craig (1971), Zolberg (1981), Hoffmann-Nowotny (1985), Shughart et al. (1986), 
LeMay (1987), Layton-Henry (1990, 1992), Hollifield (1992a) Freeman and Betts (1992), 
Freeman (1995b), Joppke (1998b, 1999), (1997, 1999), and Meyers (2001a), apply the domestic 
politics approach (table 2.1). These studies attribute changes in immigration policy to 
“situational” socioeconomic factors (e.g., recessions and large-scale immigration of different 
racial or ethnic composition contribute to restrictions on immigration) and the role of societal 
actors as shaping immigration policy (Meyers, 2000). Some investigations, including those by 
Zolberg (1978), Hollifield (1994), and Freeman (1995b), also include foundations of the 
National Identity Theory. Hollifield (1992a, 1994) and Joppke (1998b, 1999) analyze the 
formation of immigration federalism policy as a combination of the influence of domestic 
interests and rights-based politics or the courts, which introduces some elements of the 







Domestic Politics Approach 
Model Approach Concepts Definition/Elements 
Society-centred approaches. 
It assumes that the state 
serves as a neutral arena 
including interest groups 
and parties and sometimes 
subnational units such as 
provinces, states and cities. 
Its attributes change in 
immigration policy to 
"situational" socioeconomic 
factors, and large-scale 
immigration of different 
racial or ethnic composition 
contribute to restrictions on 
immigration (Meyers, 2000) 
. 
In the partisan political 
process, each political 
party proposes a 
program; during 
elections, people decide 
according to their 
proposals, and the party. 
In the interest group 
political model, created 
interest- or pressure-
groups attempt to force 
parties, representatives, 








majority of the 
public's attitudes, 
the interest group 
political process 
frequently yields 
systems that favour 
the interests of only 
small sections of the 
population. 
Interest and pressure 




ethnic groups, which 




tend to oppose it.  
Table 2.1: Domestic Politics Approach 
  
 In the partisan political process, each political party proposes a program; during elections, 
people decide among the parties according to their proposals, and the party (or coalition of 
parties) that gains power implements its policies (Meyers, 2000). Some studies focus on political 
parties as the source of immigration policy. Faist (1994), for illustration, reports statements by 
politicians of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) about immigration programs in Germany. Katznelson (1973), 
Freeman (1979) and Layton-Henry (1992) explain inter- and intra-party disputes over 
immigration in the UK. Schain (1988) examines the role of aristocracies in the evolution of the 
politics of immigration and racism in France, while Thranhardt (1995) addresses the rise of 
xenophobia in electoral politics in the UK, Germany, and France. Finally, many political 
scientists, including Husbands (1988), Layton-Henry (1992), Mayer and Perrineau (1992), 
Voerman and Lucardie (1992), Braun and Scheinberg (1997), Fennema (1997) and Kitschelt and 
McGann (1997), have studied the beginnings of anti-immigration parties in several European 
nations.     
     In the interest group political model, created interest- or pressure-groups attempt to force 
parties, representatives, and administrators to implement specific programs (Meyers, 2000). 





voters (at least in two-party, median voter systems (Congleton, 2002); therefore, the interest 
group political model can deliver policies promoting the benefits of only small segments of the 
population as a result of coalition building. 
     The interest and pressure groups usually associated with immigration policy are firms and 
ethnic groups, both of which try to promote immigration federalism, and unions and nationalist 
organizations which try to resist it. The literature is rich with case studies of this. Collins (1988) 
explains how Australian firms in the mining industry suffered restrictions on Chinese 
immigration and how Australian unions rejected Italians’ immigration during the 1920s to 1930s, 
while employers supported it (Meyers, 2000). Esser and Korte (1985) defined how German 
employers during the 1960s protested for the recruitment of foreign labour for agriculture and 
industry. Freeman (1979) reported how the cotton industry in the UK, disturbed by workforce 
shortages in the textile factories, raised the recruiting of foreign labour after World War II. 
Briggs (1984) described the opposition of American unions in the 1917-1922 period to the 
Bracero migrant-worker programs. Craig (1971) detailed how southwestern agricultural business 
interests pressed for the Bracero program in the US. Haus (1995) uses Hall’s order of change to 
explain unions’ attitudes and role in influencing US immigration policy during the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Hoffmann-Nowotny (1985) portrays the objections of Swiss unions to labour 
migration; de Wenden (1994) explains how the initiatives of immigrants’ associations reformed 
the terms of the political rhetoric on immigration in France; and Reimers (1982) describes how 
ethnic associations condemned the 1952 Walter-McCarran Act, while “nationalist” groups 
protected it (Meyers, 2000).   
     Another variant of this domestic-pluralist model focuses on local politics and centre-
periphery relationships within national politics. While Freeman (1995a) defines such studies as 
separate “spatial theories,” they share many arguments with other pluralistic explanations 
(Meyers, 2000). Money (1997, 1999) introduces her model at the regional level, with an analysis 
of employers’ support of labour and public opposition to immigration. She then explains “how 
such local pressures (i.e., Federalism) reach the national political agenda as a function of the 
national electoral margin and the size and safety of immigration constituencies”. In the same 
sphere, Body-Gendrot (1992) and Schain (1998, 2012) explain how the different centre-





politics over immigration policy. Several scholars also explain the impact of demands from the 
provinces and territories on Canadian immigration (Hawkins, 1991, 1998; Kelley and Trebilock, 
1998). 
     Domestic politics is a widely employed approach to the study of the policy of 
immigration policy. Empirically, it seems evident that economic and social factors have a more 
significant impact on immigration policies than security and strategic considerations, which are 
highlighted by the realist approach. Changes in the economy and the volume of immigration are 
also easier to recognize than national identity debates (Meyers, 2000). Domestic politics 
approaches avoid several Marxist theory challenges by offering, for instance, immigration policy 
on different ethnic origins. Moreover, such models do not neglect the influence of politics.  
     Nevertheless, these models do have several weaknesses (which they share with some of 
the other approaches).  
     First, most studies that highlight domestic influences on immigration federalism policies 
are empirically oriented and lack a general theory. Zolberg (1978) addresses: “The specialists 
who deal with emigration policies (i.e., Immigration Federalism from settlement to cities’ 
integration immigration processes), forced population exchanges, expulsions, immigration 
policies and their concomitants such as naturalization law - tend to be a-theoretic” (p.242). 
According to Zolberg (1978), domestic influences are produced typically by historians or 
political scientists concerned with social representativeness within specified time restrictions and 
in specific nations; meanwhile, experts of international law and students of international 
organizations offer other insights.  
     The second weakness of domestic studies is that they mostly examine the policy of a 
single country pursuing a specific immigration policy (Zolberg, 1978). The focus on case studies 
places an unnecessary emphasis on each nation’s particularities, rather than identifying the main 
characteristics of immigration policy. The case study method also fails to describe simultaneous 
immigration programs in multiple nations. Meyers (2001b) proposes a model that connects 
worldwide socioeconomic trends and domestic politics to address these gaps. 
   Comparative studies of the domestic politics of immigration policy fall into one of three 





(1989) – are examples of studies that explore every nation independently without showing 
theoretical conclusions. Others—including Hammar (1985), Cornelius et al. (1994), and 
Brochmann and Hammar (1999)– are more integrative because the articles are based on a 
comparable set of questions, allowing them to offer some theoretical observations and discuss 
general tendencies. Nevertheless, this work does not amount to a developed theory. Finally, 
Freeman (1979, 1995b), Zolberg (1981, 1983, 1991), Hollifield (1992a), Hardcastle et al. (1994), 
Joppke (1999), and Money (1997, 1999) are theoretically adapted but are usually based on the 
comparison of a limited number of nations (i.e., two or three countries). This study of 
immigration federalism policies in Canada and Australia fits mostly with this approach but draws 
from others as well. 
     Third, a classic domestic politics model cannot easily explain immigration and refugee 
programs approved in the face of national opposition – such as the US admission of Chinese 
during the 1860s-1870s and of Eastern Europeans from 1947 to 1991 (Cold War), Australia’s 
acceptance of immigrants from Eastern Europeans post-WWII, and the UK admission of 
immigrants from the New Commonwealth since 1959. All of the examples mentioned above 
were mostly due to foreign policy influenced by the executive branch. Studies of immigration 
policies that emphasize domestic politics deal with this problem by adding foreign policy 
considerations (e.g., Mitchell, 1989; Tobin, 1989; Bach, 1990; Layton-Henry, 1994; Hardcastle 
et al., 1994). Other studies describe the influence of ethnic groups on the immigration policy of 
their adopted country vis-a-vis their country of origin (e.g., Cubans in the US, discussed in 
Teitelbaum and Weiner, 1990; Haney and Vanderbush, 1999). However, ethnic groups are not 
powerful enough to fully explain the immigration and refugee policies.  
 
3.    Institutional and Bureaucratic Politics  
 
      One perspective on immigration policy that brings the state back in as an actor, but still 
focuses on state-level interactions, is the institutional approach which focuses on activities in the 
bureaucracy. The simple institutional approach argues that political institutions can be 
autonomous (e.g., immigration federalism and provincial autonomy), effectively forming public 
policy unaffected by societal or interest group pressures. The specific bureaucratic model is 





studies, including those by Dirks (1977), Birrell (1981), Schultz (1982), Abella and Troper 
(1983), Whitaker (1987), Roberts (1988), Hawkins (1991), Suyama (1991), Simmons and 
Keohane (1992), Calavita (1992) and Fitzgerald (1996), follow this perspective and focus on the 
role of the state (i.e., the administration/bureaucracy) in shaping immigration policy. According 
to Birrell (1981), the Department of Immigration in Australia has never been just a passive arm 
of government, faithfully implementing government policy; instead, it has aggressively 
encouraged the objective of population growth and the refinement of public support. Schultz 
(1982), Abella and Troper (1987) and Roberts (1988) explore the bureaucracy in Canada. 
Hardcastle et al. (1994) argue that “bureaucrats have substantially influenced Canada’s 
Immigration [Federalism] policies.”  
     Political choices made by earlier generations create institutions that shape both programs 
and ideas for later generations (Fitzgerald, 1996; Goldstein, 1988, 1989). In practice, the 
institutionalist model considers some variants that change according to the degree of autonomy 
and cohesion they connect to the state (Meyers, 2000). Some researchers represent the state as 
independent, acting according to its interests (variant I in table 2.2). Others argue that various 
state agencies promote specific societal interests (e.g., the Department of Agriculture is 
concerned with the interests of farmers) (variant II). According to Allison (1969), “researchers 
also differ about whether the state is monolithic, united in its view of its interest, or whether 
various bureaucratic agencies [e.g., provincial or states organizations] pursue their own, known 
as the bureaucratic model.” 
     Studies of immigration policy, which focus on the state, vary along similar lines. 
Whitaker, who analyzes Canadian immigration policy during the Cold War (1945-1991), views 
the state as (nearly) autonomous. He describes how “the policies and practices of immigration 
security have been deliberately concealed from the Canadian public, the press, members of 
Parliament, and even bureaucrats with no need to know” (Whitaker, 1987). One can trace the 
evolution of immigration federalism in Canada, at least partly to this period of development. 
However, most scholars picture a less autonomous state. Calavita (1992) borrows from the state-
centred theorists who insist that the state, and the institutions that make it up, have their interests 
and periodically enjoy substantial autonomy (for example, immigration federalism and Quebec 
emancipation). However, Calavita accepts that policy can be explained by the interactions 





Canadian immigration policy, argue that “the state has a significantly independent agenda, which 
includes the pursuit of economic security, a rational-bureaucratic agenda, and continued 
legitimacy.” At the same time, they also notice that several factors from the society — labour, 
capital, ethnic groups, humanitarian organizations, and the provinces— influence immigration 
programs (i.e., exhibiting moderate policy learning). According to Meyers (2000), structural 
studies of immigration programs differ in their view of the state’s cohesion. For instance, Bach 
(1978) describes it as relatively monolithic, while Calavita, in her studies of the Bracero policy 
in the US, observes “a ‘state’ that is extensive with internal divisions, as the policy agenda of the 
Immigration Service collides head-on with the policy goals of other state agencies, most notably 
the Department of Labor” (Calavita 1992, p.4).  
     The strength of the states is the key between the two variants of the institutionalist model. 
According to Katzenstein (1978), while “strong state” institutions are almost unaltered by 
societal influence and mostly shape the national interest, “weak states” allow more societal 
pressure that penetrates state institutions and affects public policies. 
Variant I 
Model Approach Concepts Definition/Elements 
It focuses on state-
level interactions 





approach argues that 
political institutions 
can be autonomous.  
Political choices made 
by earlier generations 
create institutions, 
which shape both 
policies and ideas for 
later generations.  
It differentiates between 
"strong" states, where state 
institutions are relatively 
unaffected by societal 




model is sometimes 
defined as a 
domestic politics 
model. However, it 
brings the state-
level back in. 
Public policy is 
formed by the state, 
but always it remains 
unaffected by 
societal or interest 
group pressures.  
In practice, the 
institutionalist approach 
can differ according to 
the degree of autonomy 
and cohesion they 
attribute to the state. 
States are "weak" and 
societal pressure 
successfully penetrates state 
institutions and influences 
public policies. 
Table 2.2: Institutional Approach 








 For example, in the case of trade and industrial policies, the US and the UK are weak 
states, while Japan and France are strong states (Meyers, 2000). Hollifield (1989) argues that 
“the statistical and administrative approach to immigration in France has contributed to the 
politicization of immigration. Conversely, in the US, the federal nature of the political system, 
the stability of the party system and the pluralist approach to legislation have worked to fragment 
the issue and keep it off the national agenda for most of the postwar period” (at least up to the 
early 1990s). However, he concludes that, despite these differences, both nations have not altered 
a relatively liberal approach towards immigration (again up the last decade).  
     Fitzgerald (1996) presents a contribution to that model, termed “improvisational 
institutionalism,” which defines the US political system as a “sectoral state” rather than a “weak” 
one. Meyers (2000) also mentions that state power and autonomy vary from one type of 
immigration policy to another in the US immigration political system: it is strongest concerning 
refugee policy, weaker with regards to “front-gate” immigration policy and weakest about “back-
door” policy (i.e., illegal immigrants). Each policy category has been regulated separately and 
has its policy network that includes a distinct set of actors, and logic, with limited cross-
influences between the three categories of policies. 
     Complete examinations of bureaucratic policymaking, such as Whitaker (1987), Hawkins 
(1988, 1991), and Calavita (1992), show the difficulties driving immigration federalism. Studies 
based on the institutionalist approach are primarily active at revealing behind the scenes 
development of immigration policies for migrant workers. The institutionalist lens on 
immigration has tried to highlight the role of immigrant workers in policy formulation, while the 
institutionalist immigration approach focuses on the bureaucratic scene. 
     However, there are several problems with the institutional approach. Some relate to the 
approach in general (Meyers, 2000). The “weak state versus strong state” model, in particular, 
has been criticized for the vagueness of its definitions of “state,” “weak state,” and “strong state” 
(Skocpol, 1992). 
     The first variant (with an independent state) suffers from other difficulties. First, it is not 
well suited for clarifying the policy on permanent immigrants, which occurs in the public arena, 
and where pressures from outside the ‘state’—i.e., from ethnic groups, nationalistic 
organizations, and extreme-right parties—significantly influence policymaking. Secondly, the 





difficult to explain why different countries have assumed similar immigration policies at the 
same time. Also, thirdly, most institutional analyses of immigration policy examining specific 
nations employ comparative methodologies to explore internal dynamics (Meyers, 2000). 
Fitzgerald’s analysis explains some of the difficulties discussed above, but it still suffers from 
various theoretical, empirical, and technical shortcomings developed in Barkan (1997) and de la 
Garza (1997).  
 In short, institutional approaches offer insights, but sometimes at the expense of overly 
specific stories that make every analysis unique. 
 
4.    Classical and Neo-Realism 
     The Realist model in immigration is arguably the most prominent method in the study of 
international relations and international political economy (IPE) (table 2.3). It “depicts 
international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states” (Walt, 1998). 
 According to Viotti and Kauppi (1987), realism is based on four key points. First, 
countries are the primary or most significant players and represent the central part of the 
analysis. Second, nations are characterized as a unitary actor, which challenges the external 
world as a unified component. Third, the nation is a rational actor. Fourth, national security 
concerns create significant debates on countries’ international agenda (e.g., one can see aspects 
of that in Australia’s immigration approach). The classical- neo-realist approach in international 
immigration focuses on current or potential disputes among nations. Concerns of security, 
defence and strategy are associated with “high” politics, but social and economic concerns are 
viewed as less critical, “low” politics (Hoffmann, 1960; Morgenthau, 1973; Waltz, 1979; 
Keohane, 1986). While some proponents of the realist approach, such as Gilpin, see the influence 
of economic elements in the international arena, they still view these elements as a political 
conflict between groups and countries (Gilpin, 1986). Those groups could also entail subnational 
efforts to equalize social and economic development. 
     Current or potential disputes between nations, including military ones, have changed 
immigration policies. They have contributed to immigration restrictions, such as the 1917 
literacy examination in the US, the introduction of exceptional conditions of travel documents 





the other hand, wars and other conflicts have led some countries to admit more immigrants and 
promote immigration. For example, France felt that it was vulnerable to another German 
invasion, and thus it encouraged immigration and settlement of Italians, Spanish, and Portuguese 
in the postwar period. Australia, “which experienced Japanese intrusions during the war and 
feared that its sparse population could not repel an Asian invasion, implemented the …perish 
policy, attempting an annual intake of about one percent of the local population” (Meyers 2000, 
p. 1264). Security issues and demographic deficiency vis-a-vis its Arab neighbour have 
strengthened Israel’s commitment to Jewish immigration (Ben-Gurion 1969, p.469). During the 
Cold War, many Western democracies favoured refugees from communist nations to confirm 
their anti-communist and anti-Soviet ideological engagement. 
 
The Realism Approach 
Model Approach Concepts Definition/Elements 
Realism 
("classical" realism 
and neorealism) is 
perhaps the most 
prominent 




IPE). It "depicts 
international 
affairs as a 




Viotti and Kauppi 
(1987) postulate: first, 
states are the 
principal and 
represent the critical 
unit of analysis; 
second, the state is 
represented as a 
unitary player; third, 
the state is necessarily 
a rational actor; and 
fourth, national 
security issues are the 
most important ones 
in the international 
relationship. 
Realists focus on actual or 
potential conflicts among 
states. Issues of security 
and strategic issues are 
sometimes referred to as 
high politics, whereas 
economic and social 
issues are viewed as less 
critical, low politics (see 
Hoffmann, 1960; 
Morgenthau, 1973; Waltz, 
1979; Keohane 1986. On 
the other hand, Gilpin 
accepts the importance of 
economic factors in 
international relations. 
The importance of 
economic factors in 
international relations, they 
still view these factors as 
working "in the context of 
the political struggle among 
groups and nations" 
(Gilpin, 1986). This model 
demonstrates how the 
actions or inactions of 
states vis-a-vis international 
migration influence the 
relation between states and 
how relations between 
states affect the rules 
regarding exit and entry 
(Weiner, 1985) 
Table 2.3- Realism and Neo-Realism Approach 
 
  
The emphasis on national security and military disputes formally induced most political 
scientists of the realist school to ignore immigration concerns. Only of late (especially since the 
end of the Cold War) has neorealist theory paid more attention to migration policy by reframing 
it as a security issue. Realist thinking has influenced studies by Miller (1979), Miller and 
Papadimitriou (1983), Teitelbaum (1984, 1995), Loescher and Scanlan (1986), Mitchell (1989); 





while this body of work explores the relationship between foreign policy and international 
migration, none of it pursues a purely realistic approach. Teitelbaum highlights the impact of US 
security and economic benefits on its immigration policies. Weiner (1985) confirms how 
countries' actions or inactions vis-a-vis international immigration change the relationships among 
nations and how relations between nations influence the laws about exit and entry. Zolberg 
(1981) notes that immigrants and non-immigrant populations  "constitute, most obviously, assets 
and liabilities concerning the mustering of military power." Loescher and Scanlan (1986) 
conclude that from 1945 to 1985, foreign policy alternatives have crucially decided which 
refugees are permitted to enter the US.  
    Hartley and Pedersen (2015) argue studies show that international immigration (e.g., 
foreign policy) programs, especially humanitarian immigration, are more related to domestic 
support for social policy than due to emotional responses.  This study of Canadian and Australian 
policies focuses on skilled international immigrants and how they have been driven by efforts to 
redistribute immigration to western provinces in both countries. Emotions and public attitudes 
are engaged but not obviously driving the policy choices or outcomes.  
    The center of the traditional-realist model to sovereign self-interested states is an 
important starting point for discussing immigration programs. Conversely to neo-Marxist 
theories, for example, realism does not ignore the impact of the country. Countries purse national 
benefits when they reduce labour migration and permanent immigration during a severe 
economic crisis (e.g., recessions or depressions), admit labour migration during economic 
growth, give priority to business and skilled immigrants, and promote immigration in an attempt 
to balance demographics vis-a-vis potential enemies (Meyers, 2000). 
However, this traditional approach has contributed only marginally to the examination of 
immigration programs, with the possible exception of refugee policy, for three reasons. First, the 
theory highlights security while considering social concerns as less significant. As a result, 
realist practices often overlook the issue of migrant workers. Weiner (1995) explains how 
migrants and refugees are perceived as potential threats to the security of countries and their 
regimes. According to Waever et al. (1993) "in Western Europe, societal insecurity has replaced 
state sovereignty as the key to prosperity or collapse of European integration, pushing concerns 





realists resist expanding concepts like security, in case it "destroy(s) its intellectual coherence." 
(Walt, 1991). 
    Secondly, realism describes the state as a unitary and rational actor. However, such a 
perspective conflicts with economic study that analyzes immigration policy as incompetent or 
non-rational (Fitzgerald, 1996). In contrast, a domestic politics model that defines immigration 
programs as the result of negotiating between various domestic actors can illuminate such state-
level, so-called irrational, behaviours (Freeman, 1995b). Consequently, even the political 
scientist who investigates the connection between international migration and foreign policy may 
include discussions of the role of interest groups and other political actors within the local arena 
(e.g., Weiner, 1985). 
    Third, realism focuses on power as a crucial concept (e.g., national or subnational 
power); but globally, power relations typically do not define immigration programs. Zolberg 
(1981, p. 10-11) argues that "On the one hand, formally independent states are distributed along 
a scale of strategic power… On the other hand, however, these same states are fundamentally 
equal as sovereignties... it is out of the formal equality among states… that each derives the right 
to maintain its integrity by controlling entry". 
 
5.    Liberalism and Neoliberalism  
 
Liberals have a more optimistic view than the realists when it comes to immigration 
policy (table 2.4). Liberals maintain international economic interdependence, transnational 
interactions, international institutions, the spread of democracy, and the international 
immigration approach can promote cooperation and even peace between nations (Meyers, 2000). 
In contrast to the realists, liberals assume that non-state entities, such as international 
organizations and multinational corporations, are essential actors in international relations. The 
economic and social issues they advance are no less critical than military and defence concerns 
(Viotti and Kauppi, 1987). The liberal paradigm can be differentiated into economic liberalism, 
interdependence liberalism, and republican liberalism. Those paradigms have had little direct 
influence on immigration policy literature (see Meyers, 2001a). However, institutional 
neoliberalism and globalization theory has been applied to clear up on immigration 





The Neoliberal institutionalist model shows that regimes help overcome difficulties of 
shared interests and facilitate collaboration and coordination between countries (Krasner, 1983; 
Keohane, 1985; Haggard and Simmons, 1987; Baldwin, 1993). Significant examples of engaged 
international institutions or regimes are free or freer trade institutions (e.g., the World Trade 
Organization, North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] and the European Union), 
international security (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]) and immigration issues (e.g., United Nations and 
International Organization for Migration). The institutionalist model combines, in fact, both 
realist and liberal arguments. Consequently, some scholars treat it as a liberal/neoliberal 
approach (e.g., Walt, 1998), while others treat it as separate (e.g., Moravcisk, 1997). 
 
 
 Zolberg (1991, 1992), Hollifield (1992b), Miller (1992), Meyers (1994) and Cornelius et 
al. (1994) conclude that supranational organizations and international regimes usually have had 
little impact on immigration policies of individual countries, with the partial exception of the EU 
and the refugee regime (on the refugee regime, see Salomon, 1991; Hartigan, 1992; Loescher, 
1993; Skran, 1995). The influence of international organizations and regimes is mitigated by the 
high domestic political costs of immigration, the difficulty of distributing the benefits of 
immigration, and the almost unlimited supply of labour that has exempted the receiving countries 
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from the need to cooperate with the countries of origin or with other receiving countries. 
 However, the removal of obstacles to the free movement of people within the EU, and the 
increased cooperation among its member states about immigration, have made this theory more 
applicable to the study of immigration policy, especially in multi-level or federal systems (see 
Convey and Kupiszewski, 1995; Koslowski, 1998; Overbeek, 1995; Ucarer, 1997). 
6. Globalization Theory 
  Globalization theory (e.g., Sassen) combines elements of the liberal approach with world 
system theory (Meyers, 2000) (see table 2.5).  
 
  During the past decade, some scholars have argued that globalization is challenging the 
stability and territoriality of the state, as well as its capacity to control its economic and welfare 
policies (Cable, 1995; Strange, 1996; Holton, 1998). Such claims have influenced studies by 
Sassen (1996a, 1996b), Baubock (1994), Soysal (1994) and Jacobson (1996), all of whom point 
to recent trends that have diminished the state's capacity to drive immigration and naturalization 
policies (see Hollifield, 1998). Sassen (1996a) argues that we must accept the possibility that 
sovereignty itself has been transformed, and that exclusive territoriality—a distinctive feature of 
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the modern state—is being undermined by economic globalization. She concludes that a 
combination of pressures, including the emergence of de facto regimes of human rights and the 
circulation of capital, ethnic lobbies, EU institutions, unintended consequences of immigration 
policies and other kinds of policies and economic internationalization, have restricted the 
sovereignty of the state and reduced its autonomy to develop independent immigration policy.  
     The global theory focuses mainly on people and capital. Castles (1998) observes that 
international migration is an essential part of globalization and that if governments welcome 
capital, commodities, and ideas, they are unlikely to succeed without the mobility of people 
within and between different regions. 
     In practice, much of the globalization literature focuses on immigrant and citizenship 
policy, which only indirectly influences immigration control policy. Soysal, Jacobson, and 
Baubock (2005) explain how human rights norms, transnational migration, and transnational 
citizenship challenge state sovereignty about citizenship. Sassen explores both citizenship and 
immigration control policy. Regarding the latter, she highlights the difficulty of maintaining a 
liberal regime for trade in goods and a restrictive one for immigrants (1996) — states "must 
reconcile the conflicting requirements or border-free economies and border controls to keep 
immigrants out." Sassen points to specialized systems governing the circulation of service 
workers within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as examples where 
internationalization of trade and investment in services necessitated labour mobility. 
     Nevertheless, she acknowledges the more limited influence of globalization on 
immigration control policy. Labour circulation systems "have been uncoupled from any notion of 
migration, even though they involve a version of temporary labour migration." Only the EU has 
formalized a regime that combines the free mobility of trade, capital, and labour; in general, 
there is a consensus among states concerning the sovereign mandate of each country to control 
its borders (Sassen,1996b). 
     Globalization has also been linked to domestic social changes, where the "national 
identity" approach helps to explain concurrent immigration policies, at least in the post-1960s 
period. Studies by Betz (1994), Kumar (1994), Richmond (1994) and Schnapper (1994) argue 
that globalization and post-industrial changes exert pressure on national cohesion and produce an 





restrictions on immigration. According to Schnapper (1994), European debates on immigrants 
are caused by the nation-state's crisis, whose values and institutions are being challenged by 
subnational pressures and European construction and integration into the world economy. 
Richmond argues that the combined effects of post-industrialism, postmodernism, and 
globalization have generated a crisis of integration in contemporary societies. In reaction to the 
insecurity felt by many faced within a rapidly changing worldwide society, there is a global 
tendency towards stricter immigration regulations (Richmond, 1994). Betz (1994), starting with a 
globalization argument, anticipates a final breakthrough in capitalism and the arrival of a global 
economy, which would reduce governments' capacity to control national economies. He argues 
that the transition from industrial to post-industrial capitalism has created profound social 
tensions and left society deeply split. This process of fragmentation and individualization has 
caused the decline of traditional political culture and has opened up fresh opportunities for new 
parties—notably radical right-wing populist parties with anti-immigration platforms (Betz, 
1994). In some senses, his description corresponds to the "national identity" approach. 
     The globalization literature contributes more to understanding of the causes of migration 
and immigrant and citizenship policy than to the study of the immigration control policy. The 
two primary examples of the influence of global trends on immigration control policy are —the 
EU regime that enables the free movement of labour and the impact of the UN human rights 
regime on refugee policy—overlap with the neoliberal institutionalist model. While globalization 
theory asserts the sovereignty of the state over immigration policy has declined, some are less 
convinced. Both Freeman (1998b) and Joppke (1998b) demonstrate that the country's capacity to 
control immigration has increased, and those liberal states admit immigrants more because of 
domestic pressures than other external considerations. Domestic needs inherently drive 
immigration federalism. Cable (1995) states that while globalization has reduced the room for 
national governments to maneuver in a growing number of fields, "controls over immigration 
could be said to represent a powerful break by the nation-state forces." 
     Finally, Hollifield (1998) argues that the most significant deficiency of globalization 
theory is its excessive reliance on economic and social forces while neglecting the influence of 
politics. According to Betz, (1994), the combining of the globalization theory and the "national 
identity approach" helps both theories by 1) adding a political component to the globalization 





Many social researchers conclude that immigration policy changes in western countries can best 
be explained with the nation-building and globalization theories. 
 
7. Immigration Federalism and Economic Immigration in Multi-level Systems  
 
     Since the 1960s, immigration regulations internationally have been built on a notion of an 
economy in which workers remain in a particular occupation, and there are limited possibilities 
for substitution among workers (Diewert, 1971). In that condition, a shortage of workers of any 
specific type could not be remedied from the existing labour force, and any deficit could severely 
impede the productivity of other workers. Immigration then played a vital role in filling the 
specific occupational and sectoral gaps and allowing growth to continue. By the 1990s, the 
primary economic model assumed that the production system was more adaptable, so immigrant 
workers needed to be skilled and were then assumed to adapt to changes in labour markets. 
Immigration policy then aimed to target a labour force with the right type of workers, namely 
flexible workers with a wide variety of skills and aptitudes. Modern immigration programs have 
three stated primary objectives: a) Increasing domestic productivity by welcoming well-trained 
and well-educated persons. b) Filling economic niches by importing labour to meet domestic 
market needs. c) Creating new businesses that improve employment rates (Li, 2003) 
 The point system enables governments to identify immigrants with the optimal balance of 
general skills rather than ones to fill specific current skill shortages. Receiving and adapting (i.e., 
settlement and integration) economic immigrants is as essential as attracting and selecting them 
(i.e., preferment). Li (2003), in Canada Immigration Debates and Issues, criticizes the historical, 
nationally directed economic approach for immigration goals. He argues that having highly 
skilled immigrants to support the Canadian economy is as important as measuring how skilled 
immigrants are incorporated into Canadian society. Li (2003) asserts that the extent to which 
immigrants are well incorporated within the country's cultural spectrum determines the effect of 
immigration. These arguments support the notion that effective immigration policy can only be 
realized with the knowledge and capacity of subnational regions. 
 Different models can be used to analyze immigration policies, especially in federal or 
multi-level governance systems. Most of the studies use an economic perspective to demonstrate 





(Borjas, 1999; Card & Peri, 2016; Kahn, 2004). Other groups of researchers analyze immigration 
using history and law (i.e. a National Identity approach) (Flynn, 2005; Grey, 2014; Harvey, 
2003) and from a perspective of power, linking immigration policies to institutional and political 
power (Heyman, 1995; Krammer, 2018; Wright, 2017). Immigration brings change; frequently, 
immigration policies are subject to economic and social pressures (Crawford et al., 2016; 
Boswell, 2004; Geddes, 2003, 2016; Hing, 1993). Most of the theories adequately explain the 
historical background, and socioeconomic and geopolitical context leading to the national policy 
change, but none conclusively shows why and how immigration becomes a vital issue to 
subnational governments.  
 Multi-level governance is essential for understanding immigration policy change 
worldwide. The specific concept of immigration federalism bridges this gap. It is particularly 
relevant for nations with multi-level systems. There are roughly 26 countries that have a federal 
instead of a unitary type of government in the world today, representing 40 percent of the world's 
population (figure 2.1). They involve some of the largest and most complex democracies, 
including India, the US, Brazil, Germany, and Mexico (Immigration Forum, 2017). Sovereignty-
based federalism was the dominant model in the past, and some argue cooperative federalism is 
the future (Cox & Miles†, 2014; Kaczorowski, 1996; Levy, 2007; Saucedo 2018; Simmons, 
Graefe & Rodriguez, 2017). Many federal countries are traditionally high immigration countries, 
including Canada, the US, Australia, Switzerland and Germany (Baglay & Nakache, 2014; Bauer 
et al., 2000; Entorf & Minoui, 2005), which many argue is due to structural factors, such as 
geography and economy.  
     Federal states divide power between two or more levels of government. The national (or 
federal) level usually enjoys jurisdiction over matters of national concern while the regional 
(provincial/state and sometimes county or local governments) level have jurisdiction over 
matters of local concern (Botha, 2013; Gardner, 2017; Smiley, 1974; Thorlakson, 2003; Telford 
et al., 2008). Unitary states have just a single level of authority. Additionally, those states have 
different governance structures, institutions, and styles—e.g. republican, constitutional 
monarchies and theocracies. The competing styles and structures can create tension. Boswell 
(2004) argued that immigration brings change, and those variations often generate different 














 Governance structures vary widely across the federations. In the US, for instance, they 
include the White House, the US Department of State, the US Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, the US Customs and Border Protection, but the Department of Homeland Security 
is the primary level in charge of immigration policies. Most recently, the US president issued a 
set of executive orders that provided the Homeland Security Department with extra resources. 
The focus is on safeguarding borders, enforcing the immigration rules, and confirming that 
individuals who pose a risk to state security or public safety cannot go into or stay in the US. 
Protecting the American population is the highest priority for the US government 
(www.dhs.gov). Drawing on Susan Strange (1994), one could conclude that there is a balance 
between a fortress society and a market economy in the US. In other OECD countries, like 
Brazil, immigration affairs are embodied in the framework of the Statute of Foreigners (Statute 
Figure 2.1- Global Distribution of Unitary States & Federal Countries   
Source: Local Profile, 2016    





of the Strangers). Before the Federal Constitution was enacted in 1988, the Immigration Law was 
developed to protect national security and protect the labour market for Brazilian professionals. 
In recent years, resolutions of the National Immigration Council, a board composed of 
representatives of various sectors of the Public Administration and the Class Federative Entities, 
triggered work on a new migration policy to address current migratory trends within both the 
national and regional socio-economic context. In some developing countries, such as Colombia, 
Ecuador, and the Philippines, the governance structure for immigration is too small to offer much 
insight into the interface between structure and style.  
      The two countries of particular interest to this study—Australia and Canada—have 
similar histories and systems, but with some significant differences. 
Canada is structured as a federal administration, born at Confederation through the Constitution 
Act, 1867, and operates as a constitutional monarchy. The Crown is thus the base of the 
executive, legislative, and judicial divisions of the Canadian government. The Governor-General 
of Canada personally represents the monarch. The Privy Council for Canada is the body that 
advises the sovereign on executive power; that system is mirrored at the provincial level. The 
structure of the Canadian immigration effort includes the Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and 
Citizenship, who has the primary responsibilities for the Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada, Passport Canada and language instruction for newcomers to Canada 
(www.gov.ca).Similarly, the government of the Commonwealth of Australia is a federal 
parliamentary Constitutional monarchy (www.australia.gov.au/). The Commonwealth of 
Australia was enacted in 1901 as a consequence of a contract between six self-governing British 
colonies, which became the six territories (www.australia.gov.au/). The terms of this agreement 
are personalized in the Australian Constitution. That agreement was drawn up at a Constitutional 
Convention and confirmed by the individuals of the colonies through plebiscites 
(http://www.australia.gov.au/). Queen Elizabeth II is currently the Head of State. The Governor-
General of Australia represents the Queen with exclusive powers delegated by constitutional 
resolution to the Australian head of the regime, the Prime Minister of Australia. The Australian 
scheme of government is a conglomerate of elements of the structures of Westminster and 
Washington with unique Australian characteristics and has been characterized as a “Washminster 





     The Australian government consists of three divisions of the federal government of 
Australia: The Executive and a bicameral Parliament. The six states retain all remaining duties 
(previously separate colonies). Further, each state has a different constitution, so that Australia 
has seven sovereign Parliaments, none of which can impose on the functions of any other. The 
Commonwealth Parliament can suggest adjustments to the national Constitution, but those 
adjustments need the support of Australians of voting age by referendum, and the result needs to 
have a “double majority,” which means every change requires at least 66% of the electorate to 
support the measure. The Australian Constitution also offers that the States can agree to assign 
powers to the Commonwealth. Some power shifts may be reached by way of a modification to 
the Constitution through a referendum. A vote on whether the suggested shift of power from the 
Territories to the Central government or vice versa, should be implemented). The Cabinet of the 
Commonwealth is the assembly of senior Ministers of the Crown, responsible to the Federal 
Parliament. Ministers are selected by the Governor-General, on the guidance of the Prime 
Minister, who assists at the former’s pleasure. In 2017, there were eighteen departments of the 
Australian government, including the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. In 
Australia, the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection is in charge of 
immigration, citizenship, and border control.  
      Canada and Australia have almost the same structure and institutions. It is essential to 
analyze the concept of “institutionalism” and how it is conceptualized in the complete study. 
Concepts and frameworks are crucial to explain and describe ideas, especially in public policy. 
Parsons’ (2007) logic in political science is one way to understand concepts such as 
“institutions” and “institutionalism.” Parsons argues that structural and institutional claims have 
two logics: 1) the logic of position related to ideational issues and 2) the logic of interpretation 
linked to the psychological view. Parsons (2007) argues that objective rationality depends on 
structural or institutional conditions to define specific actions as rational. Thus, all ‘‘rationalist’’ 
scholarship can be aligned into structural or institutional categories. According to Parsons 
(2007), institutions are human-made and have a logic of position. 
     Parsons (2007) argues that, in conventional social science, institutionalism and 
institutions emerge from a pattern of behaviour among collaboratively engaged individuals. 
Groups of individuals work together to adopt a formal organizational pattern. People refer to 





legal organizations (Parsons, 2007). Social scientists tend to describe specific organizations as 
agreements supported by treaties, standards, and law. Sometimes those documents are not even 
explicit, they are informal rules or norms. The concept of the institution reflects both formal and 
informal elements.  
 Since the “new institutionalism” from sociology and economics in the 1980s, there has 
been no shortage claims (March and Olsen 1989; Hall and Taylor 1996). Three prestigious 
schools consider “institutions” a core actor. First, rational choice institutionalism supports the 
rationality assumption of structural logic but reiterates human-made institutional constraints in 
the material landscape (Williamson 1975; Moe 1984; Shepsle 1986; Weingast and Marshal 1989; 
Eggertsson 1990; North 1990; Martin 1992; Oye 1993; Hall and Taylor 1996; Weingast 2002). 
In principle, rational institutionalists see rational individuals channelled to specific choices by 
human-made obstacles such as organizations, rules, and flows of information that change actors’ 
cost-benefit estimations. ‘Sociological institutionalists, by contrast, see institutions affecting 
action through a dynamic of legitimacy or appropriateness (Fligstein 1990; Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991; Dobbin 1994; Scott and Meyer 1994; Katzenstein 1996, Hall and Taylor 1996). 
People behave in patterned ways in line with organizational models, rules, and informal norms 
because they ‘‘take for granted’’ the legitimacy of these patterns (and assume the illegitimacy of 
alternatives, or never even imagine them). Historical institutionalism is usually described as 
standing between these two considerations, combining mechanisms of constraint and legitimacy 
(Skocpol 1979; Skowronek 1982; Zysman 1983; Hall 1986; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 
1992; Hattam 1993; Steinmo 1993; Hall and Taylor 1996). The choice of institutions at some 
point has the unintended consequence of subsequently steering actions along a particular 
historical path, in effect generating ‘‘path dependence’’ (North, 1990; Mahoney and Schensul, 
2006).  
     This current study is influenced by rational choice institutionalism and its implied 
limitation on actors managing all the information. Canadian and Australian institutions do not 
have the computational capacity to manage all the provincial and state interests, suffering from 
bounded rationality (Simon 1955; Jones 1999) and both cognitive limitations (e.g., judgment, 
reasoning, perception and memory) and incomplete task environments (i.e., factors that affect its 





     Historical institutionalism is valuable as most of the changes in immigration policy have 
been influenced by social learning and exhibit some path dependence. In Canada and Australia, 
decisions made in the past are significant and bound opportunities to develop new policy 
instruments, objectives and political discourse. Immigration federalism policy started with 
Quebec’s demands for a greater role in immigration but has grown significantly in the past 60 
years. The resulting Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) was launched in Canada at the end of 
the 1990s. Australia then borrowed from Canada some of the mechanisms to attract immigrants 
and even some policies related to immigration federalization.  
     In the 1980s, immigration federalism emerged as a new immigration approach to manage 
federal and provincial coordination and to improve the immigration selection process. The idea 
first emerged in the academy in the US (see, for example, particular issues of Law and Policy 
2011; Tulsa Journal of Comparative & International Law 2008; Harvard Law Review 2005; New 
York University Annual Survey of American Law 2002). The basic concept of immigration 
federalism is “defined as the role of the states and localities in making and implementing 
immigration law and policy” (Varsanyi et al., 2012). Cameron and Simeon (2002) assert that 
collaborative federalism has become a fundamental concept in debates over public policy. The 
notion that immigration federalism embodies the contribution from subnational governments in 
immigration matters because it is connected to the move from a concentrated to a dispersed 
model of immigration programs (Spiro, 2002). This emerging, devolving trend is found in many 
federations, including Australia, Canada, and the US. In these three nations, in particular, 
immigration has traditionally been associated with nation-building, foreign policy, and other 
areas of national interest, which naturally associated with federal (i.e., centralized) rather than 
the local rule. However, in recent years sub-national concerns and interests have asserted 
themselves.  
     Although sub-national units have always participated in the immigration process, their 
influence was experienced typically at the level of the immigrant’s actual ability to assimilate 
into a local community (e.g., depending on local employment, welfare, safety legislation). The 
essential questions of admission, membership in a country, border control, and enforcement have 
generally been determined in a centralized way by federal regulation. Thus, in Australia, Canada 
and the US, for most of the twentieth century, federal governments have been the dominant 





enforcement, governed by the idea of immigration to a nation (rather than to a specific locality) 
(Baglay & Nakache 2014; Reitz 2005; Spiro 2002;). 
     Immigration federalism originally comes from the US. It is derived from the legal 
approach that defined the role of the states and localities in making and implementing 
immigration law and policy (Law Review 2005; New York University Annual Survey of 
American Law 2002; Particular Issues of Law and Policy 2011; Tulsa Journal of Comparative & 
International Law 2008). One aspect of immigration federalism looks at federal exclusivity 
(Huntington, 2008). Immigration federalism then explores the subnational limitations to 
immigration—, especially exclusionary lawmaking, focusing on the role of states and localities 
in developing laws to foster immigrants’ inclusion (Elias 2014). Immigration federalism has 
become a social instrument of gradual institutional change (Paquet, 2017). Some of the problems 
of defining this phenomenon as a single idea are the differentiation in the forms, place, and 
aspects motivating immigration federalism in different jurisdictions (Baglay and Nakache, 2014; 
Su, 2007). For nearly 150 years, the US federal government has been pre-eminent in immigration 
policy (Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, 2013). American Federalism Theory embodies, at least 
implicitly, the corollary idea that federalism can undermine localism. Integrating local 
institutions into the national political and policy environment, the argument goes, can distort 
local politics and policies (Cox & Miles, 2014). Much of the US legislation between 2004 and 
2012 was restrictive, making it more difficult for immigrants who resided in communities to 
work and live their daily lives. Meanwhile, states and localities have responded to the influx of 
immigrants (Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, 2013), becoming pro-immigrant due to the 
development of a broader coalition of supporters. Pro-immigrant groups and coalitions have 
teamed up with clergy, police chiefs, labour unions, and business groups to help pass pro-
integration legislation, particularly as progress on the national front has stalled (Ramakrishnan 
and Gulasekaram, 2013).  
 In 2014, President Obama pointed out how deadlocked a once-promising bipartisan 
Senate migration project had become; cities and countries have become the modern immigration-
policy innovators (Policy Entrepreneurs by John Kingdon, 2011) (Singer & Wainer, 2014). 
Drivers for subnational involvement in immigration include increasing globalization, new 
international (including continental) trade agreements, the ongoing impact of federalism, 





federalism represents the association of several government levels in immigration concerns, 
connecting with the shift from a centralized to a dispersed model of regulation (Schuck, 2007). 
Three Models of Immigration federalism have emerged: Central Hegemony, Cooperative Model, 
Devolutionary Federalism (Spiro, 2001) (table 2.6). 
     The rise of immigration federalism is first associated with the incapacity of national 
policies to address local needs. Secondly, at the subnational level, it involves the mobilization of 
political or administrative entrepreneurs. Thirdly, there are aspects of politics, nationalism, 
policy diffusion, and the recognition by subnational governments of the direct and indirect costs 
of federally controlled immigration in their jurisdictions (e.g., education or health in Canada) 
(Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2013; Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014; Newton, 2012; Paquet, 
2015, 2017; Suro, 2015). Immigration federalism (Baglay & Nakache, 2014; Paquet 2014, 
Paquet 2017) is a mechanism where the federal state responds to subnational pressures and 
allows provinces/states in Canada and Australia to participate in the process of selecting 
immigrants. 
 
Key Immigration Concepts  
Immigration-/Migration  
• There is no agreement on a particular meaning of a ‘migrant.' Migrants might be 
defined by overseas birth, by foreign nationality, or by their migration into a new 
nation to stay provisionally (sometimes for as little as a year) or to settle for the long-
term.  
• Migrants are not natives and they do not have citizenship in order to reside there, 
mainly as permanent residents (PR) or naturalized citizens, or to take up employment, 
as an immigrant employee, or provisionally, as a foreign worker. 
Economic Immigrant  
• The definition by the UN tends to use the term “migrant worker,” instead of economic 
immigrant. Economic migration is defined as a decision to move and to improve the 
standard of living by gaining a better-paying job  
• According to Salverda et al. (2013) economic immigration involves people selected for 
migration, based on their ability to contribute to the economy. 
Multilevel Governance 
• The classic accounts of cooperative federalism assume a subordinate role for the state 
in dutifully implementing national mandates, perhaps tailoring the particular practices 
to accord with local circumstances (Schapiro, 2019)  
• This concept appeared in the 1980s, but it did not work until 1990s. It comprises a 
legal approach to the role of states and localities in making and implementing 
immigration law and policy (Baglay and Nakache, 2014). 
Table 2.6: Key Immigration Concepts 
 





 In the past, Australia and Canada national governments had total control over 
immigration policies. Currently, immigration processes involve a significant effort by 
subnational levels of government in Australia and Canada. The Points System in Immigration, 
conceptualized by scholars but first implemented in Canada, is a policy instrument that supports 
subnational levels of government to help select specific immigrants. However, the merit system 
does not help to answer where countries need immigrants and what type of immigrants each 
province or city needs. That requires the insights of local governments. 
     Currently, Canadian provinces determine the labour or human talent that each province 
requires. In the 1970s and the 1980s, immigration policy and immigration processes suffered 
from a lack of symmetry (Garcea, 1993). According to Garcea (1998), the bifurcated nature of 
the immigration system in Canada due to Quebec immigration policy has created negative 
impacts on the socio-demographic arena and the national identity in the country. However, the 
role of provinces in immigration to Canada, led by Quebec, has expanded dramatically since 
1990 (Vengroff, 2013). Canada-Quebec stood out for an extended period as an “asymmetrical” 
federalist model, with other provinces not engaged (Vengroff, 2013). The provincial role in 
targeting immigrants as part of broader economic growth and the preservation of cultural identity 
has worked to make Quebec a place where both government and citizens generally favour 
immigration (Vengroff, 2013). The asymmetrical negotiation of a Quebec based immigration 
process opened the door for other provinces to engage more directly in immigration. The 
resulting nominee system is qualitatively different from the Quebec model and has been 
underexplored in the literature. This thesis works to fill that gap.  Saskatchewan is chosen 
explicitly because it was one of the first and has been one of the most aggressive users of the 
nominee option. 
 One could argue that all the Provincial Nominee regulations made in the Canadian 
immigration policy in the past twenty-five years generated a second order of change; consistent 
with second-order change, the instruments have changed since 1967, but the policy objectives 
remained unchanged in their hierarchy (see Hall, 1993). On the other hand, Li (2003) and 
Tassioglou (2017) argue that immigration policies could have been improved through combined 
mechanisms between the two levels of government, but in the end, policies should complement 
other processes. Every immigration objective has a link to an immigration process. Now, most 





Ontario, for example, only sparingly uses their selection opportunities while smaller provinces, 
like Saskatchewan and Manitoba, are aggressively using the program.  
     Baglay and Nakache (2014) argue for more investigation of the second level of 
government as a co-participant in decisions on immigration issues in countries such as Australia 
and the US. However, Campbell (2004) argues that determining the effects of changing the 
regulation or policy would take at least a decade so that only now is it appropriate to consider the 
evolving policies in Australia and Canada. They are just now passing the 10-year window. 
Another challenge is that the processes of “diffusion,” according to Campbell, requires evidence 
of success in another location, so innovation federalism has not been adopted universally so it 
cannot reasonably be assessed across all the provinces/states in Canada and Australia, as some 
led and some lagged. For all these reasons, the process of subnational participation in 
immigration policies has yet to be validated.  
     Immigration federalism is a relatively new policy tool that revolutionizes immigration 
policies by embedding these subnational efforts in national policy. The remainder of this thesis 
examines the evolution and use of this tool in Canada and Australia, probing its fit with overall 
governance, economic development, and security policy. Concepts such as International Political 
Economy (IPE) and Global Defense & Security are inextricably entwined with immigration 
policy and go a long way to help us understand the general framing of that policy. This thesis 
explores how immigration federalism provides incentives for policy change at the provincial and 
federal levels. Using Hall’s Paradigm Model, this study defines how, in the past twenty-five 
years, immigration federalism has altered immigration policy in two provinces, Western 
Australia and Saskatchewan. The first step of this argument is to reveal how the policy 
instruments, policy goals, and political discourses of immigration federalism evolved in Canada 
and Australia. This research then explores the differences between Canada and Australia’s 
immigration processes and how they are used to select highly skilled individuals. The goal is to 






CHAPTER III:  
METHODOLOGY 
  
1. The research question 
The research question in this thesis is this: How have social learning and multi-
governance) altered immigration policies to attract and integrate economic immigrants into 
Saskatchewan and Western Australia, between 1967 and 2017? This question drives the choice 
of the conceptual framework, methods and technical analysis (summarized in table 3.1). 
 
Hall’s Model Case Study Document Analysis Method 
 “[P]olicymakers customarily 
work within a framework of 
ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of 
policy and the kind of 
instruments that can be used to 
attain them, but also the very 
nature of the problems they are 
meant to be addressing. Like a 
Gestalt, this framework is 
embedded in the very 
terminology through which 
policymakers communicate 
about their work, and it is 
influential precisely because so 
much of it is taken for granted 
and unamenable to scrutiny as a 
whole. I am going to call this 
interpretive framework a policy 
paradigm” (Hall, 1993, p. 279). 
It is best described as a rigorous 
study of a single case with a 
purpose to generalize across a 
larger set of cases. It follows from 
this description that case studies 
may be small-or large-N, 
qualitative or quantitative, 
experimental or observational, 
synchronic or diachronic (Gerring, 
2007a, 2009). It also follows that 
the case study research design 
matched with any macro theoretical 
framework or paradigm (e.g. 
behavioralist, rational choice, 
institutionalism, or interpretivism). 
Flyvbjerg (2013) concludes that 
social sciences can be strengthened 
with the execution of a more 
significant number of useful case 
studies. 
Triangulation requires 
documentary analysis of both 
printed and electronic 
materials (Bowen, 2009).  A 
document is something that 
we can read that offers a 
perspective of the social 
world. Formal documents 
can be read as declarations of 
fact, albeit many facts are 
socially conceived. Analysis 
can be undertaken on a range 
of different types of 
documents, including 
government records, media 
reports, private documents, 
and an array of other records. 
Table 3.1: Methodology & Methods 
 
 
2.  Conceptual framework: The Paradigm Shift Model 
     Baglay and Nakache (2014) argue for the need for more examination on subnational 
levels of governments that make decisions about immigration. Conceptually we will draw on 
paradigms from Kuhn, Hoppe and Hall and Hall’s work on social learning and orders of change. 





Social learning involves evaluating existing policies because people cannot easily identify why 
and how we got the policies we now have.  
     Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions is based on a simple cycle of progress, 
whereby he uses paradigms to understand social and scientific changes. Kuhn posited, “a 
paradigm is a universal recognized scientific achievement that, for a time, provide[s] model 
problems and solutions for a community of researchers” (Kuhn 1962, p. x). A key aspect of this 
is the notion of a cycle, where ideas go through phases, moving from pre-science to normal 
science, model drift, model crisis, model revolution and paradigm change (Bird, 2014). Paradigm 
change could work at any point in the policy cycle, including the five stages from agenda-setting 
to policy evaluation, or on the cycle itself.  
 Hoppe (2011), with his puzzling, powering and participation model, in many ways is 
mapping onto Kuhn’s paradigms and linking it to the governance challenges facing society. 
Hoppe offers two templates for unpacking policy systems. In one, he juxtaposes consensus or 
dispute overvalues and evidence or knowledge; the other transposes goals and evidence. Each is 
a pathway to seeing how agreements or disagreements on values, goals, and evidence drives 
policy. Later in this work, we will use the concepts of puzzling, powering and participation to 
assess the extent and scope of immigration federalism in Saskatchewan and Western Australia.  
 According to Hall (1993), a policy paradigm is an interpretive framework of ideas and 
patterns, which specifies not only the policy objectives and type of instruments that can be used 
to achieve them but also the nature of the problems and the way of thinking and communicating 
them through political discourse.  
 Although Hall’s work has been criticized by some researchers, he has inspired and 
motivated thousands of scholars to understand paradigms and concepts. For instance, if we 
compare Hall’s research with Rose (1991) and Jenson (1989), we realize Hall’s work is a 
reference point for much of the work in this field. Daigneault (2014) reflects in his book 
Reassessing the Concept of Policy Paradigm: Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Policy 
Studies on Hall’s contribution. Daigneault criticizes Rose and Jenson, arguing that they are less 
rigorous because, instead of studying ideas, they analyze actors (e.g., political actors, social 





behaviorally-based explanations for change, where ideas (such as economic theory) drive 
choices. In this way, it is more a societal paradigm; according to Jenson (1989), “a societal 
paradigm is a shared collection of interconnected assumptions which make sense of many social 
relations. The societal paradigm’s definition is broad and quite abstract.” Jenson wrote more 
about identities and asymmetric power relations, with a focus on identity building within a 
Societal Paradigm (Jenson, 1989, p. 238).  
 Hall then introduces the concept of Social Learning, which is similar to Rose’s Drawing 
Lessons (Rose 1991), except Hall links lesson-learning with a paradigm shift to create social 
learning. Rose’s approach is more straightforward but makes general assumptions about how the 
world works, which are not explored fully. One result is that lesson drawing studies often are 
limited to an assessment of policies and plans and fail to explore the applications and impacts of 
programs. Conversely, Hall’s work is more holistic, which fits in the realm of paradigms and the 
purpose of this study. 
 Hall views the paradigm as an ideational factor (drawing on Parsons, 2007, and his logic 
of interpretation). Hall (1993) explores how systems move between policy paradigms, using his 
three orders of change framing. The first order occurs when governments need to adjust the 
available instruments. The second-order appears when governments change tools or techniques 
(based on learning from experience) without breaking the hierarchy of objectives. The full 
paradigm shift, a third-order of change, happens with a radical and simultaneous change of 
instruments and goals, including the evolution of political rhetoric and logic. Under standard 
conditions (Kuhn’s normal sciences), there is active lesson drawing, but that does not lead to a 
paradigm shift. Paradigms stay stable over long periods until some set of circumstances tips the 
system into crisis. When there is a growing number of empirical challenges to a paradigm, 
people search for an alternative paradigm, which better fits the new circumstances. Most of the 
time, a paradigm is hegemonic. It is dominant for an extended period. However, under some 
conditions, it becomes vulnerable to attacks, and the government can open the policy agenda to 
alternatives—which creates uncertainty. People are not sure that the assumptions they used for 
decades can still solve a problem or answer the question. At times, policies do not work the way 
they should. At a given point, people start to criticize policy settings and the policy instruments 





hold a higher level of uncertainty. At that moment, the government starts to question if the theory 
that people use to assess reality and the policies themselves threatened the assumptions about 
how the economy works. 
 Rose and Hall bookend the conceptual space of interest here. Hall emphasizes the goals 
of actors, policy instruments, the problems they face, how they are articulated and, ultimately, 
how they lead to change, whether iterative or disjointed. Hall came to this approach as he 
explored broad economic paradigms such as Keynesianism and monetarism, while Rose focused 
more on second-order changes in micro-level policy instruments, where the ideas remained 
unchanged. Rose discounts first-order change as too technical and limited and third-order 
changes as more of a philosophical or theoretical investigation. Rose was more interested in and 
wrote about middle-ground theory. In this context, Hall helps to deal with the broader set of 
issues involved in immigration policy reform. 
 In this study, the ideas of immigration federalism and its related policies are designed to 
contribute to a country’s economy to generate innovation, business, and opportunities for 
everyone in society. Attracting economic and skilled migrants to Canada and Australia involved 
a change of paradigm.  
 Parsons’ concept of structural and institutional factors is useful for unpacking the systems 
and their dynamics. According to Parsons (2007), a structural factor is extensive and related to 
exogenous material things; material is considered as structure, often not human-made (p. 51). 
Parsons explains structure as things that humans cannot control or can control only to a minor 
degree. For instance, money, geography, wealth distribution, and physical distribution of power 
are not directly altered by individuals or even institutions (at least in the short run) (Parsons 
2007, p. 12). Parsons’ institutional factors are claims made by institutions that define how people 
act within human-made formal or informal organizations under specific rules and norms. Parsons 
crucially differentiates an institutional factor from a structural factor, arguing that an institutional 
factor reacts vis-a-vis to a human-made organization. Parsons concept has a strong historical and 
institutional base, which leads to significant path-dependency. The dependency pattern theorem 





     Social learning plays a role when politics and broader actors of society mobilize. Political 
parties, social movements, economists and bureaucrats are all epistemic communities that drive 
choice (Haas, 1992). This study uses Hall’s framework of three orders of change to analyze the 
institutional change concerning Immigration-Federalism’s policy in both Canada (SK) and 
Australia (WA). This study tries to identify if the third order of change occurred among the 
immigration policies in the last twenty-five years. According to Hall (1993), the third order of 
change, referred to as “paradigm shift,” involves a radical and simultaneous adjustment of policy 
instruments and policy goals, including the evolution of political discourse. The challenge is that 
immigration regulations in Australia and Canada are “path dependent,” so the key is to identify 
the triggers for change and the forces of inertia.  
3.    Case study approach 
 This work is structured around two comparative cases. A case study is a research 
approach comprising an up-close, in-depth, and critical analysis of a specific case. For example, 
a case study in Health Sciences may investigate a particular drug a doctor prescribed, and a case 
study in negotiation might study one specific business’s strategy. About two centuries ago, Le 
Play was the pioneer of the case method, using numerous disciplines of the social sciences to 
create an extensive number of case studies, many of which have registered in the pantheon of 
notable investigations. Estimating by the massive volume of new scholarly output, the case study 
research design plays a central role in anthropology, archeology, business, education, history, 
medicine, political science, psychology, social work, and sociology (Gerring, 2009). Recent 
studies of economic growth have turned to case studies of different countries’ comparisons such 
as Botswana, Korea, and Mauritius. Even in economics and political economy, areas not 
regularly remarked for their receptiveness to case-based work, there has been something of a 
renaissance. 
 According to Flyvbjerg, the “Case Study” as a method examines five fundamental 
misinterpretations concerning case studies research. The first supposed that theoretical 
information is more relevant than practical knowledge. Second, a case study itself cannot be 
generalized from a single case; consequently, the individual case study cannot contribute to 
scientific evolution. Third, Flyvbjerg (2006) mentions that the case study is more useful to 





construction. Fourth, the analysis of a “Case Study” includes prejudice towards confirmation; 
and finally, it is usually challenging to compile particular case studies. Flyvbjerg (2013) reveals 
and reviews these disputes one by one and cites Kuhn’s argument regarding why a scientific 
discipline without a significant number of cases studies carried out in-depth is a discipline 
without systematization. Copy generation and a subject without copies is an unproductive one. 
As a result, Flyvbjerg (2013) concludes that social sciences can be strengthened with the 
execution of a more significant number of useful case studies. 
 The case method incorporates a mix of purposes. Some cases are used to illustrate what 
has been done in some context; some cases are exploratory (investigative) and offer factual 
evidence in a structured way; scholars tend to produce cumulative or critical cases that assess 
and interpret an event.  
    Regardless of the style chosen, every case is focused on some defined situation, is data and 
information rich, includes a full analysis of the situation and surrounding elements and comes to 
some conclusion (sometimes a solution and sometimes an insight).  
 
4.    Comparative Document Analysis 
     Social scientists argue that qualitative methods can be a highly appropriate and insightful 
way to analyze policy changes and political actors. Some research (Bowen, 2009; O’Leary, 
2014) considers that evaluating documents is one of the most rigorous ways to find explanations 
of the research question. This research will use a Comparative Document Analysis Method to 
find how policy learning and multi-level governance affect immigration policy. This method is 
appropriate as Canada and Australia are similar countries, and Saskatchewan and Western 
Australia are comparable regions.  
 In effect, we have a natural experiment in immigration policy. This natural experiment 
has three macro drivers: security and defence, social issues, and economic impacts. It also 
involves two national governments and two subnational governments. In practice, then, this 
research explores twelve potential comparative factors (three drivers multiplied by four 
governments).  
 The first part of this analysis compares each country and province considering some 





patterns of comparison (e.g., a specific time or periods of time, immigration regulations, 
immigration processes, and type of multi-level governance tensions, political actors, social 
learning issues, policy changes, and institutional changes). The third part explains degrees of 
influence of immigration federalism on governments from the national level to the provincial 
level and vice-versa (e.g., low, moderate, and high levels of influence). The fourth part explores 
degrees of influence of social learning on both levels of government, and effects on immigration 
policies (e.g., low, moderate or high levels of social learning). The fifth part shows how multi-
governance and social learning affect different scenarios (e.g., political effects, social effects, 
economic consequences).  
     Analyzing the structure of documents becomes crucial for comparing policies and 
institutions. According to Bowen (2009), the analysis of the structure of documents is a 
qualitative model in which records will be deduced to give voice and meaning to a specific topic. 
Therefore, the information coming from different sources will be codified (i.e., give a code for 
every document). Indeed, documents incorporate coding content in similar issues to how 
transcripts of focus groups or interviews are examined (Bowen, 2009). In this research, a rubric 
will be used to evaluate documents. O’Leary (2014) proposed three types of documents. First, 
public records or official records may be used at different levels of government in Canada and 
Australia (e.g., annual reports, policy manuals, strategic plans). The second kind is personal 
documents (e.g., first-person accounts of actions, experiences and beliefs, incident reports, 
papers, reflections/journals and newspapers). The third type of document is the physical 
evidence: physical objects within the study environment (e.g., brochures, posters, agendas, 
manuals and training materials). 
     The method of document analysis is a valuable research tool in itself and is a valuable 
part of most triangulation schemes, combining methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon (Bowen, 2009). To look for convergence and validation, qualitative researchers 
often use at least two resources—that is, different data sources and methods. The objective of the 
triangulation is to provide evidence that generates credibility (Bowen, 2009). The findings 






     The results validated that the data sets can reduce the potential bias’s impact by 
reviewing the information collected through different methods. This research also uses 
quantitative data to confirm and codify some aspects of the story.  
 The structured process of document analysis started before the current analysis. This 
research will have a detailed planning process to guarantee reliable results. O’Leary (2014) 
proposed a planning method of eight steps to analyze documents and textual analysis. These are 
the eight principles that the investigation follows: 1. Create a checklist to examine (e.g., 
population, samples, respondents, participants). 2. Consider how the texts will be accessed with 
attention to linguistic or cultural barriers. 3. Recognize and address biases. 4. Develop 
appropriate skills for research. 5. Consider strategies to ensure credibility. 6. Identify the data 
one is looking for. 7. Consider ethical issues (e.g., confidential documents). 8. Have a back-up 
plan. 
     This research will seek a wide range of documents, but the papers should also be of 
quality to warrant evaluation. Bowen (2009) stated that quality is more important than the 
number of documents. O’Leary (2014) suggested two points be addressed before the analysis of 
reports: the bias of the subject from which the document originates; and the researcher’s bias. 
The researcher must take into account the personal prejudices of the author that can detract from 
the investigation. Bowen (2009) argued that the researcher must evaluate the original purpose of 
the document, such as its target audience. It is essential to consider whether the author was a 
first-hand witness or was a social researcher using second-hand sources. It is also essential to 
define if the document was requested, edited, or anonymous (Bowen, 2009).  
     O’Leary’s second significant suggestion is to consider “involuntary” evidence related to 
the style, tone, agenda, facts, or opinions in the text. This suggestion is important to take into 
account (O’Leary, 2014). According to Bowen (2009), documents must be evaluated for their 
integrity—in other words, how selective or complete the data is. Bowen (2009) recommends that 
content analysis be used as a “first-pass document review” for any investigation. In the context 
of this thesis, when the research focuses on the study of immigration policies and the pressures 
inherent in the politics of content analysis, it is used as a “revision of first-step documents” 
(Bowen 2009, p.32). This option can provide a means to identify significant and relevant 





recognize data patterns. This analysis takes emerging themes and converts them into categories 
that are used for a more in-depth analysis, making it a useful practice for grounded theory. 
     The proposed method includes careful and focused reading and re-reading of the data, as 
well as the coding and construction of categories (Bowen, 2009). Codes and emerging themes 
can help one to “integrate data gathered by different methods” (Bowen 2009, p.32). Bowen 
summarizes the general concept of document analysis as a process of “document evaluation in 
such a way that empirical knowledge is obtained, and understanding develops” (Bowen 2009, p. 
33). It is not just a process of aligning a collection of abstracts that convey what the researcher 
wants. Maintaining a high level of objectivity and sensitivity is crucial to ensure that the analysis 
of the documents is credible and valid (Bowen, 2009). 
     There are many reasons why researchers choose the Document Analysis Method. First, 
document analysis is an efficient and effective way to analyze data because documents are 
manageable and practical resources. Documents come in various forms and the right 
classification of those documents, making them a very accessible and reliable source of data. 
Obtaining and analyzing records is usually much more beneficial and efficient than conducting 
experiments (Bowen, 2009). Secondly, documents are stable and “non-reactive” data sources, 
which means that they can be read and reviewed several times and remain unchanged by the 
influence of the researcher or the research process (Bowen 2009). Third, document analysis is 
frequently used because there are different ways in which social scientists support and strengthen 
research. Fourth, document analysis can be used in many various research fields, either as the 
primary method of data collection or as a complement to other methods. Fifth, documents can 
provide complementary research data. Sixth, reports can provide background information and 
massive data and, therefore, are helpful to contextualize the research within the subject or field 
(Bowen, 2009). Seventh, documents can contain data that can no longer be observed, offering 
insights that informants have forgotten and in recollecting might modify or redevelop. In 
addition, analyzing documents can uncover questions to be formulated or situations that should 
be recognized, making it a way to ensure that the research is critical and complete (Bowen, 
2009).  
     However, it is also essential to consider and be aware of the disadvantages of using 
document analysis. A first concern is that documents are not created with research agendas in 





correctly provide all the information necessary to answer a research question. Some documents 
may only offer a small amount of useful data or, occasionally, none. Other materials may be 
incomplete, or data may be inaccurate or inconsistent. Sometimes there are gaps in or shortages 
of documents, which forces the researcher to use other information to fill the gaps (Bowen, 
2009). Also, some reports or records may not be available or easily accessible, leading to an 
uneven picture of an event. For these reasons, it is crucial to evaluate the quality of documents 
and face some challenges when using document analysis. Another concern to take into account 
before starting the study of documents is the possible presence of biases ( e.g.,  in a record and 
by the researcher). Bowen (2009) and O’Leary (2014) claim that it is crucial to thoroughly 
evaluate and investigate the subjectivity of the documents and understand one’s data to preserve 
the credibility of the research. 
     The reason why issues related to document analysis are concerns and not disadvantages is 
that they can be easily avoided by having a transparent process that incorporates steps and 
evaluative measures, as mentioned above and exemplified in O’Leary’s two processes of eight 
stages (2014). As long as a social scientist begins document analysis knowing what the method 
entails and has a planned procedure, the benefits of document analysis far outweigh the pitfalls 
that may arise.  
 This technique will be used to clarify how Peter Hall’s theories of policy and social 
learning changes were manifested between the levels of national or provincial governments in 
Australia and Canada variously in conventional, intermediate or irregular manners. 
 For this thesis, the primary data sources to compare include government-authorized 
statistics (i.e., official information) about Canada and Australia’s economic immigration and its 
political and economic impacts. The secondary resources will be papers related to valuable 
immigration contributions, “Paradigm Shift” Model, immigration federalism, political and 
economic facts. The tertiary resource will be agendas and newspapers that will contribute to the 










STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
IMMIGRATION POLICIES 
 
This chapter compares the structural and institutional factors driving immigration 
federalism in Canada and Australia in the last twenty-five years. Immigration federalism in both 
countries is characterized by the establishment of state/provincial/territorial immigrant selection 
programs) and its implications for the role of the subnational governments, policy change and 
multi-level governance. Given the limited literature on the subject, and the lack of previous 
comparative studies on immigration federalism in Australia (WA) and Canada (SK), this study, 
is one of the first approaches. As this whole investigation reveals, the influence of geographical, 
natural, and built structures, historical factors, and institutional design is important (table 4.1). 
 
Canada (and rank in world) Australia (and rank in world) 
Area    Area    
• Total 9,984,670 km (2nd) • Total area 7,692,024 km2 (6th) 
• Water (%) 8.92 • Water (%) 0.76 
Population 36.54 million (2017) Population 24.6 million (2017) 
• 2018  37,067,011 (38th) • 2018  25,081,300 (51st) 
• 2016 census 35,151,728 (6) • 2016 census 23,401,892(7) 
• Density 3.92/km2 (10.2/sq. mi) (228th) • Density 3.3/km2 (8.5/sq. mi) (236th) 
GDP (PPP) 2018 estimate GDP (PPP) 2018 estimate 
• Total $1.847 trillion (15th) • Total $1.313 trillion (19th) 
• Per capita $49,775 (20th) • Per capita $52,191 (17th) 
GDP (nominal) 2018  GDP (nominal) 2018 
• Total $1.798 trillion (10th) • Total $1.500 trillion (13th) 
• Per capita $48,466 (15th) • Per capita $59,655 (10th) 
Gini (2012) 31.6(8) Gini (2012) 44.9(9) 
Table 4.1: Canada and Australia land and people 
Sources: Statistics Canada, various. Australian Bureau of Statistic, various. 
 
While the state/provincial/territorial programs look quite similar, they differ in some 
essential design elements and deliver different outcomes. The Australian programs are in some 





Canadian system is more difficult for skilled migrants to navigate (table 4.2) but once pre-
screened, they have lower barriers to admission and more opportunity for PR. Keeping this in 
mind, we use Parsons’s structural and institutional factors to explore the contexts for those 
diverging results. 
 














1992 254,792 28,371,264 0.9% 76,330 17,284,000 0.4% 
1993 256,641 28,684,764 0.9% 69,768 17,494,000 0.4% 
1994 224,387 29,000,663 0.8% 87,428 17,667,000 0.5% 
1995 212,865 29,302,310 0.7% 99,139 17,854,000 0.6% 
1996 226,071 29,610,210 0.8% 85,752 18,071,000 0.5% 
1997 216,035 29,905,948 0.7% 77,327 18,310,000 0.4% 
1998 174,195 30,155,173 0.6% 84,143 18,517,000 0.5% 
1999 189,951 30,401,286 0.6% 92,272 18,711,000 0.5% 
2000 227,455 30,685,730 0.7% 107,366 18,925,000 0.6% 
2001 250,638 31,020,596 0.8% 88,900 19,153,000 0.5% 
2002 229,048 31,358,418 0.7% 93,914 19,413,000 0.5% 
2003 221,349 31,641,630 0.7% 111,590 19,651,000 0.6% 
2004 235,824 31,938,004 0.7% 123,424 19,895,000 0.6% 
2005 262,241 32,242,364 0.8% 131,593 20,127,000 0.7% 
2006 251,642 32,570,505 0.8% 140,148 20,394,000 0.7% 
2007 236,754 32,887,928 0.7% 149,365 20,697,000 0.7% 
2008 247,248 33,245,773 0.7% 158,021 21,015,000 0.8% 
2009 252,172 33,628,571 0.7% 140,610 21,262,000 0.7% 
2010 280,681 34,005,274 0.8% 127,458 22,183,000 0.6% 
Table 4.2: Immigration of Permanent Residents in Context, Canada and Australia 
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC-CIRC)- Data for 1992 to 2010 (refer to fiscal 
years). Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship report 2011.  
 
   
 In the past decade, provinces/states have been developing new immigration regulations 
and agendas to deliver better labour market results, greater competitiveness in the worldwide 
market for immigrants, and increased governmental competence (Doomernik & Jandl, 2008; 
Hailbronner and Koslowski, 2008; Shachar, 2006; Transatlantic Academy Report, 2009). In 
some federal states, these changes have led to more active involvement of sub-national units 





in Immigration Federalism, Multinational States, and Subnational Communities compares 
Flanders and Quebec reviewed arguments in favour and against immigration federalism. Xhardez 
(2020) explores how Flemish and Quebecois political elites implemented different models to 
attract and integrate economic immigrants considering claims for recognizing cultural-linguistic 
diversity, highlighting the asymmetrical power between national and subnational governments.  
This so-called immigration federalism raises multiple questions of policy and practice. Although 
specific factors motivating the development of immigration federalism vary by jurisdiction, 
immigration federalism is often seen as driven by two main interrelated factors: a) the increasing 
importance of efficiency of the immigration management; and b) perceived and actual difficulty 
of centralized immigration systems in responding to diverse regional needs/concerns (Baglay & 
Nakache, 2012). One concern that remains virtually unexplored in the current literature is 
immigration federalism’s impact on the receiving regions and their cities.  The analysis of the 
factors driving this change in policy study is divided into three main parts. Analysis in section 1 
compares structural factors in both countries and provinces (e.g., geography, borders, and built 
systems). That analysis includes demographic characteristics, involving both the resident 
population and economic immigrants. Social scientists have until now paid only marginal 
consideration to the issue of isolation/ inclusion influences within the analysis of immigration 
federalism. Given the unique locations and cultures in the two jurisdictions, we can explore this 
here. Immigration is first about people, but also about how cities and states/provinces work 
together. This section explores how cities and states/provinces can offer an affordable place for 
both old and new residents.  
     Section 2 presents an analysis of the impact of the historically driven institutional design 
that drives policy in the two regions, particularly for attracting permanent skilled immigrants and 
temporary immigrant workers. The emergence and implementation of immigration federalism in 
these countries is examined—Canada developed regional/provincial immigrant selection while 
Australia created the skilled nominated migration stream. This thesis does not deal directly with 
refugee class or family reunification. Instead, it focusses on immigration processes related to 
settlement and integration. As shown, immigration federalism in these two countries provides 
provincial/state immigration programs with expanded or even unique immigration opportunities 





(SSRM). However, these opportunities pose new challenges for safeguarding people and cities. 
Section 3 presents an assessment of the relative importance of structural and institutional factors.  
 
1.    Structural Factors  
     According to Parsons (2007), a structural factor is extensive and related to exogenous 
material things and material things, which are considered to be structures and not human-made. 
This approach explains that structural factors are things that humans cannot control or control 
only to a minor degree (i.e., human-derived material things) (table 4.3). 
 
 West Australia Saskatchewan 
Total area 1,021,478 sq. mi 251,700 sq. mi 
Land area 976,790 sq. mi 228,450 sq. mi 
Water area 44,687 sq. mi 22,921 sq. mi 
Population 2017 2,640,000 1,098,352 
Population Density 2.6/sq. mi 4.8/sq. mi 
Table 4.3: Western Australia and Saskatchewan general information 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics and Statistics Canada, Census of Canada 
 
 For instance, money, geography, distribution of wealth, and the physical distribution of 
power are not directly altered by humans (Parsons 2007). This study explains three main 
structural factors, such as borders influence, geographical position, and community isolation. In 
this context, Saskatchewan and Western Australia exhibit some similarities but some obvious 
differences. 
  
1.1 Canada and Saskatchewan 
  
     Some have said that Canada (and probably by inference Australia) has too much 
geography. Hertz and others talk about the massive spans of land and water that have influenced 
the nation’s economic and social development. Saskatchewan is blessed—or cursed—by land 
and resources. 
 Saskatchewan occupies 651,900 square KM of land in the northern fringe of the Great 
Plains areas, with about 9% of the surface covered in freshwater and 45% covered in trees. The 





million acres of farmland, equal to about 47% of the national farm area. Under the surface, the 
province is endowed with extensive mineral resources, including uranium, potash, oil, gas, gold 
and other minerals and precision metals. Given its location, the climate is a major factor in 
development. As a continental territory, it has low average annual temperatures, with extremes of 
+40 degrees Celsius and -40 degrees Celsius, persistent winds and low annual precipitation. The 
annual frost-free growing season is only about 100 days. These factors have historically 
constrained immigration, but with recent resource booms, development has accelerated. 
 Saskatchewan is profoundly both isolated and integrated into the Great Plains area. The 
large urban centres are more than five hours driving or one hour flying from the nearest big 
urban areas in adjacent jurisdictions and more than three hours flying (and three days driving) 
from the commercial center of Toronto and the national capital, Ottawa. Saskatchewan shares 
borders in Canada, with Alberta to the west, Manitoba to the east, the Territories to the north, 
and two American northern tier states, North Dakota and Montana, to the south. Interprovincial 
and international mobility is significant.  
 Our proximity to the US is a significant challenge for Canada and immigration. 
Immigration policies in both countries allow Canadians and Americans to move from one 
country to another relatively quickly. The US is by far the leading target for most Canadian 
emigrants. About a million Canadian-born citizens lived in the US in mid-2017, with others 
settling mainly in the UK (92,000), Australia (57,000), France (26,000), and Italy (26,000), 
according to assessments by the UN Population Division (Alperin & Batalova, 2018). Most 
Canadians in the US who get legal PR—also known as obtaining a green card—do so either as 
direct relatives of US residents or as employer-sponsored newcomers. According to the 
Migration Policy Organization, in 2016, about 47 percent of Canadians in the US were 
naturalized as new Americans, contrasted to 49 percent of all foreign-born people in the US. In 
relation to the total foreign-born population, Canadians in the US have a favourable income 
average, are less likely to live in deprivation, and are more likely to pay the insurance and be 
college-educated. Canadian-born Americans are significantly older, on average, than the average 
immigrant or US-born citizen (Alperin & Batalova, 2018; Census Bureau 2016 American 
Community Survey). In effect, the US is a significant draw for high-flying Canadians. Canadian 





 The structural reality is Canada is inextricably co-habiting with the US (95% of the 
population lives within 100 miles of the US border) but also challenged by being connected to 
US immigration policy, which is among the most radical of any country. This radicalism 
influences immigration outcome. Canada is a pathway for millions of people every decade who 
see us as a bridge to migrate to the US. The perception, if not the reality, is that US borders are 
less closed to people who come through Canada. However, skilled immigrants looking at that 
route do not choose to settle first in western Canada, especially Saskatchewan. The same is true 
of migrants in the US considering moving to Canada—they seldom settle in northern tier states, 
instead of settling in the South, East or far West. One driver for mobility is the different 
outlooks.     The American Dream suggests equality of opportunity, a level-playing arena where 
everyone could uproot himself or herself; Canada also prides itself on equality of opportunity but 
not at the expense of redistribution policies. Canada’s Gini Coefficient, an estimation of 
economic inequality, is significantly lower (signally more equal distributions) than America’s 
(.44 vs .48 respectively), especially in the past decade and when measured in after-tax and after 
public services are counted (World Bank, 2015). Moreover, mobility between income groups is 
much higher. Canadians are twice as likely as Americans to shift from the most deprived quintile 
of the people to the most prosperous population. Likewise, the connection between the income of 
parents and children is more equitable in Canada. By virtually every measure, Canada has 
surpassed the US in striving for equity. People worldwide have started to notice. From the US, 
refugees and asylum seekers (especially from Africa) are now fleeing into Canada, expecting a 
sympathetic immigration hearing and a better future. In Latin America, there are records of 
economic immigrants travelling north, planning to cross the US border, and moving into Canada. 
In addition, international students are increasingly selecting Canada over the US, partly due to 
more restrictive immigration policies in the US, especially those from Muslim countries. 
     Garcea (2012) argues that Saskatchewan has tried to create different policies to attract 
and retain economic migrants to the province. After 2000 the province specifically targeted 
international students. The Canada-Saskatchewan Memorandum of Understanding on the Off-
Campus Work Permit Program for International Students signed in April 2006 was a key policy 
that supported attracting international students (see International Students in Saskatchewan 





     Canada has had many concerns about how to encourage permanent settlement. Provinces 
like Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and the Territories have designed some immigration policies to 
maintain and strengthen their skilled workforce. A particular challenge is that a significant 
number of skilled immigrants who see Canada as an option apply to settle in large cities where 
there are more opportunities and jobs and likely a broader host community with the same culture.  
 Because of the high cost of immigration, skilled immigrants make decisions and choices 
depending on where they think they can recuperate money for applying. The proximity to the 
US, in particular, is a critical structural factor that limits Saskatchewan’s ability to attract and 
retain skilled workers. 
     Retaining skilled workers, both from abroad or within Canada, is challenging because of 
the easy mobility between provinces and proximity of Saskatchewan to the vibrant and growing 
centers of Calgary, Edmonton and Winnipeg. Saskatchewan historically has had more 
outmigration of skilled workers than in-migration, and in the early years of the decade, as many 
as 500,000 locally educated people had migrated. Calgary is Saskatchewan’s third-largest city, 
based on the number of residents there with provincial birth certificates.  
 While Saskatchewan has ample resources in terms of land, bio-resources and natural 
resources, developing and exploiting those assets has taken more than a century to mature. 
Saskatchewan is probably the most resource and trade-dependent province in Canada, with more 
than half its GDP coming from goods production; in the rest of Canada, only 30% of output 
comes from goods activities. Saskatchewan differently relies on a range of primary resources, 
including grains, oilseeds, pulses, livestock, oil and gas, potash, uranium, wood and their spin-off 
industries (Government of Saskatchewan, 2009). In 1995, provincial uranium amounted to 30 
percent of world uranium reserves (Phillips, 2006).  In the northeast, the Paleoproterozoic 
greenstone belt around Flin Flon is mined for sort variety of minerals (e.g., copper, gold, and 
zinc). In the Estevan region, coal has been mined since 1880 (Government of Saskatchewan, 
2007). In the early twentieth century, lignite coal for power and heating was an essential mineral. 
Potash mining was introduced in the 1950s near Saskatoon and Esterhazy and has an estimated 
75 percent of the world’s potash reserves, making it a leading producer of the mineral. Finally, 
oil and gas have developed, to the point that 23% of the provincial GDP is generated in 






GDP at basic prices by industry, Canada and the provinces and territories, average 2014-18 











































































CA 30 2 2 9 0 10 70 
NL 49 0 7 28 2 3 51 
PE 23 4 0 1 1 10 77 
NS 19 1 0 3 2 7 81 
NB 25 1 1 6 4 10 75 
QC 27 2 2 4 3 14 73 
ON 23 1 1 2 1 12 77 
MB 30 5 1 6 3 10 70 
SK 52 8 10 23 2 7 48 
AB 44 1 0 28 1 7 55 
BC 24 1 2 6 2 7 76 
YT 21 0 6 2 2 1 79 
NT 43 0 29 6 1 0 57 
NU 39 0 21 2 2 0 61 
Table 4.4: GDP at basic prices by industry, Canada and the provinces and territories, average 2014-18 
Source: Phillips and Castle (2013), forthcoming; Statistics Canada. Table 36-10-0402-01 Gross 




The majority of the province’s manufacturing firms process raw materials or inputs to the 
sectors. Saskatoon is home to a few large-scale world-leading firms, including Cameco and 
Nutrien, the leading world players in uranium and potash have corporate headquarters in 
Saskatoon, but for the most part, the firms developing resources are headquartered elsewhere. 
Instead, the province differentially uses family-owned enterprises (farms and industrial ventures 
alike), Crown corporations (e.g. SaskTel, SaskEnergy, and SaskPower and SGI, a public insurer) 
and cooperatives (e.g. Federated Cooperatives Ltd.) 
All of these industries are highly capital intensive, with large built capacity on farms, in 
woodlots, in oilfields, at mineheads and in service and supply centres, all linked by extensive 
transportation infrastructure (e.g. roads, rails, pipelines and airports). This built structure has 
skewed job and population growth to a small number of centres, all linked to the two largest 





class sectors. As a result, most new jobs, especially those requiring higher skills, are located in 
the cities or discrete places near resource operations.  
Exports are the other big story. Without exports, Saskatchewan would have the economic 
prosperity of a developing country. More than 73 percent of the GPD depends on exports of 
goods and services (www.statcan.gc.ca), the highest of any province. Moreover, unlike the rest 
of Canada, a large and growing share of those exports are directed to non-US markets.  
The province is a small, niche player in the innovation space, with two Innovation Place 
Research Parks contiguous to the Universities in Regina and Saskatoon that host various science 
and technology firms and labs undertaking research in the energy, mining, agricultural and high 
tech sectors. A third Innovation Place Research Park, the Forest Centre in Prince Albert, has 
received the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) award. Those three parks 
contribute approximately $592 million to the provincial economy annually (web.archive.org, 
2009). 
    Demographically, the province is more rural than Western Australia. While just less 
than half the provincial population lives in the two largest cities, Saskatoon and Regina, about 
one-third of the residents live in rural areas. The rest of the population is distributed across more 
than 750 small cities, towns, villages and hamlets. Population density is about 1.8 people per 
square kilometer, the lowest of any province except Newfoundland and Labrador.  
    The combination of a small population and high-intensity production of high-value 
export goods translates into high employment ratios and a correspondingly high GDP per capita 
in Saskatchewan. The province in 2014-18 earned, on average, 38% more than the national 
average, second only to Alberta. High employment, low unemployment and high income per 
capita all are robust attractors for highly skilled migrants. 
 
1.2 Australia and Western Australia  
 
Western Australia and Saskatchewan, while almost at the opposite ends of the world from 
each other physically, have many similar structural factors that affect their opportunities and 
constraints. Western Australia occupies 2.6 million square KM of land, about 4 times the size of 
Saskatchewan, spanning the entire Western third of Australia. The state has about 15 percent of 





percent of the land in the state is suitable for cultivation or grazing. Similar to Saskatchewan, 
under the surface, the state is endowed with extensive mineral resources, inducing iron ore, 
natural gas, gold, aluminum, bauxite, oil, and range of base and rare earth metals, some of which 
have yet to be developed.  
Given its location as a coastal state, with more than 10,000 KM of shoreline mostly along 
the warm Indian Ocean, WA has a Mediterranean climate. However, the significant continental 
reach of the state complicates the climate. Overall, the natural setting is a key factor in 
development. The state has extremes, albeit at a higher average annual temperature than in 
Canada. Lows can go below freezing, but the average in the winter is about 12 degrees Celsius 
along the west coast. Summer highs average around 29 degrees on the coast and higher inland 
but can spike well over 45 degrees Celsius. Moisture is the biggest challenge, as hot, dry winds 
complicate the sparse and variable rainfall—averaging between 200 mm in the Darling Range 
and 1278 mm in the southwest, compared with 354 mm in Saskatchewan. The agriculture 
opportunity in WA is different from in the eastern states, in that the main growing season is 
during the winter months as the summer is too hot and dry for most crops. As in Saskatchewan, 
the growing season is limited to only about 100 days, but in WA that is due to lack of moisture 
and excessive heat while Saskatchewan faces frost. These factors have historically constrained 
immigration to the coastal fringe but with recent resource booms, development has accelerated in 
spots in the interior. 
Western Australia is far more isolated than Saskatchewan, both physically and 
emotionally. While WA shares an eastern border with the Northern Territory and South 
Australia, the nearest community of any size is three days by train or more than four hours away 
by air. The nearest national capital is more than 5 hours distant by air, which makes Perth the 
most isolated capital in the world. Given the location, air and sea are the primary means of access 
to the rest of the world. 
 Australians have robust overseas links, and many who were born in Australia have spent 
some part of their lives in other nations; Australians live and work around the globe (The 
Committee for Economic Development of Australia CEDA, 2003). Statistics show that one 
million Australians at any time may be living and working outside the country, equal to around 
4% of the population, making Australians one of the most itinerant societies in the world 





entrants worldwide (Hugo, 2000), new economic forces such as globalization (i.e., globalization 
theory in immigration) might now be affecting this traditional pattern. Hugo et al., (2003) 
characterized this international exchange of people as a ‘brain circulation,’ a term that suggests 
significant benefits for Australia. 
Australia is a traditionally high immigration country, and its immigration policies have 
targeted to attract economic immigrants on a sustained basis. However, an essential concern in 
Australia and some areas in WA is illegal immigration (Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Hartley & 
Pedersen, 2015; Kenny, 2016; Millbank, 1999). A significant number of low-skilled immigrants 
attempt to arrive in Australia by boats, especially from Africa, and other irregular immigrants 
and refugees arrive in Australia by boat from Indonesia and other parts of Asia. Those people are 
usually called “boat people.”  
This dual challenge has generated significant debate in recent decades. The first part of 
the debate is about bringing people to sustain and develop the Australian economy and society. 
The second part is related to the actions of the Australian government and its treatment of “boat 
people.” The stories are sensationalized in the Australian press. For this sensationalism, Australia 
has come under international criticism, especially for how illegal immigrants have been arrested 
and detained in offshore island camps while their requests for refugee status have been 
processed. Lost in much of the debate is the plight of the migrants themselves. An unknown 
number of people die each year trying to make the crossing in unsuitable, overloaded boats—it is 
a dangerous, long journey, and the arrival points in northwestern WA are some of the most 
desolate and naturally inhospitable places of the world.  
According to Paul Power, CEO of the Refugee Council of Australia, there is an enforced 
policy demanding people go back in the same direction that they have come (what might fit 
under the heading of enforcement of immigration federalism). Power argues, “Australian policy 
at no point has taken account of the need for security of immigrants trying to reach Australia by 
boat” (Farrell, 2015). This type of event opens a dangerous discussion for politicians in 
Australia. In 2015, the Australian government adopted tighter regulations related to immigration, 
which has worked to deter the flow of asylum-seeking boat people. The result was that only 16 
boats made the journey to Australia in 2015, only one was successful, and no deaths were 





The federal government, concerned by the risk of illegal entry, has created policies that 
tie immigration federalism into enforcement federalism. Immigration federalism in Australia is, 
to a significant extent, directed to enforcement rather than limited coordination and cooperation 
about selection and retention, especially with WA state governments (South Australia and 
Victoria have little interest in boat people as they are well situated to avoid any landings). WA 
has had direct experience with illegal immigrants. One notable example was the approach and 
seizure of the 44,000-ton ship Tampa in the waters north of WA, which had 433 irregular 
claimants for refugee status. During the eleven days before the Tampa’s arrival, there were 
reports of more than 1,500 illegals landing in Australia on small boats, and reports that another 
5,000 would-be immigrants were preparing to begin trips from Indonesia (The US Committee for 
Refugees and Immigrants, 2001). That news made many Australians feel under attack—their 
island status affected their outlook. The Western Australian government employed military force 
to prevent their landing and requesting asylum. The decision about what to do with the 
immigrants turned into a minor international crisis until, weeks after, New Zealand agreed to 
take 150 of the asylum seekers and Nauru (a tiny, poor island state in the Pacific Ocean) 
accepted the rest of immigrants in return for an Australian cash settlement (Kneebone & 
Rawlings-Sanaei, 2007).  
Predictably, the government’s response was immediately censured by international 
leaders (i.e., “destroying its reputation”), international agencies (e.g., “unacceptable”), and 
criticized by elite media and academic opinion leaders in Australia. Nonetheless, surveys 
revealed that 78 percent of Australians supported Prime Minister John Howard’s “resolve,” and 
his party jumped five percentage points in the polls. This tremendous support followed two 
public concerns. The first is a sizable increase of illegal immigration, mostly of Iranians, Iraqis, 
and Afghans. Second, a police report in 2015 cited crimes, such as Lebanese men gang-raping 
non-Muslim women, as rising threats. According to Pedersen and Thomas (2013), much of the 
support for the government attitude has been motivated by anti-Muslim sentiment rather than 
anti-boat people’s attitudes. Australia is not unique: similar views are emerging throughout the 
west, most notably in Austria, where open access has triggered a backlash among the population 
actively responding to an influx of people with alien cultures.  
Howard’s response to calling out the military to close the frontiers to unauthorized 





uncontrolled immigration becomes an ever-more central issue for Western societies. An island-
country is an isolated country by nature, which creates a sense of security, but with more than 
59,000 kilometers of shoreline (12,000 in WA), most of it undeveloped, this isolation creates the 
impression of being more permeable and at-risk relative to nations that have specific borders to 
control immigration. Immigration policies in WA thus are conflicted, with much effort focused 
on attracting high skilled immigrants, but other efforts were driven by the need to secure their 
natural frontier, an insurmountable structural factor. 
WA’s development is primarily driven by the extraction and processing of its natural 
endowment of different types of mineral and energy commodities. The structure of the economy 
is closely associated with these essential resources, providing a comparative advantage in 
resource extraction and processing. Goods production accounts for 47% of the state GDP, very 
similar to Saskatchewan (at 52%). WA mining is the biggest single sector, accounting for an 
estimated 58% of Australia’s mineral and energy exports (Department of Mines and Petroleum, 
2011) and 29% of the WA economy. Over the past 15 years, WA has provided more stable 
production support and become less dependent on just a few main export markets, protecting the 
economy from variations in world prices to some degree (WA Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2013). Finance, insurance, construction, and property services have grown steadily and have 
increased their share of economic output (WA Department of Treasury and Finance, 2006).  
As for Saskatchewan, exports are vital. In the 2000s, growth in global demand for 
minerals and petroleum, especially in China (iron ore) and Japan (for liquefied natural gas), has 
assured economic growth raised the national average. WA’s overseas exports accounted for 46 
percent of the nation’s total (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008) (Curran, 2012). The states’ 
leading export products are iron ore, alumina, nickel, gold, ammonia, wheat, wool, crude oil, and 
liquefied natural gas (LNG). WA is a leading extractor of bauxite, which is processed into 
alumina at four factories producing more than 20 percent of the world output. It is also the 
world’s third-largest iron ore producer (contributing 15 percent of world output) and contributes 
75 percent of Australia’s 240 tons of gold annually. Agricultural production in WA is a 
significant contributor to this western state and the whole country, making up to half the nation’s 
wheat crop annually (Crop Report, 2008) (table 4.5).  
There is also high demand for WA exports of live animals to Southeast Asia and the 





refrigeration facilities support live animal trade over imports of processed meat. WA also 
controls a significant fishing industry. Products for local consumption and export are western 
rock lobsters, prawns, crabs, shark, and tuna, as well as pearl fishing in the Kimberley area of the 
state. Processing is assigned along the west coast. Tourism has grown in influence, with 
significant amounts of visitors coming from Europe (42 percent) and Asia (34 percent) (WA at a 
Glance, 2008). Tourism is an active economic driver in several of the smaller community centers 
outside of Perth, particularly in coastal areas. 
 
 
Perth is the biggest city, with about 78% of the state population, with most of the rest 
located along a narrow band along the southwestern coast. The main industrial area of Kwinana 
just south Perth has the nation's most significant oil refinery, with a volume of 146,000 barrels of 
oil per day, producing most of the state's petrol and diesel (Australia Institute of Petroleum, 
2008; McKinnon, 2014), as well as alumina and nickel processing factories, port facilities for 
grain and other bulk exports, and inputs and supply industries for mining and petroleum (e.g., 
heavy and light engineering, and metal fabrication). Shipbuilding (e.g., Austral Ships) and 
associated maintenance industries are located at nearby Henderson, just north of Kwinana. 
GDP at basic prices by industry, Australia and states/territory, average 2013-14 

















































AU 27 2 8 5 6 73 
WA 52 3 30 2 5 48 
SA 28 5 4 4 8 72 
VIC 21 3 2 3 7 79 
NSW 17 1 2 2 7 83 
QLD 30 2 9 3 6 70 
TAS 27 8 1 5 7 73 
NT 20 3 13 1 3 80 
Table 4.5: GDP at basic prices by industry, Australia and states/territory, average 2013-14 
Source: Author’s calculations using Nicholls & Rosewall, 2015. The Economic Performance of the 





Important dependent industries include concrete and building product manufacturing, flour 
milling, food processing, animal feed production, automotive bodybuilding, and printing.  
The geographic constraints and economic opportunities largely determine the 
demographic structure of WA. The state is the second-largest sub-national unit in the world. 
Only about 2.5 million residents live in the state – equal to 11 percent of Australia’s population – 
which makes it the fourth most populated state. However, WA has the fastest-growing 
population of all the Australian states (Sibma, 2016). Given the large landmass in WA – around 
2.6 million square kilometers – and the relatively small population, the population density is just 
less than 1 person per square km or 2.5 people per square mile, which is even lower than in 
Saskatchewan. 
Overall, the built capacity, even in the face of some negative structural factors, delivers 
high incomes and job growth. WA gross state product per person of $102,232 is more than 52 
percent above the nationwide average and higher than any other state in the Commonwealth 
(WA Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). This translates into higher family incomes, but the 
resulting immigration and population growth has stressed the housing market, so that Perth 
property prices are among the second highest in Australia behind Sydney, and high rental rates 
continue to be a problem.  
Strong but selective economic opportunities, attractive incomes and rising demand for 
jobs, all based on exploiting abundant natural resources, are major attractions for skilled workers. 
Compared with Saskatchewan, which can easily be a stepping off point for relocation to 
neighbouring provinces or the US, Western Australia has few easily accessible nearby labour 
markets, so that those who are attracted to the state tend to stay longer, in spite of relatively high 
costs of housing and living.  
1.3    Comparative Structural Factors 
The economies of both Saskatchewan and WA are based on extractive industries, reliant 





products, and minerals. Those factors create a bond between skilled workers and the region, 
generating a structural tie. 
Saskatchewan in some ways is structurally more vulnerable. The volatile natural climate, 
high dependence on mostly primary production and exports, capital dependency and highly 
competitive adjacent territories means that none of the abundance in the province is secure. 
Disruptions in markets, climate change, trade disputes, volatile interest rates and competitive 
polices in neighbouring territories can adversely affect both attraction and retention of skilled 
workers. Moreover, the heavy reliance on small and medium sized family owned enterprises, 
locally-managed Crown and cooperative enterprises, narrowly-based large-scale joint-stock 
companies (e.g. Cameco and Nutrien) and foreign multinationals creates greater uncertainty. 
Many of those ventures either are less resilient or make decisions from afar based on 
circumstances that may not relate to local opportunities or conditions.  
Conversely, WA has a wide range of locally managed firms with global scale, largely 
based in the mineral industry, including, iron-ore, alumina, nickel, gold, ammonia, crude oil, 
liquefied natural gas (LNG), wheat and wool. While still vulnerable to global events, WA is 
somewhat more insulated as it is larger and more efficiently structured around Perth, where 
economies of scale and scope would be expected to deliver up to 15% efficiency gains relative to 
the smaller centres of Regina and Saskatoon (saskatchewan.ca, 2006) (Venables 2006). 
 
2.     Institutional Factors 
 
Historical factors drive the institutional context. Politicians, academics, and social groups 
have always been big actors in immigration debates in Canada and Australia. Both nations share 
a similar colonial history as members of the British Empire and have much in common in terms 
of traditions and norms. In that sense, they have developed on similar paths. However, there are 
key institutional factors that drive different immigration policies for both countries and their 
subnational programs. The process of defining the current system is analyzed by periods; almost 






2.1    Canada and Saskatchewan 
Canada’s immigration system has evolved over the past century in fits and starts. Until 
after the Second World War, Canada, and Australia, were essentially part of the British Empire, 
with full right of mobility anywhere in the British realm. There were no significant immigration 
rules or processes, as long as you were British born.  
The Great War (1914-1917) produced a significant change in Saskatchewan’s future. 
Demand for food production to be maintained and expanded to meet Imperial needs first 
exempted many farmers from the war, but then triggered a boom in wheat production. As farm 
incomes increased, migration soared, and the provincial population rose from 492,000 in 1911 to 
757,000 in 1921 and a peak of 921,800 in 1931.  
     The Great Depression following the 1929 stock market crash coincided with a decade 
long drought in the 1930s, causing devastation in Saskatchewan’s economy (Rowell Sirois Royal 
Commission, 1940). In spite of drought, the population continued to rise until it reached a peak 
in 1936 at 931,200 people. Drought continued and despite policies such as the Prairie Farm 
Rehabilitation Administration (PFRA) and relief programs, roughly 250,000 people left the 
region during the Dirty Thirties and Saskatchewan became one of the poorest places of Canada. 
The economy recovered a bit in the Second World War as Saskatchewan was tasked with 
growing grain for the war effort, but recovery was limited. Saskatchewan’s population only 
recovered to its 1936 peak in 1966.  
Saskatchewan from the beginning has used both federal and provincial powers to advance 
development. The first waves of immigrants, attracted to Saskatchewan by federal policies, were 
transported on railways constructed with federal support and provided free land from federal 
reserves. Within the province, the political parties in power, regardless of ideology, have 
sponsored and maintained public investment and ownership of key infrastructure, including all 
the key utilities, a bus company, an insurance company, publicly run hospitals and medical care, 
and many of the industrial sectors. One challenge of this strong public role is that sometimes 
developments were delayed due to lack of resources or policy direction. Phillips (2006) notes 





leapt ahead of Saskatchewan as it developed its oil, so that now it is both wealthier in per capita 
terms and has almost 4 times as many citizens as its neighbour. 
Pre-Confederation the colonies had whatever authorities the Empire allowed and in the 
early years after Confederation in 1867 the new provinces both had constitutional authority 
("under Section 95, Constitution Act, 1867, the federal and provincial governments share power 
over agriculture and immigration; either order of government can make laws in this area, but in 
the case of a conflict, federal law prevails") and exercised that authority. But as the 
Confederation matured, the federal government came to dominate the immigration process, all 
but squeezing out provincial efforts. For much of that period of federal dominance, Canada 
sponsored massive flows of unskilled immigrants to populate the underdeveloped country, and it 
was not until after the Second World War that provinces reengaged in immigration. In the 1960s, 
the dominant paradigm in attracting immigrants to Canada was to get more Europeans and 
people from the US. In 1967, the federal government adapted and adopted the point system to 
sharpen the criteria (specifically on education, age, language, and other factors) against which 
applicants for admission would be assessed and admitted. That was the first significant step to 
provide and establish a new class of immigrants, one that has been refined as the economic or 
highly skilled category (Green & Green, 1995). In the 1970s, one observes a gradual return of 
the provinces to the realm of immigration management. First, in response to the Quiet 
Revolution and sovereignty effort, Quebec acquired progressively more powers over selection 
and settlement, and from the 1990s onwards, other provinces followed suit (Baglay, 2012).  
Three key immigration policies emerged in this period. First, the immigration regulations 
introduced in 1967 established new standards for evaluating potential immigrants. This policy 
enhanced the objectivity of admissions procedures, setting up a system in which independent 
immigrants are assessed points in specific categories relating to their education, occupational 
skills, employment prospects, age, proficiency in English or French and personal attitude. 
Applicants earning 50 points or more out of a possible 100 were allowed entry, regardless of 
their race, ethnicity, or national origin. 
Second, the Canadian Multiculturalism Policy was a statement to the House of Commons 





approved government policy. Multiculturalism was designed to protect the cultural freedom of 
individuals and provide recognition of the cultural contributions of several ethnic groups to the 
Canadian community. The government committed to promoting multiculturalism by supporting 
cultural groups in their development, assisting people in overcoming discriminatory restrictions, 
fostering intercultural exchange, and helping immigrants in learning French or English. Garcea 
(2006) emphasized that multicultural is not just a federal goal; provinces have had an important 
role in advancing multiculturalism policy.  
Third, the Immigration Act, 1976 (Lindsay Van Dyk, 2000) expressed an essential 
change in Canadian immigration law. It was the first immigration act to explicitly describe the 
objectives of Canadian immigration policy, determine refugees as a different class of newcomers 
and mandate the federal government to consult with other levels of government in immigration 
planning and management. The act was positively regarded as a progressive piece of legislation, 
and it received broad social and political support. 
In Canada, for most of the twentieth century, federal governments have been the 
dominant player in immigration regulation, producing a unified model of immigrant selection 
and enforcement governed by an idea of immigration to a nation [rather than to a specific 
locality] (Baglay & Nakache, 2014; Reitz, 2005; Spiro, 2002). In the last two decades, however, 
Canada saw the emergence of new actors—sub-national units (provinces, states, even cities, and 
municipalities) — seeking to take a more active role in the immigration process.  
Until the 1990s, there was an extreme concentration of immigrants in Ontario, British 
Columbia, and Quebec. The renewed role of provinces in immigration management in both 
countries can be primarily explained by settlement and labor market challenges that could not 
have been adequately addressed by the federal immigration program or domestic migration. In 
Canada, most new arrivals until then settled in British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, and their 
metropolises (esp. Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal). Between 1995 and 2008 (Citizenship 
Immigration Canada, 2009), over 80 percent of newcomers settled in these provinces, while 










In addition, the federal selection criteria were not always responsive to local labour 
market needs. Provinces expressed severe frustration with the backlog in the Federal Skilled 
Worker Program (Alboim, 2009). In the 1990s, Canada applied a new immigration regulation in 
response to federal and provincial negotiations to improve the immigration selection process. 
The new regulation worked to implement the notion of immigration federalism. This concept, 
"defined as the role of the states and localities in making and implementing immigration law and 
policy, has become an increasingly relevant issue" in public policy (Varsanyi et. al, 2012).  
Cameron and Simeon (2002) discuss how and why collaborative federalism has emerged 
as a fundamental concept driving debates over public policy. This literature has operated with an 
implicit understanding that immigration federalism denotes the involvement of multiple levels of 
government in immigration matters and is associated with a shift from centralized to the 
decentralized effort (Su, 2008; Varsanyi et al., 2012). While such a characterization captures the 
general nature of this new phenomenon, immigration federalism is associated with a developing, 
devolving trend common in many policy areas in Canada and the US. In these two nations, 
immigration has traditionally been associated with nation-building, foreign policy, and other 
PNP Immigration Programs Percentages 
Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec 90% 
Rest of Canada 10% 
Figure 4.1:  Economic Immigrant Destinations – 1997  





areas of national interest, which naturally aligned with federal (i.e., centralized) rather than local 
regulation. Now it is increasingly if not mostly directed to economic opportunity. 
In 1992, the Canadian government focused more attention, or at least more debate, 
toward increasing the importance of the economic component of immigrants’ admission. The 
new five-year plan involved an increased investment in language training in improving the 
assimilation of migrants into the markets and increased focus on “designated” occupations 
(Canada, 1992). Launched in May 1991, a nominated occupation list was formed, which 
contained jobs in short supply in specific provinces. Immigrants who matched this list were 
given added points and processed on a high-priority basis. The same year, the government 
introduced a new Immigration Act, designed to provide greater control over the inflow (i.e., a 
degree of powering policy). The Act gave the immigration department broad new regulatory 
powers, including the ability to set limits on components of the inflow and turn away applicants 
once specific numbers had been reached for a particular category. That regulation was an early 
first move toward increased use of immigration for economic policy. The Canadian government 
recommended using the new Act to decrease the percentage of the inflow who were in the family 
reunification category, which dropped from 52 percent in 1992 to 43 percent by 1995 (Green & 
Green, 1995).  
In 1995, the then Liberal government added a new regulatory framework, Into the 21st 
Century: A Strategy for Immigration and Citizenship, which set immigration targets at 1 percent 
of the population level; however, target ranges rather than specific numbers were to be set for 
annual campaigns (Green & Green 2004).  
Even though the Immigration Act of 1976 has reported clear immigration goals, it was 
not until the new program in 2002 that we get a clear preference for immigration’s economic 
component. Separating refugee management from other immigrants and balancing economic and 
family class immigrants mean that economic immigrants are no longer a residual (Green & 
Green, 2004). The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) 2001 renewed the 
Immigration Act, 1976 was enacted on June 28, 2002. Controversially, the government missed 
implementing an element of the legislation that would have achieved a Refugee Appeal Division 





goals and guidelines the Canadian government uses for newcomers’ immigration into Canada. 
The Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR) outline how IRPA’s requirements 
are to be implemented. The Act is governed by Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 
(IRCC) and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).  
In the 2000s, there has been continuous demand for immigrants in Canada. This demand 
is in substantial part due to the aging population and Canada’s inability to fill labour shortages. 
Without immigration, Canada’s economy could experience challenges. In response, since 2003, 
there have been adjustments to Canada’s Immigration System. Ten years ago, the focus was 
more on permanent immigration, while today, Canada’s immigration policy is increasingly 
focussed on recruiting more temporary workers. Typically, these workers will do work that 
locals will not do. The number of immigrant workers in Canada in the last decade has tripled 
from 101,100 to 300,210. In 2013, Federal and Provincial governments designed new measures 
to allow some of those temporary foreign workers to get permanent immigrant status in Canada. 
The Canada Experience Class (i.e., federal immigration program) and Provincial Nominee 
Programs (i.e., every province has specific programs) in particular allow for some transition of 
temporary workers. These programs provide economic immigrants in Canada who have gained 
local work experience and have the opportunity to live in Canada permanently. 
The effect of the increasing number of ‘economic’ class of immigrants is revealed in the 
numbers of newcomers being admitted to Canada, with increases from 137,860 to 156,120 per 
year over the past ten years. One result is a decrease in the number of immigrants coming under 
the family reunification program, with a decline from 62,300 to 56,450 per year over the same 
period. In the 2000s, immigration inflow from China and India was substantial, while in 2010s 
the Philippines have been the source of the highest number of immigrants in the economic class. 
In addition, people who want to escape high unemployment in their home countries—e.g., 
skilled Irish, French, and British—have arrived in Canada. Other changes over the past decade 
include a more significant focus on employment and more effort directed toward integrating 
newcomers into life in Canada. Those changes include a greater focus on language skills and a 





Moreover, the evaluation of a person’s education and qualifications has changed in the 
past decade. Currently, people applying for immigration to Canada need to have their education 
reviewed and get an Educational Credential Assessment (ECA) certifying their international 
educational credentials. Moreover, in the past decade, there has been a growing focus on filling 
the gaps in the labour market in Canada (a key driver in Saskatchewan in particular). Nowadays, 
there are particular eligible occupations for Federal Skilled Worker candidates. Before the 2010s, 
the high skilled immigration program assigned more emphasis on work experience and 
education, but in 2013, the Canadian government moved to make sure that the newcomers who 
arrive in Canada will be able to get jobs where employers are unable to receive workers—hence 
the focus on qualifications. 
In the past decade, the focus of Canada’s immigration policy has shifted from seeking 
highly educated professionals to recruiting more skilled workers who will be able to make a 
substantial contribution to the market workforce in the shortest amount of time. During the past 
decade, Canada was, on average, admitting 230,000–250,000 immigrants a year, with 
approximately 60 percent in the economic class (CIC, 2012a). Such a total annual intake 
constitutes roughly 0.8 percent of the country’s population. Over the entire twenty-five years 
under discussion (1992-2017), the points system has focused this campaign on selecting highly 
skilled migrants. Including the main applicant and their spouses and dependents, economic 
migration overall continues to contribute about 60% of migrants (Hiebert, 2016).  
Immigration policies in the mid-1990s began to respond to a new set of objectives, 
mainly to respond better to short-term regional labour market changes often associated with 
commodity cycles (especially shortages arising in booms) and to shift immigration away from 
the three most significant cities to areas of the nation seeking more economic immigrants. These 
objectives were reflected in the modification of the point system included in IRPA 2002 and 
implementation through a series of new immigrant programs, including the Canadian Experience 
Class, Ministerial Instructions, the Federal Skilled Trades program and the option to apply for 
PR as temporary immigrants from the Live-in-Caregiver program. Program performance 
improved radically in 2002. Nevertheless, more was needed, as none of these programs explicitly 





The Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) was introduced in 1998 (see table 4.6) in 
response, with the forthcoming federal-provincial agreements empowering subnational 
governments in the Canadian immigration policy field (Schmidtke, 2014).  
  
 
Schmidtke (2014) observes that by 2007 eight provinces and one territory had signed 
some form of agreement with the Federal government, which then enable the coordination and 
application of immigration policies and agendas between the two orders of government. Li 
(2003) argues that the PNP created a “multi-tiered system of immigrant selection.” While 
Schmidtke (2014) suggests that the agreements threaten to undermine Canada’s immigrant 
recruitment system and its focus on stringent qualifications and professional expertise, the 
programs are accessible. The PNP platform has solved some difficulties but needs continual 
improvement to support federal-provincial and local immigration processes (e.g., preferment, 
attraction, selection, settlement) to continue to attract high skilled immigrants.  
In January 2017, the Canadian government identified a range of concerns related to 
humanitarian and illegal immigration, which they wanted to address through innovation to the 
PNP. The Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship launched the Atlantic Immigration 









Province/Territory Date of First 
Signed PNP 
Agreement 
Start of PN 
Program in 
P/T 
8 5 3 0 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 1-Sep-99 1999 
6 4 2 0 New Brunswick 22-Feb-99 1999 
5 1 1 3 Manitoba 22-Oct-96 1999 
11 6 5 0 
Prince Edward 
Island 29-Mar-01 2001 
9 2 4 3 Saskatchewan 16-Mar-98 2001 
12 3 6 3 British Columbia 19-Apr-98 2001 
15 8 7 0 Alberta March, 2002 2002 
16 7 8 1 Yukon April, 2001 2002 
19 9 9 1 Nova Scotia 27-Aug-02 2003 
22 10 10 2 Ontario 21-Nov-05 2007 
22 11 11 0 
Northwest 
Territories August, 2009 2009 
Table 4.6: SINP Efficiency/ PN programs to each province/territory 





Pilot to balance these issues with the economic migration program in the four easternmost 
provinces, enabling governments there to identify and contribute to refugee settlement and 
hosting of illegal migrants under review. By including these categories in PNP, the provinces 
have some role in what previously was solely at the discretion of the federal government. 
A paradigm shift is working in the immigration field. After five decades of reform, this 
completes the implementation of immigration federalism, as now almost all discretionary 
immigration is managed through federal-provincial agreements. Saskatchewan has been a major 
beneficiary of this reform. The number of new immigrants arriving in Saskatchewan increased in 
the last decade and a half. Statistics Canada reports the provincial share of Canada’s recent 
immigrants expanded from just under one percent (about one-third of what would be a 
proportionate share) in 2001 to four percent in 2016 (which is more than the province’s share of 
the population, and hence driver for growth). The climb is part of a more significant trend. 
During the past 15 years, the share of recent newcomers in the Prairie Provinces has more than 






PNP Immigration Programs Percentages 
Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec 66% 
 
Rest of Canada 34% 
Figure 4.2:  Economic Immigrant Destinations – 2015-2017  





 According to Durst 2017, in the last few years, Saskatchewan has benefited by attracting 
many "people not only from outside Canada but also within Canada" (CBC News, 2017; 
StatsCan, 2000-2017). Nevertheless, Canada’s birth rate is not likely to meet the province’s 
growing demands. The country needs labour to maintain economic growth and compete in the 
international arena with other nations similar to Canada. Newcomers also bring families and 
children who attend school, rent apartments, and buy houses and cars, all which help sustain the 
overall economy (Durst 2017). Durst notes that "Saskatchewan previously saw a large number of 
immigrants coming from Asia, but now more are coming from the Middle East region and parts 
of Africa", which adds to the cultural diversity of Saskatchewan communities (CBC News, 2017; 
StatsCan, 2000-2017). While this has created some challenges with the older settler population, 
Durst notes there is a general agreement so far that it is important to “keep openness tolerance 
and acceptance of differences.”  
 Indeed, the program is significant for Saskatchewan. Records show that immigrants 
accounted for about 10.5 percent of Saskatchewan’s 2016 census population, up from 6.8 percent 
only five years earlier. A further 12.1 percent of the population are second-generation 
immigrants, while 10.8 percent identify as a visible minority in Saskatchewan. Approximately 
110,000 immigrants have come to Saskatchewan since 2010. 
 
2.2    Australia and Western Australia 
 
 In Australia, under ss. 27 and 51 of the Constitution Act, immigration and emigration 
laws are reserved uniquely to the national government (i.e., federal government). When 
Australian states were separate territories, they autonomously practiced immigration control, 
authorized immigration entrance, and provided settlement assistance (Jupp, 1998); the Australian 
states continued operating a somewhat productive role in immigration until the 1910s (Atchison, 
1988; Jupp, 1998). Following WWI, the federal government took over the role, as immigration 
was viewed as key to achieving two main federal goals: economic expansion and protection 
(Jupp, 2002).  
 The center of the migration program shifted after 1945, as new federal immigration 





years from concentrating on attracting migrants, mostly from the UK, to attracting skilled 
immigrants and temporary skilled immigrants to meet the specific labour demands in the 
economy (Spinks, 2010). After 1945, the federal government was able to expand the Australian 
population to motivate post‐war economic progress and increase the number of people to protect 
the nation (Spinks, 2010). After a substantial rise in migration in the early part of the 1970s, 
there was a decreasing trend in the rate of in-migration through to 2005 (Sibma, 2006). By 1969, 
plans directed the recruitment of as many as 185,000 migrants annually. However, "by 1975, the 
planned intake for the year had been reduced to 50,000" (Spinks, 2010. Australia started mass 
immigration in 1947. Managing the integration of such a large overseas population has been an 
essential goal for successive Australian governments. Early settlement policies were predicated 
on assimilation, with immigrants being required to adapt to Australian norms and values 
(McAllister, 2018). From 1961 to 1971, the WA population in particular increased drastically. 
Statistics show that the WA population surpassed Saskatchewan’s population in that period. In 
1961, Saskatchewan had 925,181 compared with WA at 746,750, but by 1971, WA had 
1,053,834 people, while Saskatchewan was virtually unchanged 926,242.  
 Questions of national identity are highly relevant to Australia. In earlier years, the focus 
was on maintaining the Britishness of society, but more recently, it has involved accommodating 
the highest proportion of foreign-born of any advanced society. As in Canada, since the 1970s, 
immigrant policies have stressed multiculturalism, with migrants being encouraged to retain their 
cultural beliefs and attitudes while at the same time needing only modest skills to gain 
citizenship and, therefore, achieve full political rights (Castles et al., 2003; Markus, Jupp, & 
McDonald, 2009). 
 Australia adapted and adopted the points system from Canada and introduced it in 1979 
to select immigrants. The main difference between the Canadian and Australian points system 
was the specific conditions for selecting immigrants who obtained the best qualifications on 
youth, education, experience, and fluency in English (e.g., the minimum language requirements 
in Canada was lower than Australia on average). Other differences have had minor incidence. 
 Since the 1980s, Australian states have become more actively involved in the 
immigration process and mainly immigrant selection. The level of emigration (permanent 





passenger cards that they are leaving Australia permanently, grew modestly from the early 1980s 
until the mid-1990s and then accelerated sharply (Sibma, 2006). More people were needed to 
meet the outflow. One challenge, as in Canada, is that in the post-war period, immigrants tended 
to gravitate towards the metropolises in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland (esp. 
Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane) (Hugo, 2008). Between 1988 and 2000, these states were 
destinations for, on average, more than 80 percent of newcomers (DIAC, 1999–2000, 9). 
Although their share of arrivals has decreased somewhat since 2000, in 2010–11, these states still 
accounted for almost three-quarters of new migrants (DIAC, 2011). At the same time, regional 
(rural) Australia suffered from outmigration and lack of arrivals, leading to noticeable labour 
shortages (Hugo, 2008, p. 558). While migration estimates are at comparable levels to what 
occurred in the previous period, the focus is now completely different. The primary determinant 
of migration programming since the 1980s has been a focus on the labour market results of 
immigrants (Birrell, 1981) 
 Admissions rose steadily after these changes in the early part of the 1980s; by 1988, there 
was another peak under the Hawke Government with a proposed admission of 145,000. 
However, migration targets were progressively lowered in the 1990s, to a low of 80,000 in 1992–
93 (DIMA, op. cit). While those numbers began to rise again, the main story in 1995-96 to 2008-
09 is that skilled migrants grew from 29 percent to 67 percent of Australia’s total migration 
program. Conversely, the share of immigrants under the Family Stream sunk from 69 percent to 
35 percent (Sibma, 2006). After Howard attained power in 1996, an initial decline was turned 
around, and a progressive increase in the planned migration admission occurred, with 
immigration closely tied to economic growth. In 1996–97, skilled migration moved to 47 percent 
of the migration program—on the way to a new peak in 2008–09 (Spinks, 2010).  
 Multiple policy measures worked to raise the probability that newcomers will be able to 
get a job and achieve economic autonomy, thus decreasing the risk of migrants becoming a drain 
on the public purse. Some of the policy measures introduced in the 1990s included the 
introduction of a nominated skills list, mandating the English language skills required and more 
rigorous rules concerning the recognition of qualifications from abroad to meet acceptability 





workers in the world labour market has been key to a sharp acceleration in immigration to and 
emigration from WA and the rest of the country (Sibma, 2006). 
 There have been three significant long-term improvements in immigration administration 
(Sibma, 2006). First, settlers, specifically those who moved to Australia after obtaining a PR visa 
abroad, are now included in the administration. This category also incorporates New Zealand 
citizens who declare on their passenger card when they land in Australia that they expect to stay 
in Australia permanently. The second category of movers is residents. Residents are described as 
people with the credentials to live in Australia permanently. They incorporate those born in 
Australia and those who were born abroad and who have received a PR visa or Australian 
citizenship. This visa may have been acquired by the overseas-born resident either before 
moving to Australia or as a settler. The third group involves people admitted onshore after the 
person arrived as a visitor.  
 The scale of the annual settler flow is determined mainly by the size of the overall 
migration program. The only element of settler admission outside the migration policy is New 
Zealand citizens, who since the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement of 1973 have free movement 
and right to work without a visa. The number of settlers has also improved because the migration 
program has been enlarged in the 1900s. However, there is a limited relationship between the 
migration program, and the settler flows because some PR visas can be given to people already 
in Australia, especially partners of migrants and international students. In the case of the latter, 
the growth in the numbers of people granted PR under the onshore international student visa 
subclasses under the General Skilled Migration (GSM) program works in such a way that their 
numbers, based on arrival statistics, reduce the available spaces in the rest of the migration 
program for Australia’s workforce.  
 An important point to note is the high mobility of residents. Australia has faced persistent 
net losses of skilled workers, as many residents move overseas permanently for job or family 
reasons. It is also inevitable that a country like Australia with its very high overseas-born 
population (currently about 29 percent) may lose some of these residents because of the strength 
of their ties to family and careers abroad. In the 1990s, the scale of the losses increased 
significantly, generating concerns that Australia may be losing many of its most productive 





Australia on a temporary visa or, if they are a New Zealand citizen, indicating that they are 
visiting Australia. The pattern for visitors offsets some of the domestic demographic trends; in 
some cases, visitors choose to stay in Australia for many years or, perhaps, permanently. Overall, 
the number of skilled immigrants revealing themselves to be visitors on arrival in Australia 
usually exceed those declaring that they are leaving Australia after a long-term visit. Near the 
end of the 1990s, the net gains of skilled visitors to Australia began. Visitors roughly compensate 
for the net losses of residents, thus in numerical terms, the ‘brain drain’ from resident losses is 
comparable to the ‘brain gain’ from visitor flows. As a result, settler inflows are, for the most 
part, net gains for Australia’s skilled workers.  
 Australia in the 1990s designed two major visa classes that enable temporary entry in 
Australia for more than one year. First, overseas student visas allow whereby non-Australians to 
study in full-time accredited and registered courses (generally as full-fee paying students). 
Overseas student visas are generally granted for the duration of the study. Second, business 
visitor visas (esp. 457 Visas) entitle businesses to recruit skilled personnel to fill positions that 
cannot readily be filled locally. Recipients of these visas can stay in Australia for up to four 
years. Since the mid-1990s, the number of temporary visas granted in Australia has risen 
dramatically. Student visas increased from around 53,000 grants in 1994-95 to around 175,000 
grants in 2004-05, partly due to the Australian government’s decision in the late 1990s to allow 
successful overseas students to apply for PR under the Skills Stream of the Migration Program. 
 Driven by overseas migration, Western Australia’s population rose by over half a million 
people in the past decade (Lyly, 2018). Net overseas migration based on temporary skill 
migration) made up 59 percent of the growth (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016). The 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) concludes that overseas immigration was the primary 
driver of WA’s population. The natural increase (births minus deaths) contributed 35 percent of 
growth, while interstate migration added 6 percent but decreased considerably with the slowing 
of the local economy after 2015 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017).  
 It seems that the original purpose for 457 Visas has not worked out precisely as expected.  
For example, the Barrow Island Project rose with a workforce of 8,000. The Temporary work 
visa has certainly become the fastest growing visa type used in both WA and Australia. In 2014-





622,436 temporary visas (Anthony, 2017). This shift signals a move from Australia being a 
settler nation to a temporary-migrant nation (Collins, 2014), a major change in post-war 
immigration policy. That shift is observed in WA as well. After the federal government 
expanded the temporary visa program in 2010, it gave temporary overseas skilled immigrants 
higher processing priority than General Skilled Migration (GSM). As a result, temporary visas 
overtook permanent visas in West Australia for most the past decade. At the end of 2015, 
temporary work visas accounted for 29,960 out of 54,400 (or 55 percent) of total visa arrivals, 
while permanent visas made up 11,780 or 22 percent of total arrivals (irwas.org/west-Australia, 
2017). 
 The challenge with temporary visas is that people fail to build attachments and tend to 
move on at the end of or before the expiry of their visas. As a result, the number of permanent 
departures has doubled in less than a decade, rising from under 30,000 in 1996-97 to around 
62,000 persons in 2004-05 for Australia as a whole. The norm over the past few decades was that 
Australian residents born overseas accounted for the majority of permanent departures (Sibma, 
2006). One concern is that mobility seems to be catching. The most striking feature in recent 
years is the massive rise in the number of Australian-born permanent departures. Australia has 
always had a significant population abroad, but in the past, this was temporary—Australia gained 
much from young Australians experiencing work in other countries and returning to settle. This 
fact suggests it will be in Australia’s interests to develop policies that encourage brain circulation 
rather than brain drain among Australia’s young people. Policy actions relevant to this group 
include establishing and maintaining contact with the diaspora, encouraging expatriates to return, 
and designing initiatives to keep talented Australians in Australia (CEDA). 
 In 2008–09, 55 percent of visas granted under the skills stream were granted to 
dependents of the primary applicant (Spinks, 2010). The Rudd Government for 2008–2009 in the 
wake of the economic challenges resulting from the Global Financial Crisis undertook a review 
of permanent skilled migration (Spinks, 2010). The review concluded the need to shift focus 
away from ‘supply-driven’ independent skilled migration towards ‘demand-driven’ efforts that 
link employers and the government to manage sponsored skilled immigration (Evans, 2012). 
Effective January 2009, skilled workers sponsored by an employer are given more powerful 





and some IT professionals and engineers, were given priority (Spinks, 2010). A second set of 
related reforms in February 2010 sharpened the program’s focus to motivate settler offers to 
those skilled individuals immediately needed by the Australian industry rather than simply to 
make offers based on the supply of independent skilled migrants. The reforms involved the 
cancellation of almost 20,000 General Skilled Migration visas where the applicants remained 
offshore before September 2007, cancellation of the Migration Occupations in Demand List 
(MODL) and the phasing out of the Critical Skills List which was launched in 2009. The reforms 
also triggered a review of the points test, under which candidates for the general skilled 
migration program are granted points against particular rules (e.g., age, education, English 
language ability) and must reach a particular pass mark in order to qualify for the grant of a visa 
(Spinks, 2010). 
 In July 2010, Australia launched a new Skilled Occupation List (SOL) began, with 181 







 That list was designed to ensure the Skilled Migration Program is demand‐driven rather 
than supply‐driven. In order to be qualified for independent skilled migration, applicants must 
hold significant qualifications in occupations listed on the SOL. Occupations that have been 
recognized as no longer in demand, such as cooks and hairdressers, were excluded from the list. 
 
Skill Stream in Detail 
 
 for permanent skilled migration was set at 113 850, 
ecting highly skilled people to 
as of 
the Australian economy 
categories where priority was given to occupations on 
 the 
: SOL/Non SOL by program category (primary 
applicants) 
The skill stream outcome for 2010-11 was 113 725 places (46 616 offshore and 
67 109 onshore) and represented -0.11 per cent of the initial planning level of
113 850. 
In 2010-11, the planning level
an increase of 5.0 per cent from the 2009-10 planning level of 108 100.  The 
increase was in response to signs of an improving labour market following a 
significant slowdown in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis. 
The 2010-11 skilled migration program focused on sel
deliver a more responsive and targeted migration program, particularly in are
still experiencing skills shortages.  The program targeted the 
following visa pathways: 
• the employer sponsored category; 
• the state or territory government sponsored categories; and 
• the independent skilled 
the skilled occupation list (SOL). 
Outcomes across priority (sponsored) groups represented 62.1 per cent of the skill 
stream outcome in 2010-11, compared to 61.6 per cent in 2009-10.  Priority 
processing measures are adjusted periodically to ensure the economy receives
skills it needs currently, and have been in effect since 1 January 2009. 
In 2010-11 90.0 per cent of primary applicants in the skilled independent category 
had an occupation on the SOL compared to 91.3 per cent in 2009-10.  Figure 5 
displays the SOL/Non SOL breakdown by visa category. 





















































































Demand in the skill stream was lower over the 2010-11 program year compared to 
2009-10.  Some 122 794 lodgements were received in the skill stream in 2010-11 
compared to 147 444 in 2009-10, a 20.0 per cent decrease.  Some 166 242 clients 
remain in the pipeline as at 30 June 2011. 
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The SOL is updated annually (Spinks, 2010). The 2010–11 Migration Program, announced in 
May 2010, allocated 168,700 places, made up of 113,850 places in the economic immigration 
program, 54,550 places in the family immigration program and 300 unique eligibility places 
(Spinks, 2010). 
According to the 2011 Australian census, by then, 26 percent of the population were 
immigrants, with a further 20 percent first-generation offspring of immigrants (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Most immigrants to Australia come from the UK; in the 2011 census, 
around 1 in 20 Australian residents (or 1.1 million) had been born in the UK (2011 Australian 
census). Other large foreign-born groups include New Zealand (483,000), China (319,000), India 
(295,000) and Italy and Vietnam (185,000 each). Together, these six countries constitute almost 
half of all of the overseas-born population in Australia (McAllister, 2018). Combining first and 
second-generation immigrants, almost half of the Australian population, is either a migrant or the 
child of a migrant. This level of overseas born within the population easily surpasses all other 
immigrant societies, including Canada, the US, and Israel (https://data.oecd.org) (McAllister, 
2018).  
As in many other immigrant societies; therefore, Australia has progressively developed 
policies aimed at making it as easy as possible for immigrants to assimilate into the host society 
(Koopmans et al., 2012). Ensuring an inclusive sense of national identity is widely accepted as 
crucial to Australia’s long-term stability and prosperity (McAllister, 2018).  
 
2.3.    Comparative analysis of institutional factors  
 
    Saskatchewan and Western Australia both look to have similar structural and 
institutional factors. Both are resource-based and export-dependent, and throughout their 
histories have depended on immigration for population and economic growth. Immigration 
federalism has also been a key part of the history in both jurisdictions. The introduction of the 
immigration point system and regional agreements to include subnational priorities and efforts in 
immigration management has been vital to both jurisdictions' economic and demographic 
progress in recent years. On the face of it, the two systems look very similar, but there are some 





First, Saskatchewan is in a more vulnerable situation, with a higher dependence on a 
narrower set of primary resource exports accessible only through expensive land or air 
transportation systems, fewer local institutions with global reach and significant local and 
regional competition for skilled labour and business development. In contrast, isolation works in 
Western Australia’s favour, as there is low competition regionally, and they can use their 
proximity to Asia and ocean access to serve the world’s fastest-growing markets competitively. 
Canada has been the innovator on immigration policy as the global first adopter of the 
point system, multiculturalism and immigration federalism. Nevertheless, often the first is not 
best. As the imitator, Australia has been able to transfer the learnings from Canada and create 
more tailored and responsive systems. The constitutional role for both federal and provincial 
efforts on immigration has narrowed the range of options. The capacity for diversity is relatively 
narrow in Canada. 
In contrast, there was no real emancipation of the states in Australia—the constitution 
unambiguously and fully allocates authority for immigration policy to the Commonwealth. This 
clarifies who will drive the policy and in some ways facilitates diversity of effort. The 
Commonwealth government is able to do one-off deals with both states and cities/regions. 
Australia has added to the devolution of authority with Designated Area Migration Agreements 
(DAMA), such as with the City of Kalgoorlie-Boulder in WA, where the cities are part of the 





CHAPTER V:  
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM IN SASKATCHEWAN AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
 
This chapter examines the long-standing differentiation between Canadian and Australia 
driven by their immigration systems. Whether immigration federalism is likely to reinforce or 
reduce existing similarities between these two types of immigration systems is assessed. 
1.    Canada and the Saskatchewan Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) 
     The Canadian federal government and provinces /territories began co-operating on 
immigration as far back as 1976. Nevertheless, the early federal discussion with provinces and 
territories about immigration was limited. While the system had moved to use points for 
selection, it remained at a high level, and there were no patterns, checklists or processes about 
regional or sectoral demands to structure the discussion, so the federal-provincial engagement 
was weak and mostly ineffective (Schmidtke, 2014).  
The Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) was introduced in 1998 to provide provinces 
with a mechanism to articulate to domestic economic growth needs. Each province and territory 
(PT) signed and started the PNP at different times. By 2007 the PNP effort included nine 
provinces and two territories, each which can nominate potential immigrants who meet specific 
provincial/territorial needs and who intended to remain in the nomination region. The PNP is a 
policy tool that assists federal and provincial governments to direct, control and manage 
economic immigration. In addition, PNP provides a structure for the federal government and PT 
governments to coordinate planning, administration and evaluation of the annual programs for 
economic immigrants into each PT. 
Moreover, PNP helps the Federal Government and PT to work together to refine the 
technical requirements for potential high skilled immigrants (PNP Evaluation Report, 2012) 
(table 5.1). The 2009 PNP Logic Model provides four key objectives. The first objective 
attempts to increase the economic benefits of immigration to PTs, in full consideration of 
provincial and territorial economic development priorities and local labour market conditions. 
The second objective is to distribute the benefits of immigration more widely and equitably 





collaboration and coordination. Finally, the program is designed to encourage development and 
strengthening of official language minority communities (English in Quebec and parts of the 
Maritimes and Ontario and French almost everywhere except Quebec).   
 
Total Provincial Nominee Program immigrants as percent of all economic immigrants, 
cumulative totals 2011-2017  
Provincial Nominee Program Total Economic Migrants PNP as % total 
Total 307,292 1,115,865 28 
NL 2,521 4,075 62 
PE 9,604 10,029 96 
NS 11,056 15,852 70 
NB 13,043 14,706 89 
QC 179* 235,769* 0 
ON 23,351 354,573 7 
MB 72,562 77,937 93 
SK 62,042 68,758 90 
AB 65,271 181,774 36 
BC 45,555 150,093 30 
YT 219 319 69 
NT 1,210 1,450 83 
NU 243 516 47 
Table 5.1: PNP Percentages 
Source: Paul Trujillo calculations using CEIC data. 
* Quebec has a separate system for selecting migrations other than the PNP program 
 
 While the nominee program was initially primarily charged with attracting economic 
immigrants to support each jurisdiction’s economic goals, several PTs have introduced other 
objectives, such as regional development, into their Provincial Nomination (PN) agendas. Since 
the PNP started, the atmosphere has transformed remarkably. Conflict and confusion reigned 
before the program; as the PNP processes evolved, provinces began to have a better appreciation 
for federal challenges, the federal system gained insights into the dynamics of local and regional 
labour markets, and both parties found grounds for compromise and success. Provinces, such as 
PEI, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and New Brunswick, have used the PNP as the primary channel 
through which they select immigrants to their region; in those provinces, about 90% or more of 





 The initial PNP incorporated the federal points system, with applicants being judged on 
their education, occupational skills, employment prospects, age, proficiency in English or 
French, and personal attitude. Applicants earning 50 points or more out of a possible 100 were 
allowed entry, with other selection criteria refined in specific programs developed under the 
PNP. As of 2020, the PNP operates five programs that manage different types of economic and 
skilled migrants. 
     Canada and Saskatchewan have signed a range of different types of agreements, all of 
which work to improve the collaboration between the federal and provincial governments. The 
most critical agreements were the Canada-Memorandum of Understanding on the Off-campus 
Work Permit Program for International Students in April 2006 and the Canada-Saskatchewan 
Memorandum of Understanding on Post-Graduation Employment for Foreign Students in May 
2004. For this study, we focus on the Canada-Saskatchewan Immigration Agreement signed in 
May 2005, which includes the changes related to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(IRPA), 2002. The purpose of the 2005 agreement is to determine the particular roles and 
obligations of the federal and provincial governments in the processes governing permanent and 
temporary newcomers being recruited to Saskatchewan under the IRPA. 
     The Canada-Saskatchewan Immigration Agreement, 2005, has ten objectives. The first 
objective fosters an active partnership between Canada and Saskatchewan within the 
immigration processes (e.g., promotion, recruitment, selection, admission, control, settlement, 
and integration) for all migrants seeking to come to Saskatchewan (www.canaca.ca). Second, the 
agreement provides Canada and Saskatchewan processes to consult and cooperate on the 
expansion and implementation of plans, programs, and tools to determine the levels and 
distribution of immigrants to Saskatchewan and Canada, including those to promote and support 
the expansion of minority official language communities in Saskatchewan. Third, the agreement 
sets the objective to cooperatively develop and implement new initiatives and projects that meet 
regional immigration needs. Fourth, the agreement lays out principles to coordinate the roles and 
responsibilities between Canada and Saskatchewan immigration processes. Fifth, the agreement 
sets expectations that the relationship will provide Saskatchewan with the opportunity to address 
its social, demographic, economic growth, and labour market needs, including skills shortages. 
Sixth, it lays out steps to foster cooperation in information sharing, investigation, and evaluation 





agree to deliver programs and initiatives to settle and integrate immigrants in Saskatchewan, 
including appropriate, fair, and ongoing funding for settlement services provided in 
Saskatchewan. Eighth, the agreement sets an objective of developing cooperation in achieving 
humanitarian goals and family reunification. Ninth, the parties signalled intentions to cooperate 
in the construction and implementation of policies to address limitations to qualification 
verification and assimilation of immigrants into the labour market. Finally, tenth, the parties 
agreed to cooperate in facilitating movements of temporary workers and students to 
Saskatchewan.  
     While Saskatchewan signed its PNP agreement in 1998 and operationalized it in 2001, it 
wasn’t until these refinements in the mid-2000s that the program got moving. Quebec started 
from the beginning in 1968 with some own immigration regulations, but Saskatchewan started to 
promote immigration in 2009. The first years saw few PNP selections, but by 2009, the program 
was functioning, and the number of economic migrants through the program started to grow.  
     In 2012, the Minister of Immigration, Jason Kenney, announced that Canada saw positive 
results from the PNP’s perspective. The minister reported that nationally, Canada had gone from 
5,000 admissions under the Provincial Nominee Program in 2005 to 45,000 planned for 2012 
(Canada Archive Speeches, 2011). Kenney particularly singled out the sharp rise in immigration 
to the West and East. Immigration to Atlantic Canada doubled, to Manitoba tripled, to 
Saskatchewan quadrupled and to Alberta doubled over those five years. Of particular note, 
Saskatchewan went from only 2,000 permanent residents settling in 2005 to 9,000 in 2011 
(Canada Archive Speeches 2011). The program helped fuel provincial population growth and 
turned Saskatoon into one of the fastest-growing urban centres in Canada for much of that 
period. That, in no small measure, was achieved by expanding the admission of provincial 
nominees through the Saskatchewan Immigrant Nominee Program, the specific PNP for the 
province, from 500 skilled immigrants in 2005 to 8,700 in 2011 (Kenney, 2012). 
     How do the Saskatchewan Immigrant Nominee Program (SINP) nominations work? 
SINP offers a skilled worker system to enter Canada. Through the SINP, Saskatchewan requests 
residency applications from skilled workers who want to come to Saskatchewan and nominate 
successful candidates to the federal government to gain permanent residency in Canada. The 





potential candidates must also apply for PR through Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship 
Canada (IRCC) Canadian Immigration Commission. 
 Nonetheless, it is very significant to understand who is not eligible to apply. First, 
refugee applicants in Canada who seek refugee status from the Government of Canada are not 
eligible. Second, individuals living illegally in Canada or their nation of residence are exempt. 
Third, people who have had a removal order issued against them by Immigration, Refugees, and 
Citizenship Canada (IRCC) or the Canada Border Services Agency are ineligible. Fourth, people 
who are prohibited from entering Canada for any reason are barred. Potential immigrants may be 
rejected for immigration to Canada if the applicant or any dependent family member 
(accompanying or not) does not meet IRCC’s requirements. Those requirements are related to 
health and criminality, unresolved custody or child support disputes affecting any member of the 
applicant’s family or their representatives intentionally misrepresenting the applicants in the 
application. When SINP administrators believe there has been a misrepresentation in an 
application, they will hold off on processing it until after SINP officers investigate. SINP 
administrators will send the applicant, their intended employer, and their representative, a 
“procedural fairness letter” with details. They will be able to send in evidence that they did not 
commit misrepresentation. The critical task for economic immigrants who desire to immigrate to 
Saskatchewan is to prove that they intend to live and work in Saskatchewan. Those potential 
skilled immigrants need to complete applications correctly and deliver valid documentation. 
Every potential skilled immigrant creates an account and completes the different sections. They 
need to scan and upload all the completed applications and backup credentials in PDF format 
onto their online submission. The final stage is to save and submit their applications online and 
keep the originals for supplementary review.  
 SINP administrators will then review applications in stages, to make sure they are 
complete. Complete applications will have all the requirements adequately submitted as per the 
checklist. Incomplete applications will not be accepted, and applicants may need to reapply and 
submit a new request. SINP administrators send a letter informing of any deficiencies in the 
candidates’ application. Complete applications proceed to the review stage, at which point SINP 
officials may yet request more documentation. SINP officials provide potential migrants some 
time to submit supplementary documentation, and SINP immigration officials may, at times, 





Potential immigrants will remain in the process if SINP immigration officials receive the 
required information in the given time. If applicants did not, they might be deemed ineligible. 
The detailed judgment is then communicated directly to the applicant or their agent—the SNIP 
deems this important as it strives to be transparent and accountable. However, applicants do not 
know, and it is impossible to determine who makes the decisions—is it a board, a designated 
official or some more distributed set of decision-makers.  
 Once SINP administrators have checked all the information in the applications, they will 
make a recommendation on the nomination. There are only two types of decisions at this stage. If 
an application is approved, the candidate is deemed nominated. SINP administrators send the 
applicant a nomination package with information on the next steps. Applicants will have to apply 
to IRCC within six months of nomination for their visas. If applications are ineligible, SINP 
administrators send the applicant a notification letter. The applicant may ask for a secondary 
review. SINP has procedures and guidelines for each category. It is important to note that the 
SINP staff works through the Government of Canada embassies and consulates worldwide to 
promote, identify and recruit, but does not use immigration consultants or other commercial 
agencies or representatives. As an applicant, potential immigrants to Saskatchewan can choose to 
work with an immigration consultant or not, but they are their agents and have no special status 
with SINP. No immigration consultant is allocated any immigrant quotas of any sort from the 
province of Saskatchewan, or any other province in the program.  
     Each year, the SINP sets a maximum number of applicants in each of its recruitment 
categories to make the program more efficient. The program for Saskatchewan was finally 
launched in 2002, four years after the provincial PNP was signed. In 2006, the first cap was put 
on the number of people who can be nominated, and a specific occupation-in-demand profile 
was developed. Over the years, the SINP has developed multiple streams for entry of particularly 
skilled people, building flexibility into the immigration campaigns. A range of innovations has 
been developed in the system. In 2016, Saskatchewan adopted a pathway similar to the federal 
Express Entry stream to accelerate recruitment and admissions. At that point, the federal system 
required, and the province incorporated a requirement for proof of settlement funds and a 






     The SINP effort has changed over time. Currently, there are two main SINP categories 
for skilled immigrants. First, the International Skilled Worker Category (ISWC) targets three 
main types of skilled workers, those who are abroad and want to work and live in Saskatchewan 
and either have an employment offer or have demonstrated skills in an occupation in-demand 
(but do not need a job offer) and those living and working in the province at the time of 
application. Second, the Entrepreneur and Farm Category is open for entrepreneurs who plan to 
start a business or those wanting to own and operate a farm. This study focuses on the first 
category, the International Skilled Worker Category (ISWC).  
     The most innovative part of the International Skill Worker Category is the programs 
targeted on recruiting abroad: the ISW-Employment Offer, the ISW-Occupation in Demand, and 
the ISW-Saskatchewan Express Entry (SINP-EE).  
     The ISW-Employment Offer subcategory is for skilled immigrants who get a job offer for 
a skilled occupation in Saskatchewan. Applicants may be qualified for this subcategory if they 
live abroad or have evidence of formal status in the country, are not a refugee seeker, and in 
2020 must score at least 60 points out of 100 on the SINP point evaluation framework. Points are 
granted based on five elements: education and training, skilled job experience; language 
proficiency; age; and, adaptability to the province labour market. Potential immigrants to 
Saskatchewan need at least one year of work experience in the applicants’ proposed occupation 
in the past ten years. Also, applicants need to reach a literature score of at least Canadian 
Language Benchmark (CLB) 4, while employers and professional governing bodies may request 
language scores higher than CLB 4. Applicants need to be sure to provide documents to prove 
that they are eligible and meet the five factors above. For instance, if an applicant claims 20 
points for having a university degree, the applicant must attach a copy of their university degree 
and complete transcripts. If their diploma or transcript is in a language other than English or 
French, they must also attach a verified translated version. Applications submitted where 
documents are missing or not appropriately translated will be considered incomplete, and the 
application will be closed. If an application is closed, applicants will be sent a letter and advised 
to reapply at a later date with a complete application. This system is quite flexible in some ways. 
The threshold points for nomination can and have been changed over the past years based on 





result, any one province’s criteria may vary from the rest (within bounds) and any federal targets 
in similar programs. 
      Potential skilled immigrants need to know about using Immigration representatives. 
Immigrant workers are not required to use an immigration representative or consultant to apply 
to the SINP. However, if they wish to hire a representative, candidates must make sure they are a 
lawyer in Canada in a good reputation with a provincial law society or licensed by the 
Government of Saskatchewan. There are online-lists of licensed/approved consultants and 
recruiters. Potential immigrants can study more about Saskatchewan’s laws that protect foreign 
workers from exploitation and abuse through the recruitment and immigration process by visiting 
Protection for Immigrants and Foreign Workers. Applicants must show proof of eligibility for 
Saskatchewan licensure if their intended occupation is in a regulated profession or compulsory 
apprenticed trade; they will need this as part of applicants’ SINP application. To see if their 
intended occupation is regulated in Saskatchewan, they can go to Regulated Occupations and 
Licensing Requirements (ROLR). 
      Immigrants through the Employment Offer sub-program need to have an offer of 
permanent, full-time employment in Saskatchewan. They require a robust SINP job approval 
letter as proof. There is no particular record of occupations in Saskatchewan. However, a 
candidate’s application is expected to be part of the National Occupational Classification (NOC) 
Matrix level “A,” “B,” or “0”, or in a designated trade in Saskatchewan (www.SK.ca). Food and 
beverage servers should apply to the Hospitality & Project subcategory, and health professionals 
should apply to the Health Professionals subcategory.  
 The ISW-Occupation in Demand (ISWOD) is for economic immigrants who do not hold 
a job offer in the province but are part of the highly-skilled in-demand occupation in the province 
and meet the subcategory criteria. Individuals may be eligible in the trade, regulated, or non-
regulated occupational categories. Applicants may qualify for this subcategory if they live 
outside Canada or have proof of legal status in Canada. This subcategory asks the same 
requirements as a skilled international worker by employment offer subcategory: applicants 
should not be a refugee seeker; they need to score a minimum of 60 points out of 100 on the 
SINP point assessment grid, and they need to have a language score of at least Canadian 
Language Benchmark (CLB) 4. The main differences to the ISWEO are: applicants need to 





to Canadian education method, and applicants must have earned a diploma or a license, or degree 
related to the major that they have studied. If applicants have obtained degrees outside Canada, 
such as an academic or technical degree, diploma, or certificate, applicants must submit an 
educational credential assessment (ECA) from a designated organization, as per IRCC’s list of 
recognized institutions. Applicants who have achieved trades or vocational training as part of 
their high school education are not required to submit an ECA (e.g., get an ECA certificate takes 
in overage 10-12 weeks) but must instead apply for licensure as defined on the In-Demand 
Occupations List for SINP requirements related to professional status and licensure. The 
Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship has nominated ECA Assessment Service, a 
private educational credential assessment service, to assess credentials for individuals applying 
for immigration to Canada. Applicants in ISWOD need at least one of the following conditions 
in their field of expertise, over and above their education or training credentials: one-year 
experience in the past ten years in a skilled profession (non-trades); two years’ experience in a 
skilled trade in the past five years; or twelve months of work in Canada in the past three years 
(non-trades and trades). 
 Moreover, they need work experience in a high skilled occupation in the National 
Occupational Classification (NOC) Matrix level “A,” “B,” or “0” that is included on the SINP 
In-Demand Occupation List. Applicants may be asked to present evidence of professional status 
or license (e.g., regulated occupations or those with professional certification standards in the 
country and Saskatchewan) for their occupation on the SINP In-Demand Occupation List for 
these requirements. If applicants are requested to provide proof of licensure, their applications 
are not processed until such proof is provided; otherwise, applications will be delivered as 
incomplete, and the application fee (currently $300 per application) is not refunded. People 
skilled in occupations without licensing in Canada are exempt, even if they may be licensed 
elsewhere. SINP will advise applicants as appropriate. 
 Skilled workers looking to immigrate to Saskatchewan under the SINP Occupation In-
Demand and Express Entry (EE) are required to submit an Expression of Interest (EOI) profile of 
their skills and qualifications. The EOI is an online pre-application process that allows 
candidates to register their interest in immigrating and disclosing their qualifications. Candidates 
can only hold one EOI profile. SINP assesses the EOI against local needs and criteria and invites 





number of candidates who may submit an EOI, not all candidates who do so will be invited. The 
points scores linked with an EOI profile will determine the likelihood of receiving an invitation. 
Those with high scores inside the pool of nominees will hold a more prominent option of being 
invited to apply. 
     A particular example of the program in Saskatchewan is the recruitment of medical 
experts. The Medical Council of Canada must assess candidates planning to apply as a physician 
or specialist physician (NOC 3111 or 3112). Individuals expecting to get a PR as a pharmacist 
(NOC 3131) must have an assessment from the Pharmacy Examining Board of Canada. The 
matching process inside SINP determines which eligible candidates may get invitations. After 
applicants receive an invitation to apply through the EOI system, they must follow all the 
standard guidelines and processes.  
 The ISW-Saskatchewan Express Entry subcategory is for economic workers who want to 
live and work in Saskatchewan, but unlike other programs, they need to be in the Immigration, 
Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) Express Entry Pool. They can apply simultaneously or 
sequentially. Candidates to immigrate to Saskatchewan in this category may qualify if they live 
outside Canada or have proof of legal status in Canada. Applicants accepted into IRCC’s Express 
Entry Pool are assigned an Express Entry Profile Number and Job Seeker Validation Code, 
which clears the federal process. Express entry is a digital system that IRCC uses to deal with 
applications for permanent residence from skilled workers. Those applicants with high scores 
within the pool of candidates have a greater chance of being invited to apply. The benefit of this 
pathway is that processing times are capped at six months or less, and once a candidate has been 
assigned to the Express Entry Pool, they have more time to enter the country. In other programs, 
if they fail to match or take up an opportunity within six months, they have to reapply.  
     As noted, the differences between these three subcategories from the Immigration Skilled 
Worker Category’ are explained in Annexes. 
 The SINP version of the PNP, a dynamic, flexible, user-friendly, focused, and most 
effective collaborative delivery of immigration policy in Saskatchewan, is one of the better 
examples of immigration federalism in Canada. The most obvious benefit is that Saskatchewan 
has graduated from being mostly disconnected from international migration (and a great place to 
come from) to being one of the larger and sustained hosts of skilled immigration. Before the 





has attracted upwards of 15,000 per annum. The dramatic turnaround in the provincial economy 
over the same period would have been limited if not truncated without access to these workers. 
Furthermore, the provincial population is rapidly diversifying, with more than 10 percent visible 
minorities in 2016, compared with only about 5 percent a decade earlier.  
     The program also has improved relations between the two orders of government. Both the 
federal and provincial governments are now more aware of each other’s interests and, 
particularly for the province, their interests are advanced and realized in this new programming 
space. While the high-level conflict has diminished, and there are no significant disagreements 
about the program’s principles and objectives, both parties would like improvements. At times, 
the federal government is concerned about the rigour of the provincial processes while the 
province regularly asks for larger quotas. Beyond the scope of the current programming, 
applicants themselves signal an interest in greater support. The current federal and SINP 
programming provides little or no support for applicants to meet the needs of the program itself; 
applicants are forces to rely upon third-party consultants and advisors. This fact has created an 
immigration consultation business that helps but also creates a wedge between the program and 
users, at some considerable cost.  
 
2.    Australia and the WA State-Sponsored Regional Migration (SSRM) Program  
 At times, Australia has been an imitator and, at times, an innovator, ultimately making 
immigration federalism a uniquely Australian program. While Australia moved as early as 1972 
towards a merit-based selection process, it wasn’t until 1989 that Australia implemented a points 
system. Once policy started to change, Australia went further and faster to a much more 
distributed system, with cities, sub-state regions and regions all having distinct roles in the 
system. Along the way, the country developed a range of visa classes tailored to local needs that 
differ markedly from the Canadian model. One outcome of the focus on tailored programming is 
that the Australian system is more about temporary labour-market management than permanent 
settlement.  
 Australia operated a largely race-based immigration process until the 1970s, as the goal 
was to populate and secure the territory with white, ideally British migrants. While merit 





years the number of criteria has grown so that currently the system assigns to applications based 
on their assessment against 11 criteria: age; English language ability; credentialed community 
language requirements; skills; partner skills; educational qualifications; Australian study 
requirements; professional year in Australia, and nominations by states or territories for one of 
the key visa subclasses (190 or 490). (Hereafter, we will only refer to states as the focus is on 





 Immigration federalism began formally in 1996 with the introduction of the State-
Sponsored Regional Migration (SSRM) program, a program similar to the PNP system in 
Canada. Canada’s early stated goal was to distribute migration more widely in order to populate 
underdeveloped areas. The system was created mainly in answer to lobbying by states and 
territories as they looked for a solution to skill shortages that impacted their economy and social 
progress (Hugo, 2008). Most of the states were faced with difficulties of low population growth 
and struggling economies, partly complicated by and partly ignored by the population policy that 
routed immigrant settlement into large urban centres. With the introduction of the SSRM system, 
Figure 5.1: State-Specific and Regional Migration outcomes in Australia 





the state, local government and employers could sponsor newcomers to meet their specific needs 
(Hugo, 2008). The preferred mechanism was to use different visa categories. A range of visas 
was included in the SSRM: Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS); State and Territory 
Nominated Independent scheme (STNI); Skilled Designated Area Sponsored Visa Categories 
(SDAS); Skilled Designated Area Sponsored Overseas Student Category; Skilled Onshore 
Designated Area Sponsored New Zealand Citizen Visa Category; Regional Established Business 
in Australia (REBA); and Skilled Independent Regional (Provisions) Category (SIR). 
     The Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS) was a critical component of the 
push to attract migrants to non-urban regions (migration.wa.gov.au). RSMS, launched in 1995, 
allows employers in a designated RSMS area to attract skilled workers from abroad. The 
program supports skilled immigrants from overseas to fill skilled vacancies for a minimum of a 
couple of years. Successful nominees who are qualified to live in these regions can apply to 
migrate permanently to Australia after two years of residency. The number of visas awarded 
under the RSMS is relatively low (only 8,811 places in 2008–09) but volatile (the targets rose 74 
percent in both 2007–08 and 2008–09) (Spinks, 2010).  
 State governments may sponsor migrants under a range of other programs and visa 
categories. Spinks (2010) mentions "the Business Skills Visa Category (BSVC) enables states to 
sponsor entrants with business skills to set up businesses in regional, rural, or low-growth areas 
of Australia. In 2008–09, around 96.4 percent of all provisional business-skills-visa applications 
were state-sponsored” (Spinks, 2010).  
     The Australian government in 2010 added the Enterprise Migration Agreements (EMA) 
and Regional Migration Agreements (RMA). The first EMA allowed regional areas, states and 
territories to negotiate umbrella framework agreements. Those programs are intended to help 
employers access skills and technical expertise unavailable in Australia’s regions. The Australian 
government wanted to encourage overseas businesses to establish Australian operations or to 
fulfill contractual obligations under Australian projects or contracts through local production. 
Australia’s recent information indicates that regional migration initiatives are becoming more 
successful (www. aph.gov.au, 2010). In 2009, the total number of visas granted under all the 
State‐Specific and Regional Migration (SSRM) initiatives was 33,474, a 28 percent increase 
from 2007–08, equal to 29 percent of the total skills stream for 2008–09 (DIAC, Report on 





operation, in 2017, WA put a pause on processing state-level Regional Sponsored Migration 
Scheme (RSMS) 187 Visa subclass, although RSMS applications continued to be accepted in a 
number of regions in the state, including Gascoyne, Great Southern, Kimberly, Mid-West, Peel, 
Pilbara, South West, and Wheatbelt. The Perth metropolitan area is explicitly excluded from the 
definition of Regional Australia for the RSMS.  
     The Designated Area Migration Agreement (DAMA) is another immigration program for 
highly-skilled immigrants, and the program entails a formal agreement between the Australian 
government and a regional, state or territory authority. DAMA is a two-tier framework that 
operates in a specific regional area. The first tier is an overarching five-year deed of agreement 
(head agreement) with the region’s representative. The second tier covers individual labour 
arrangements with specific employers under the head agreement for that region. DAMA provides 
access to more economic immigrants than the standard skilled migration program. Under the 
DAMA framework, employers in designated areas experiencing skills and labour shortages can 
sponsor skilled and semi-skilled overseas workers. The unique feature of DAMA is that it lets 
skilled immigrants nominated by their employers in the region live and work in Australia 
permanently—almost all the other skilled worker immigration classes offer temporary access, 
which requires further applications and reviews to be converted to permanent residence. DAMA 
provides flexibility for states, territories, or regions to respond to their unique economic and 
labour market conditions. For example, in WA, the Goldfields Designated Area Migration 
Agreement (Goldfields DAMA) is an employer-sponsored visa program, that comes under the 
Temporary Skill Shortage Visa Subclass 482 (labour agreement stream) and the Employer 
Nomination Scheme Visa Subclass 186 (labour agreement c) (www.migration.gov.au). "An 
individual worker cannot apply for a visa independently under the Goldfields DAMA; workers 
must look for a job with a Goldfields business who will sponsor them" 
(www.ckb.wa.gov.au/Doing-Business/DAMA).  
      Applicants sometimes cannot understand how the Australian Immigration System Works, 
which affects immigration to WA. One complication is that the Australian immigration system 
has two different lists of occupations. First, the Australian and New Zealand Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO) is a combined list-code for every occupation, which 
gives information on the skill level of jobs, qualifications and experience needed to work in 





in 2009 and 2014 with minor changes. Second, the general Skilled Occupation List (SOL), 
directed to migrants other than from NZ operated, identifies the genuine skill needs across 
Australia. These lists underpin the employer-sponsored, points-tested, state-nominated and 
training visa programs. The lists are revised regularly in response to changing market and skills 
needs. In 2017, the SOL was replaced by the Medium and Long-term Strategic Skills List 
(MLTSSL) and a corresponding short-term list. One of the significant changes in the MLTSSL 
was the expansion of the number of occupations to 212. Applicant’s skills need to be assessed 
for skilled migration by the relevant assessing authority for the occupation they are nominated 
and applying for. There are a range of visa subclasses to segment migrants by their context: 186 
– Employer Nomination Scheme; 187 – Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme; 189 – Skilled 
Independent (Points-tested stream); 190 – Skilled; 407 Training Visa-Nominated; 482 – 
Temporary Skill Shortage; 485 – Temporary Graduate; 489 – Skilled Regional (Provisional); and 
186 – Employer Nomination Scheme.. 
     WA actively nominates immigrants for the permanent Skilled Nominated visa (subclass 
190) and the temporary Skilled Regional (provisional) visa (subclass 489), which authorizes 
economic immigrants to live in the state after entry (www.migration.wa.gov.au). The process for 
obtaining State nomination has three extended stages. First, applicants must submit an eligible 
Expression of Interest (EOI) profile to the Department of Home Affairs through the Skill Select 
Database (SSD). The EOI stage does not incur any fee but is also not a visa application. 
Applicants are immediately informed of whether they meet the pass mark for their chosen 
occupation and thus will not be invited to apply for a visa. Those applicants who meet or exceed 
the skills required for their chosen occupation will be contacted by the Commonwealth 
government or the specific state they have indicated an interest in of their success. At that point, 
they are eligible to be nominated for a skilled visa by either an Australian employer or one of the 
governments.  
     Applications with approved EIO profiles are sorted and selected based on a range of 
criteria. First, applicants eligible for the general stream are ranked by their points score; 
applicants may be eligible for the graduate stream if they have two years of full-time study at a 
WA university or other formal institution in WA, either at the undergraduate or graduate level. 
Second, applicants are then judged based on the amount of Australian work experience in their 





Fourth, under specific programs, applicants may be required to participate in a skills assessment 
or appropriate test. Fifth, the current eligibility of an applicant’s intended occupation is checked. 
Sixth, applicants must have an available nominated occupation in the intended visa subclass on 
the specific state skilled migration occupation list (e.g. the Western Australia SMOL) if 
applicants are using the general stream or the graduate occupation list (GOL) if they are using 
the graduate stream (table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2: Western Australian Skilled Migration Occupation List & Graduate Occupation List 
Source: WA Government. 
 
 Assessments need to be validated, confirming the candidate meets the threshold in each 
category. The skills assessment is key. An assessing authority checks that applicants meet the 
standards they set, including all university or trade qualifications for their occupation. 
Assessments are valid for three years from their issue date unless a shorter period is listed on the 
assessment. Assessing authorities cannot and do not provide migration advice or any updates 
regarding a candidates’ visa applications. 
     The first step to getting skills assessment is to check the list of eligible skilled 
occupations (list of eligible skilled occupations). This list tells applicants the relevant assessing 
authority for each occupation. Unlike in Canada, where third-party services do these 
assessments, the assessors in Australia are the actual regulatory authority for the profession or 
occupation. As a result, there is a higher chance that immigrants will be able to take up and 
practise their profession in Australia immediately—migrants to Canada often find that their 
foreign credentials, while sufficient for immigration, do not qualify them to practice in their field 
without some supplementary training or evolution. Each authority has its assessment procedures, 
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time frames, and the actual assessment of each applicant’s qualifications and experience can take 
some time (table 5.3). 
  Applicants who fail to get a positive assessment result cannot apply for a skilled 
migration visa (i.e., these applicants do not go to the pool). While there are general English 
proficiency requirements for all migrants, skilled applicants need to demonstrate at least the 
minimum English language requirements in all four components in a single test applicable to 
their occupation and stream. Those with a passport from the United Kingdom, Canada, New 
Zealand, the US or Ireland are not required to take an English exam to be eligible for WA state 
nomination.  
 
     All applicants in the most temporary-visa status need to be younger than 45 years of age 
and give evidence of work experience in their EOI. If applicants have completed a Master’s 
degree or Ph.D. in WA and are applying through the graduate stream, the work experience is 
waived for WA State nomination. If applicants are selected to receive an invitation, WA 
Migration Services email them with a link to the State nomination application form, which 
applicants have 28 days to complete. Interestingly, the application includes three multiple-choice 
questionnaires that test applicants’ knowledge of WA.  
     Applications must meet the State nomination criteria, which includes additional 
requirements depending on the stream that they intend to apply. Approved applicants not 
Canada (SK) Educational Credential Assessment 
(ECA) 
Australia (WA) Assessment Authority by 
Occupation 
 International Credential Assessment Service of 
Canada (ICAS- ON) April 17, 2013 
Architects Accreditation Council of 
Australia (AACA) 
Comparative Education Service – University of 
Toronto School of Continuing Studies. (CES-
ON) April 17, 2013 
Chartered Accountants Australia and New 
Zealand (CAANZ) 
World Education Services (WES- ON) April 17, 
2013 
Dietitians Association of Australia (DAA) 
International Qualifications Assessment Service 
(ICES- BC). August 6, 2015 
The Institution of Engineers Australia 
(IEA) 
International Credential Evaluation Service 
(IQAS- AL). August 6, 2015 
Institute of Public Accountants Ltd (IPA) 
Table 5.3: Canada (SK) Educational Credential Assessment, 2019 





currently residing in WA also need to demonstrate they have sufficient funds to cover their 
settlement costs in the state for at least their first three months (i.e., a similar condition in SK-
Canada) (table 5.4). 
 
 
 Once admitted, applicants need to live and work in WA for a minimum of two years, 
verified by a settlement survey every six months for these two years. 
      This study focusses on the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS), a 
Department of Home Affairs program that authorizes Australian employers in regions to 
nominate economic immigrants to fill job vacancies, where no local Australians are available to 
take the job. The RSMS visa authorizes economic immigrants to work in Australia under one of 
two streams: the Direct Entry stream and the Temporary Residence Transition stream. An RSMS 
certifying body must assess the Direct Entry stream that allows employers and nominated 
positions. Regional Certifying Bodies (RCBs) can be state government agencies, local chambers 
of commerce, local authority councils or provincial development as in companies. Regional 
certifying organizations advise the Department of Home Affairs on whether direct entry stream 
requests for the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme satisfy specific needs. The RCB 
estimates only the business and the position being nominated. It does not assess the individual 
who is to be nominated for the position; it merely assesses the vacant position before recruiting 
someone to fill the role. Each assessment is valid for three months. 
Number of Persons in 
Household  
Funds Required in SK- 
Canada (in CA$) 
Funds Required in WA- 
Australia (in CA$) 
One person CA$12,475 CA$17,967 
Two people CA$15,531 CA$26,950 
Three people CA$19,093 CA$31,442 
Four people CA$23,181 CA$35,934 
Five people CA$26,292 CA$40,425 
Six people CA$29,652 CA$44,917 
Seven people CA$ 33,014 CA$49,409 
Table 5.4: SK - WA Settlement Funds 2019 
 Source: CEIC and Western Australian Immigration Department. In Australia, for every 
additional dependent – $5,000 (AUD). Author’s conversions from Australian Dollar to 





     WA can nominate economic immigrants by two types of visas. Highly-skilled immigrants 
use visa 190 to immigrate to WA, including Perth and surrounding areas, while economic 
immigrants use Visa 489 to immigrate to other regions in WA (Perth is exempt under 489). Visa 
190 is a Skilled Nominated visa for immigrants who wants to stay in Australia permanently. This 
points-tested stream costs around AU$3500-4500, and around 75-90 percent of applications are 
assessed in 8-10 months. This visa allows economic immigrants to work or study anywhere in 
Australia, become Australian citizens, and sponsor eligible relatives for PR. Applicants need to 
have a suitable skills assessment for their intended occupation. If applicants’ skills were assessed 
based on a qualification they got in Australia while the applicant held a student visa, the 
qualification must be from studying a course registered on Commonwealth Register of 
Institutions and Courses for Overseas Students (CRICOS). Furthermore, applicants must be aged 
under 45 when Australia invites applicants to apply for the visa, although they can turn 45 after 
they are invited to apply. A state can also withdraw their nomination after a candidate has started 
their application, at which time the candidates’ application becomes invalid. 
     Visa 489 allows skilled workers to stay in Australia for up to 4 years from the date that 
applicants are granted, and there is no age limit for the applicants. The cost of this visa is 
currently about AU$3750 for the principal applicant and more for dependents. This visa allows 
economic immigrants to stay in Australia for up to 4 years from the date WA immigration 
Department grants admission for applicants under visa subclasses 475, 487, 495 or 496 (the 
Extended Stay pathway). The visa provides applicants with the opportunity to live, work and 
study in the specified regional areas of Australia for which they applied. Visa applicants can 
travel to and from Australia as often as they want while the visa is valid. At the time they apply 
for this visa, applicants must hold a provisional visa and have complied with all conditions of 
that visa for at least two years (i.e. Skilled Regional Sponsored visa subclass 475, Skilled 
Regional Sponsored visa subclass 487; Skilled Independent Regional visa subclass 495; or 
Skilled Designated Area Sponsored Provisional visa subclass 496). Applicants must have never 
held more than one of these visas. Visas 190 and 489 ask for other requirements: character 
assessment, military and police certificates; health status; special requirements for ship workers; 





 All applicants since 15 October 2007 must read and sign the Australian values 
statements, which confirms that they will respect Australian values and obey Australian laws. 
There are two versions of the Australian values statement: one for economic immigrants under a 
temporary visa and an extended values statement for applicants for a permanent or provisional 
visa. Applicants must sign or accept the Australian values statement every time they apply for a 
visa, so applicants might need to sign it more than once. If applicants do not sign the Australian 
values statement, their application might be delayed, or Australian Immigration Officers might 
refuse to grant the visa. The Australian Immigration Department can offer an exception only in 
compelling circumstances.  
 Australia has constructed a system similar to but qualitatively different than Canada’s. 
While the points system is similar, the application of immigration federalism is not so much a 
state-Commonwealth process and more tailored to regions within the states. In Western 
Australia, for instance, Perth is exempt from the agreement. Moreover, most economic migrants 
are admitted under provisional or temporary visas and need to apply for permanent residence 
later. While the system has moved significantly away from the race-based system in force before 
1970, the Australian values statement’s imposition is a signal that everyone in the country does 
not fully embrace multiculturalism.  
 
3.    Analysis 
 
      Immigration federalism is flexible. In Canada, the constitutional mandate is jointly held 
between the federal and provincial governments while in Australia, it is a federal authority but 
has been managed more cooperatively. Australia’s constitution does not provide any guidance on 
how devolved responsivity to states/regions/cities might work. Many goals can drive 
immigration federalism, so the pathway to impact is part of its nature. The adoption of greater 
federalism in this policy field is driven by the idea that federalism has a purpose—the unitary 
state is practically too large to govern effectively. Large pan-continental nations like Australia 
and Canada need regional representation. The need for a constitutional compromise between the 





the Australian model has been able to be more flexible, including regions, cities and firms in the 
definition and management of skilled immigration.  
 The real driver for immigration federalism is to open up the system to advice from others, 
which often includes the whole immigration process. Immigration federalism can promote 
changes and improvements in recruitment, selection, settlement and retention. The greater local 






PUZZLING, POWERING AND PARTICIPATION  
IN IMMIGRATION POLICY REFORMS 
 
 As discussed in chapter 3, Hoppe’s puzzling, powering, and participation model provides 
one way to assess the drivers, scope and impact of immigration federalism in Saskatchewan and 
Western Australia. The following analysis focuses on key examples were puzzling, powering and 
participation dominate, concluding that while one might see a higher purpose of some of the 
measures and processes, one can still see a fluid mix of might, right and practicality in each of the 
stories. The balance of the three drives explains some of the outcomes.  
 Hoppe defines “puzzling” as the intellectual exercise of policy design, where ideas drive 
the framing and structuring of both problems and their solutions. Where there is broad consensus 
on the underlying logic or theories of the policy problem, the goals are clear and accepted, and 
there is ample relevant evidence of the cause and effect relationships, ideas rule. According to 
Hoppe (2011), people can see “powering” as the internal political machinations of governments to 
implement their values and beliefs. Parties build coalitions that advance their ideas through 
policies. The values, goals and evidence homogenize within coalitions, but competing coalitions 
propose contrasting proposals as they fight for power. Wood (2015) asserted that while puzzling 
is the cognitive side of the politics and part of the social learning process, powering is a political 
conflict driven by the competition over different issues within the power relations of politicians. 
Here, ideas are a means to political power, and not valued for their purity. Hoppe’s proposal to 
explore the state through his puzzling, powering and participation framing is fundamentally about 
governance and how we better engage the governed into the system of governing society. In that 
sense, citizen engagement is a goal and end in itself. The administration of immigration federalism 
has contributed to that venture in a number of ways that we explain later in this chapter. 
 Those three drivers--puzzling, powering and participation--were analyzed to understand 
how policy paradigms have worked in the province of Saskatchewan, Canada, and the state of 








1.     Third-order changes: System Changes 
 
 A third order of change (effectively a paradigm shift) involves a radical and simultaneous 
change of instruments and goals, including the evolution of new political rhetoric and logic. This 
section explores some crucial changes in the goals and structure of the whole immigration policy 
system in Canada and Australia, including the development and implementation of the merit-based 
points system, multiculturalism, and agreements affecting fiscal federalism and new concepts of 
residency.  
 
1.1 Merit-based, Immigration Points Systems 
 
      In 1967 Canada implemented the first immigration point system anywhere. The idea was 
developed and promoted in the scholarly space over the previous few decades, but it took Canada 
to implement it. As Canada passed its centenary, the need for more skilled workers became 
apparent, and the traditional supply of skilled immigrants from Europe was dwindling. The system 
met the challenge of broadening the focus of the national effort. The tool evolved and developed 
over the next thirty years, but the basic notion of adjudicating applications with points in a range 
of targeted categories drove national policy. After signing the PNP in 1998, Saskatchewan engaged 
with the points system, initially merely using it as defined by the federal rules. Since then, the 
point system has undergone an incremental change to reflect provincial priorities. Saskatchewan 
and all the provinces demanded more flexibility to accommodate their own needs. For example, 
truck drivers or machine operators might need more technical abilities than a higher level of 
English proficiency. Saskatchewan and other provinces with PNPs can use the flexibility and 
dynamic nature of the points tool to address their specific concerns while also conforming to the 
overall intent of the federal program. 
 In contrast, Australia didn’t start using a modified merit system until 1979, and it wasn’t 
until 1989 that Australia formalized a point-based immigration system similar to Canada. In 
contrast to the Canadian experience, states in Australia did not argue for more participation in 
immigration policy, so the merit system was developed primarily to help the national government 





Typically, Western Australia and the local governments coordinate specific programs and 
immigration campaigns within the national points system.  
     On the face of it, the points systems in Canada and Australia operate similarly. Both 
countries assign points for age, language proficiency, work experience, education, and factors such 
as study in their respective countries and work in their region. Nevertheless, the requirements and 
criteria for those factors in both countries can change at any time. Therefore, the two systems 
exhibit significant practical differences, as the minimum points for admission through skilled 
immigration programs can change between years (e.g. from 60 points in 2017 to 65 in 2018 in 
WA), specific groups might be targeted (e.g. people under age 45 are targeted for temporary 
immigration via the 190 Visa in Western Australia) and specific skills might be emphasized (e.g. 
Saskatchewan offers up to 20 points for English proficiency of the applicants compared to only 18 
in Western Australia. Most importantly, the key difference between Canada and Australia is the 
score that economic immigrants must reach. In Canada, a skilled immigrant should have a 
minimum of 67 points to be eligible, while Western Australian’s program requires a minimum of 
only 60 points in 2017.  
     Conceptually, the merit-based points system used in Canada and Australia is probably a 
pre-condition for immigration federalism to function. In Canada, the point system was an example 
of puzzling, as the policy systems sought out ideas to create the appropriate tool to select economic 
immigrants to meet regional demand. In Australia, the merit system was officialised two decades 
after Canada as a way to mediate local needs in the national system. Effectively it was a 
participatory approach. In both cases, however, once the point system was in place, it both 
enhanced wider participation but also distributed new power to new actors (provinces and states, 
immigrants, employers and, in Australia, cities and regions). Local voices are now heard in the 
respective systems.  
 
1.2 Multiculturalism Policy 
 
 Canada, under Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, declared in 1971 that Canada would 
adopt multiculturalism as a national policy. The Government of Canada recognized and respected 
that society was becoming more diverse, with new languages, customs and religions. In 1998 the 





between citizenship and modern immigration, highlighting processes of exclusion (e.g., physical 
appearance, obstacles to citizenship for immigrants) and processes for improving the relationship 
between citizens and immigrants (Griffit 2017; Lu et al., 2009; Tastsoglou, 2017).  
 In Australia, multiculturalism was first presented in 1973 through the speech “A Multi-
Cultural Society for the Future”, delivered by the Minister for Immigration under the Whitlam 
Government. This was the first time the term ‘multi-cultural society’ was used in an official 
Australian Government policy statement, and it spurred an open debate about social cohesion and 
the adjustment of immigrants in Australia. Multiculturalism has also been far more controversial 
in Australia than in Canada, at least partly due to the dominance of British immigration to the 
country until the 1970s. As in Canada, that source of immigration dried up, forcing the country to 
look to more diverse sources for immigrants. As society became more diverse, a robust ethnic 
movement emerged in the 1980s, accompanied by a form of multiculturalism that advocated that 
Australia become an amalgam of separate ethnic communities. In the 1990s, the Commonwealth 
and state governments adopted a wide range of multicultural ideas, concepts and policies into their 
respective systems. 
      The rise of multiculturalism is a valid example of puzzling policy in both countries, as 
governments and society sought ways to manage concerns about the increasingly diverse 
population triggered by economic immigrants. While this policy has generated little political 
conflict in Canada (it is largely treated as an idea whose time had come), occasional anti-immigrant 
conflicts in Australia have generated greater powering around the policy. The recent Australian 
Values Test is one attempt to reconcile the majority’s concerns with the increasing diversity of 
society.  
 
1.3 Agreements enabling immigration federalism 
 
 New mechanisms created a space to experiment with regional participation in immigration 
regulation. Agreements between the national governments, provinces/states/territories and specific 
regions have definitely been driven by a need to increase participation in the targeting, selection 
and settlement of skilled workers in both countries. 
 Indeed, one can trace the impetus for immigration federalism to the French Canadian fact. 





compromise to address the needs and desires of Quebec to maintain its distinct society. As the 
Quebec government gained power and autonomy over immigration to the province, other 
provinces put pressure on Ottawa to provide them with some greater role. So, while the idea of 
immigration federalism emerged independently, implementation was an act of powering. Canada 
finally introduced The Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) in 1998, which worked to empower 
subnational governments (Schmidtke 2014). Those agreements enabled every province and now 
the territories to engage in the coordination and application of immigration policies and agendas. 
The debate around how immigration regulations could or should be fit to provincial interests was 
a “high politics debate”.  
     Conversely, in Australia, there is no constitutional mechanism to allow for political 
engagement on this policy matter. The only way that immigration federalism worked in Australia 
was built by the Commonwealth government deciding unilaterally to involve state governments in 
immigration. It is not clear how much Australia drew on the system working in Canada, but they 
are following the intent and went further, bringing regions and cities into the system along with 
the states. That goal in Australia was partnership and participation.  
 
1.4 Nature of residency 
 
 Immigration historically was about permanent settlement. The policy agenda in Canada 
and Australia has added the new idea that immigrants may not be permanent. In Canada, most of 
the skilled migrants are still offered a pathway to permanent settlement, but increasingly foreign 
nationals completing degrees in Canada are offered temporary rights to work, and, in recent years, 
up to 300,000 lower-skilled temporary workers have been admitted dealing with regional 
shortages. Australia has gone much further with the notion of temporary access, with most 
applicants offered only time-limited rights to settle, which then must be converted through further 
action once the settler has demonstrated their fit.  
 
 The emergence of temporary and contingent immigration is an attempt to reconcile 
challenges in societies. Other countries have large temporary workforces (e.g. Germany and many 
Middle Eastern states), but in the two cases studied here, the temporary system is formally 





an adaptive and responsive labour market, but it also manages conflicts resulting from large scale 
migration and the social pressures it creates, which makes it a kind of powering solution.  
 
2.    Second-Order Changes: Process Changes 
 
Second-order changes involve changes in tools or techniques (based on learning from 
experience) without breaking the hierarchy of objectives. This section explores three fundamental 
second-order changes, specifically the new roles for applicants, firms and external assessors of 
credentials in the immigration process. As one might expect from more technocratic innovations, 
most of these are more about puzzling and participation than about powering.  
 
  2.1    Role of Applicants and EOI 
 
 Applicants are now an essential part of the selection process. In the first instance, they now 
define where they would like to migrate. This idea about “preferences matter” allowed economic 
immigrants to have their voice heard (Hirschman, 1978). In the old system, immigrants who 
wanted to migrate to Canada or Australia were largely judged based on their national background 
and local support systems (e.g. family), and hence they mostly followed the path of those who 
went before, largely ending up in large urban areas. New models in immigration push economic 
immigrants to decide where they will live and work. Under this new concept, economic immigrants 
are required to construct an “Expression of Interest”. In 2015, Canada launched the EOI system to 
help switch from passive processing of applications to a prioritized system that gets in-demand 
people with the skills to succeed in Canada faster than before. EOI works in two stages. First, 
prospective immigrants indicate their interest in coming to Canada by providing information 
electronically about their skills, work experience and other attributes. Second, individuals who 
have met certain eligibility criteria have a chance to maintain their “expressions of interest” in a 
pool ranked against others already in the pool; IRCC then draws from that pool to invite the best 
candidates, including those with in-demand skills or with job offers, to apply for a work permit 
visa. The EIO encourages economic immigrants to choose a place where they can get employment, 





Similarly, in Australia, economic immigrants use SkillSelect to make an expression of 
interest (EOI), a two-step selection mechanism whereby applicants are pre-selected into a pool and 
then selected from the pool. Selection at both steps uses a changing set of parameters, weights and 
ranking to respond to shifting economic and policy priorities. In both countries, the EIO 
immigration tool comes from the ideas realm and is motivated to increase participation, in this 
case, of the migrants themselves.  
    
 2.2    Role of Firms 
 
 Firms are essential to developing demand-driven immigration in both Saskatchewan and 
Western Australia. They have information not available to national governments. Both countries 
directly involve firms in identifying needs and opportunities and in selecting applicants to fill those 
spaces. In the past 25 years, each country has increased economic immigrant inflows, expanded 
source countries, defined new and emerging fields, and dramatically expanded both permanent and 
temporary labour flows (driven by state and employer sponsorship).  
 In Canada firms work through provinces while in Australia they work directly with regional 
programs, such as the Enterprise Migration Agreements (EMA) and Regional Migration 
Agreements (RMA). Especially since 2010, Australian employers have aggressively sought to 
participate. But the result has been that Australian firms have gained more power than in Canada, 
as they are often large actors in smaller regions, compared with modest actors in a Canadian 
province. WA agreements generally exclude Perth and focus on smaller centers with relatively 
large employers needing immigrants. Even the largest employers in a province in Canada, such as 
Saskatchewan, are minor employers in any provincial total economy, which dilutes their power. 
  
 2.3    Credential Assessment 
 
 Matching the desire and capacities of potential migrants with the demand and needs of 
firms almost always involves assessing the international skills, experiences and credentials. Before 
the points system and the federal-sub-national agreements, this was only a minor issue. With the 





 There is one main difference in the processes for evaluating credentials of potential skilled 
immigrants between Saskatchewan and Western Australia. While in Australia economic 
immigrants must have their national credentials officially assessed before they apply to migrate, 
in Saskatchewan it operates differently. Canada has an early and late assessment process, with all 
assessments by third parties (not the professional regulators), so that applicants may be approved 
and accepted but not be able to work in their field. In Canada, and Saskatchewan, the credential 
assessment for degrees and professional accreditation is done by third party commercial assessors, 
and not by the professional governing bodies in Canada. This approach reduced the complications 
of the distributed authorities in professions, where some are uniquely federally governed, some are 
provincially governed, and some have mixed systems. So, third-party, arm’s length assessments 
are the norm. The challenge with this is the immigrants may have their credentials confirmed by 
the assessors but still are unable to practice in their field as the domestic professional regulators 
do not accept foreign credentials as equivalent. This creates a mismatch in some professional 
spaces—many highly skilled and trained immigrants are simply unable to ever practice in their 
field in Canada. Moreover, because most of the professions are provincially regulated in Canada, 
a formal approval of a credential in one province does not necessarily mean recognition in another 
province or territory; multiple assessments may be required if the skilled worker intends to move 
within Canada. 
 In Australia, most of the key professions appear to be regulated by a single commonwealth 
level authority. The Australian system assigns the task of credential evolution to these national 
bodies so that if the credentials are validated, it meets both the immigration need and provides a 
pathway to professional practice. In Western Australia, for example, the assessments are done by 
the national professional governing bodies so that when economic immigrants arrive, they are 
already certified.  
     The divergence in systems between the two countries is partially a powering phenomenon. 
The power of the professions in Canada dominates. The professions are able to restrict access and 
select only the types and numbers of market entrants that meet their needs but do not destabilize 
incomes and job markets.  
     One other outcome of this divergence is that the Canadian system faces higher amounts of 
credential fraud, possibly because the third party assessors are unable or unwilling to undertake 





stage is longer in Canada, as the assessors invest more time and energy to confirm foreign 
credentials. All immigrants and the employers lose from this as all cases are slowed by the need 
to undertake more due diligence. In effect, the burden is passed from the fraudsters to the legitimate 






CHAPTER VII:  
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 This thesis is focused on answering the question of “how have social learning and multi-
governance altered immigration policies to attract and integrate economic immigrants into 
Saskatchewan and Western Australia, between 1967 and 1992.” This chapter summarizes the answer 
and explores some implications. 
 
1.    Key findings 
 
 Immigration policies in Canada and Australia have moved towards immigration federalism in 
the last quarter of the century, but in somewhat different ways and for different reasons. There are 
various structural and historical/institutional factors driving immigration federalism policies targeting 
economic immigrants in both countries and their provinces and states. Structural factors were 
analyzed in terms of each government’s geopolitical position. While Saskatchewan has had 
significant success in attracting economic immigrants because of its robust economy and the US 
border influence, WA has been distracted by illegal immigration.  
 Historical and institutional factors were reviewed to identify the nature of policy change. 
Canada engaged in exploration en route to immigration federalism while Australia and WA in 
particular, engaged in organizational learning to exploit the concept of immigration federalism 
developed elsewhere. While the stories differ in some important ways, both countries’ policies 
exhibited path dependence, with a set of critical third-order changes creating the precondition for a 
set of operational second changes. At root, the shared constitutional jurisdiction for immigration in 
Canada and the French fact in Quebec set the stage for profound immigration reform in Canada, 
which ultimately opened up the entire system to the provinces. In many ways, fiscal federalism in 
Canada was as much about normative power-sharing as program efficiency. Australia did not have a 
similar push, as the constitutional authority for immigration has been and remains assigned to the 
Commonwealth government. Reform there was triggered more by the efficiency argument.  
     It is possible to link these general conclusions to specific findings regarding the policy tools 
and mechanisms. We found that four significant policy innovations triggered a wholesale change in 





     The merit-based points system in immigration has been one of the most influential tools that 
increased participation in immigration policies. In the beginning, the point system simply was used 
top-down to refine the type of immigrants the host country would select, but this instrument 
combined with other later innovations opened the system to bottom-up participation and engagement 
to drive greater skilled immigration to drive economic development in Saskatchewan and Western 
Australia.  
     Multiculturalism then changed the way the two countries welcome and retain economic 
immigrants. Support for multiculturalism has been a key tool for attracting economic immigrants, 
arguably more important than the economic opportunities themselves. This policy was tailored to fit 
the different predominant cultures in Australia, even coexisting with a values test. However, 
multiculturalism has absolutely affected the subnational societies as it has triggered and supported a 
large increase of immigrants from much more diverse cultures.  
     National-subnational agreements, including some with local regions in Australia, are the 
most obvious manifestation of immigration federalism, working to distribute economic immigrants 
more widely across Canada and Australia. Those agreements create a relevant and impactful role for 
subnational governments, regions and firms, as they identify needs and match with qualified 
applicants. In Canada, the provincial agreements have engaged in extensive “social learning” while 
Western Australia developed from powering politics and a focus on participation.  
     Three primary objectives have driven immigration policies in Canada. The first objective is 
to enhance the economic outcomes of entering migrants. The second objective is to better respond to 
short-term regional labour market shortages often associated with commodity booms. The third 
primary objective is to shift immigration away from the three most significant cities to other areas of 
the nation that are seeking new economic immigrants. These objectives were first fully reflected in 
the point system included in IRPA 2002 and then in the implementation of a series of new immigrant 
programs between the federal and provincial governments, including the Canadian Experience Class 
(i.e., Saskatchewan Experience Class), and the Federal-Provincial Skilled Trades Program. Those 
new objectives in immigration were finally aligned in the 2009 PNP Logic Model, which also sought 
to encourage the development of official language minority communities.  
     In contrast, in Australia, immigration policies have been differentially driven by national 
security concerns and an effort to preserve Australian jobs. A secondary concern, as in Canada, was 
that as recently as 2001-06, over 90 percent of migrants settled in the four capital cities of Sydney 





percent settled in non-capital regions (Hugo et al., 2003; WA Department of Local Government, 
2012). As a result, current policies and policy tools needed to be improved. From late 1996, 
following the inauguration of the Howard Government, the migration agenda was re-balanced away 
from the family towards skilled immigration. Four key interests influenced how Australia and WA 
managed this transition. First, temporary residency has been the pathway to developing aggressive 
immigration of highly skilled workers, reconciling the career aspirations of residents with local 
firms’ needs. Second, the top-down, central policy management by the national government has 
waned, with WA moving from an inflexible immigration policy 25 years ago to considerable 
flexibility. Third, the agreements were not limited to state-Commonwealth partnerships; there are a 
number of regional agreements that involve smaller cities and regions. Fourth, the active 
participation of local authorities and leading firms in specific regions make these partnerships more 
effective in attracting economic immigrants. For the past 25 years, skilled migrants have made up 
about 70 percent of Australian immigration. In 2012, WA had the fastest-growing population in 
Australia, rising by 2.9 percent per annum over the past year, more than double the national growth 
rate. More than 60 percent of the growth came from international immigration in the 2010s. One 
result is that around 31 percent of people living in WA are now overseas born, compared with 27 
percent for Australia as a whole (Hunt, 2017).  
      Interestingly, skilled immigrants are, by their nature, migratory workers, so it is not unusual 
that those enrolling in the Australian labour market have more internal mobility than the Australian-
born (Hugo & Harris, 2011). But this domestic flow is mostly between the larger cities rather than 
smaller centers and development regions.  
      The national and some state governments have taken a variety of actions over the past decade 
to tap into migrants’ flow and promote innovative, skilled immigrants to live and settle in regional 
areas, including in WA. These efforts began in the 1990s when additional points were granted to 
people intended for sponsorship (by families, employers and regional organizations) to settle in 
designated regional areas. They have since developed into a broad range of projects that aim to 
attract skilled immigrants into the regions.  
     The other major innovation underlying immigration federalism is related to “the nature of 
residency”, whereby selection and admission of both high and low skilled workers do not necessarily 
entail offers of permanent residence. Both jurisdictions have allowed temporary workers to fill the 





     The success of these third-order changes depends significantly on a number of second-order 
changes that redefine the role of firms, applicants and credential assessment in the immigration 
system. Firms are the first part of the equation. Australian’s firms have a high capacity to sponsor 
almost as many economic immigrants as they can handle. In contrast, in Canada, firms have to work 
within the parameters developed by the national and provincial governments. The second part of the 
equation relates to applicants who play a crucial role in identifying their interests and ambitions. The 
third part of the equation is the process of credential assessment, which varies markedly between 
Saskatchewan and Western Australia. While in Western Australia, economic immigrants have 
official national credentials before they arrive, in Saskatchewan, economic immigrants often get a 
formal review of their professional status after they arrive in Canada, which in Canada leads to a 
disconnect between immigrants and their labour success. 
 
2.    Conclusions  
 
     This study is influenced by rational choice institutionalism. Historical institutionalism is the 
key that opens doors and turns light on. It shows how path dependence and social learning (e.g., 
participation) have influenced most of the second order of change and paradigm shifts in immigration 
policies.  
     In this study, immigration federalism is conceptualized from high-level dimensions to the 
operational elements. We explored the dynamics of multi-level governance and immigration 
processes and the impact of “economic immigrants and local governments participation” in 
Saskatchewan and Western Australia.  
 This study discussed the economic and political advantages of federated systems of 
governments. Some federal countries have maintained a centralized system to govern some specific 
areas (e.g., security) but are increasingly opening up to distributing power more widely, partly as a 
governance principle, but more often in pursuit of greater efficiency. Given the reality that over time 
immigration defines the population which has political ramifications, it is hard to separate these goals 
in any place. We identified two main factors driving this policy change. Social learning plays a 
significant role in both economies because politics and broader actors of society mobilize over new 
immigration processes. Devolution of power to Saskatchewan started in 2009 when political parties, 
social movements and bureaucrats created a strong epistemic community that began to discuss 





have benefited less from social learning. Australian states have been drawn in by the Commonwealth 
to engage with immigration; along the way, Western Australia adopted some conventional, 
intermediate or irregular measures to equalize social and economic development across the state. 
We then explored the concept of immigration federalism. New circumstances in both countries 
pushed them to explore and adopt the notion of immigration federalism. This concept, defined as the 
role of the states and localities in making and implementing immigration law and policy, has become 
increasingly relevant in public management. This literature has operated with an implicit 
understanding that immigration federalism represents the participation of multiple levels of 
government in immigration matters. It is connected with a shift from centralized governance to 
regional efforts to enhance immigration processes. While such a characterization captures the general 
nature of immigration collaborative federalism, this phenomenon is associated with a developing 
trend of devolution common to many policy areas in Canada and Australia. In these two nations, 
immigration has traditionally been associated with nation-building, but recently economic 
competitiveness, regional development and multiculturalism have assumed higher priority. 
     The concept of paradigm change permeates this work. Hall provides his assessments of the 
paradigm as an ideational factor, drawing on Parsons, 2007. Hall (1993) then explores how systems 
move between policy paradigms, using his three orders of change framing to describe the nature of 
the change. Both Australia and Canada undertook a range of third-order changes that worked to 
effect immigration federalism as the dominant policy; Saskatchewan and Western Australia were 
both parts of driving some of these while others were imposed upon them. These system-level 
changes then triggered a range of second order that the subnational governments were directly and 
actively engaged in defining and implement.  
 The research revealed a radical change of goals and instruments, including the Saskatchewan 
immigration Nominee Program (SINP) in Saskatchewan and the State Specific and Regional 
Migration (SSRM) schemes in Western Australia. Both are primarily directed to attracting the best 
economic immigrants to support local economic and industrial development in their regions. This 
new system began to demand more coordination and participation. Settlement immigration processes 
started to work first because the critical challenge for subnational governments. In the last decade, 
Saskatchewan began to develop infrastructure and better processes in immigration, especially in 
recruitment and settlement. In Western Australia, early participation by Perth has ended and now all 
of the focus is on participation of local governments in the immigration settlement process. This has 





 Saskatchewan and Western Australia followed different types of pathways to select economic 
immigrants to apply for Permanent Residence (PR). Saskatchewan includes the International Skilled 
Worker program, the particular immigration program that we are interested in. Occupation In-
Demand and Express Entry processes offer the opportunity for selected immigrants to be admitted 
into a pool of applicants who have an extended time to make a match and migrate. Australia’s 
system, in contrast, is more about getting skilled people in quickly, usually without any offer of PR, 
and settling them more permanently later. It is too early to conclude which system will work better in 
the long run.  
  The concepts of puzzling, powering, and participation help unpack the story further. The first 
part of the analysis emphasizes how paradigm third-order changes have altered the immigration 
policy at the system level. The merit-based points system, multiculturalism, immigration federalism 
and a more flexible type of residence all have opened up the opportunity for quite flexible and 
targeted immigration campaigns. The second part of the chapter reviews the second-order changes 
that have increased participation of firms, applicants and assessment bodies. Those policy tools are 
the core of the system. Firms, as employers, are able to identify and directly recruit to support their 
commercial interests explicitly. Applicants who, 25 years ago, did not need to specify where or what 
they wanted to do now is key to defining where they will live and what job they will do. Professional 
assessments for economic immigrants are a significant factor because they mediate between 
employers and economic immigrants. While Canada relies on external organizations to assess 
credentials of economic immigrants, Western Australia uses the national professional unions to 
assign and regulate credentials to economic immigrants, which means labour market attachment is 
stronger in Australia. 
 
3.    Policy implications 
 
 Traditional high immigration countries have been recognized by their different social values, 
as they have had to balance security and economic development. When migrants arrive at a new 
place, they aspire to contribute to the host society. Success should be measured based on how well 
they achieve their aspirations. Canadian and Australian societies have the highest percentage of their 
populations foreign-born and seem to have also created healthy and vibrant societies. This is in part 
due to how they design immigration policies to meet the needs of newcomers and the host regions, 





immigrant, those regions expect to get immigrants with qualified talents to contribute across those 
regions. This expectation for skilled immigrants and economic benefits is understood by the Canada 
and Australia governments. Collaborative federalism policies launched in the 1980s were only 
superficially implemented in the 1990s; this is a case where collaboration through immigration 
federalism has become the “immigration regional key.” Their enduring support is due to their ability 
to address the economic, demographic and social needs of specific Canadian and Australian 
provinces/states and cities and the firms that work there.   
     Governments everywhere can learn from this study about the importance of monitoring and 
assessing the economic immigration program performance and productivity, the re-evaluation of 
trends and directions, and the development of operational policy options for subnational and local 
program improvements. Immigration policy often is cast as “high” politics, but that often is a poor 
basis for creating systems to address other than security concerns. The need to attract highly skilled 
immigrants requires a new, collaborative immigration federalism basis for negotiation and 
management.           
      This study suggests that the recent innovations in Australia and Canada represent a new and 
potentially more successful approach to collaborative federalism. Two key elements worth exploring 
are the collaborative immigration processes and management of economic immigrants. The first sub-
element of this new collaborative immigration federalism is more than the focus on skilled 
immigrants for new regions; it is the collaborative processes that each day support the inflow of 
economic immigrants to Canada and Australia. The asymmetric participation from local, 
provincial/state and national governments is one way this has worked. In the 1995-2008 period, when 
most new arrivals to Canada settled in BC, Ontario, Quebec, and their metropolises and other areas 
often “starved” for newcomers, the federal selection criteria were unresponsive to subnational labour 
market needs. Similarly, most economic immigrants in Australia tended to gravitate towards New 
South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and their metropolises in response to the standardized national 
criteria. The resulting highly diffused system in Australia offers some useful lessons for Canada (and 
perhaps many other federal and even unitary states)—cities, in general, have a great need and 
potential to contribute to immigration. The second sub-element of collaborative immigration 
processes highlights ways to manage intergovernmental, multi-level government conflicts. Recasting 
policy problems in their context of their puzzling, powering or participation context can open up new 





 While this study has focused on two jurisdictions with similar political and economic 
histories, similar governments and federal systems, some of the observations and conclusions may be 
relevant to unitary and microstates as well. Immigration, especially that of highly skilled workers, is 
increasingly becoming a key policy variable for almost every state. Few countries are able to 
uniquely train and supply all the workers and skills they need. So, recruiting, selecting, matching and 
retaining these highly sought-after individuals is going to become increasingly challenging. 
Experiences in Canada and Australia, two highly attractive and competitive countries, suggests that 
more voices are needed to make the system work. Moving towards merit systems (using points or 
some other objectified criteria), combined with a greater tolerance for diversity and inclusion of firms 
and communities in formal yet flexible processes of recruitment, selection, matching and settlement 
could go a long way to reducing tensions and increasing successful migration that supports economic 
and social development. Cities, subnational governments, professions, firms and sectors, among 
others, can and should be strong allies and partners to make immigration work for everyone.  
 
4.    Limitations 
 
 As a comparative case study over a limited time period, we can only partially explore the 
concept of immigration federalism. In some ways, the study was fundamentally narrowed by the 
limited experience the two countries have with the new policy. It takes years, if not decades, to 
accumulate enough experience and evidence to fully explore the potential of any new policy tool. 
Furthermore, the focus on two British Commonwealth colonies governed through federal structures, 
while allowing us to hold many confounding variables constant, narrows the scope of the lessons we 
can draw for other forms of government, including republics and unitary states.  
 
5.    Extensions 
 
     Future research could explore what some political scientists call collaborative immigration 
federalism and seek insights about collaborative immigration process in both unitary and federal 
nations. We limited the study to first and second-order changes; more work on third-order change 





     Some immigration regulations related to new public management in immigration (i.e., strong 
participation) could be investigated in-depth to determine if or how they could contribute to 
innovation, business growth, and development opportunities for all levels of governments.  
New comparative case studies could expand the current literature on immigration 
federalism’s impact on the receiving regions and their cities.  
This study can also potentially provide greater theoretical (i.e. theory-developing and theory-
refining) contribution to the novel approach called the” Most Similar Systems Design and puzzle-
solving approach.” This methodological approach was implicitly used to compare for similarities 
between Australia and Canada to help sort out how both countries defied the logic of path 
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Immigrants to Canada by category, 1981 to 2011 
Year Economic Family Protected persons Others Total 
1981 60,238 51,359 14,981 2,063 128,641 
1986 35,840 42,477 19,204 1,835 99,356 
1991 86,500 87,970 36,180 22,159 232,809 
1992 95,790 101,113 37,167 20,722 254,792 
1993 105,652 112,644 24,946 13,399 256,641 
1994 102,308 94,190 19,773 8,114 224,385 
1995 106,626 77,386 27,800 1,054 212,866 
1996 125,369 68,359 28,356 3,987 226,071 
1997 128,349 59,978 24,226 3,482 216,035 
1998 97,909 50,896 22,797 2,593 174,195 
1999 109,248 55,274 24,380 1,049 189,951 
2000 136,284 60,619 30,081 471 227,455 
2001 155,717 66,795 27,914 211 250,637 
2002 137,863 62,292 25,101 3,792 229,048 
2003 121,047 65,123 25,982 9,197 221,349 
2004 133,746 62,275 32,686 7,116 235,823 
2005 156,313 63,375 35,776 6,778 262,242 
2006 138,249 70,518 32,499 10,375 251,641 
2007 131,244 66,243 27,953 11,313 236,753 
2008 149,069 65,583 21,859 10,736 247,247 
2009 153,491 65,208 22,850 10,623 252,172 
2010 186,918 60,230 24,697 8,846 280,691 
2011 156,118 56,451 27,873 8,305 248,747 
Table A.2:- Immigrants to Canada by category, 1981 to 2011:                                                               
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC): Note: Data available 












Table A.3: Immigrants to Canada by category, 1992 to 2011 (Percentage) 
 
Immigrants to Canada by category, 1992 to 2011 (percentage) 
Year Economic Family Protected persons Others Total 
1992 37.6 39.7 14.6 8.1 100 
1993 41.2 43.9 9.7 5.2 100 
1994 45.6 42 8.8 3.6 100 
1995 50.1 36.4 13.1 0.5 100 
1996 55.5 30.2 12.5 1.8 100 
1997 59.4 27.8 11.2 1.6 100 
1998 56.2 29.2 13.1 1.5 100 
1999 57.5 29.1 12.8 0.6 100 
2000 59.9 26.7 13.2 0.2 100 
2001 62.1 26.7 11.1 0.1 100 
2002 60.2 27.2 11 1.7 100 
2003 54.7 29.4 11.7 4.2 100 
2004 56.7 26.4 13.9 3 100 
2005 59.6 24.2 13.6 2.6 100 
2006 54.9 28 12.9 4.1 100 
2007 55.4 28 11.8 4.8 100 
2008 60.3 26.5 8.8 4.3 100 
2009 60.9 25.9 9.1 4.2 100 
2010 66.6 21.5 8.8 3.2 100 
2011 62.8 22.7 11.2 3.3 100 
Table A.3: Immigrants to Canada by category, 1992 to 2011:                                                           
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC): Note: Data available 














































Immigration to Canada by Category (2015–17), Principal Applicants and Immediate Family 
Members 
Year Category Female Male Total 
2015 Economic 83,834 19% 86,548 21% 170,390 20% 
2015 Family 37,552 9% 27,838 7% 65,485 8% 
2015 Refugees and H&C 17,922 4% 18,020 4% 35,958 4% 
2016 Economic 76,183 17% 79,844 19% 156,030 18% 
2016 Family 45,357 10% 32,640 8% 78,006 9% 
2016 Refugees and H&C 30,515 7% 31,827 8% 62,343 7% 
2017 Economic 77,302 18% 81,960 20% 159,262 19% 
2017 Family 47,396 11% 35,070 8% 82,470 10% 
2017 Refugees and H&C 21,664 5% 23,082 6% 44,747 5% 
Total 437,725 100% 416,829 100% 854,691 100% 
Table A.4:  Immigration to Canada by Category (2015–17), Principal Applicants and Immediate 
Family Members:                                                                                                                                                                        



































Provincial Nominee Program Summary (2015–17) 
Year Female Male Total 
2015 21,143 23,388 44,536 
2016 22,143 24,037 46,180 
2017 23,680 26,044 49,724 
Total 66,966 73,469 140,440 
Table A.5: Provincial Nominee Program Summary (2015–17). Including applicants and Immediate 
Family Members) 
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from 2018 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration: Note: PNP has 
grown exponentially since its implementation in 1996 when only 233 people were admitted in the PN 






Table A.6: Percentage distribution of landed immigrants by province of destination, Canada, 









Percentage distribution of landed immigrants by province of destination, Canada, 1981 to 2011 
Year NL PEI NS NB QB ON MA SK AB BC Territories Total 
  Percentage 
1981 0.4 0.1 1.1 0.8 16.5 42.8 4.2 1.9 15 17.2 0.2 100 
1986 0.3 0.2 1.1 0.6 19.6 50.1 3.8 1.9 9.7 12.7 0.1 100 
1991 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.3 22.3 51.6 2.4 1.1 7.3 13.9 0.1 100 
1992 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.3 19.2 54.6 2 1 7 14.5 0.1 100 
1993 0.3 0.1 1.2 0.3 17.5 52.6 1.9 0.9 7.2 17.9 0.1 100 
1994 0.3 0.1 1.5 0.3 12.5 52.4 1.8 1 8 21.9 0.1 100 
1995 0.3 0.1 1.7 0.3 12.8 54.5 1.7 0.9 6.8 20.9 0.1 100 
1996 0.3 0.1 1.4 0.3 13.2 53 1.7 0.8 6.1 23 0.1 100 
1997 0.2 0.1 1.3 0.3 12.9 54.5 1.7 0.8 5.9 22.1 0.1 100 
1998 0.2 0.1 1.2 0.4 15.3 53.1 1.7 0.9 6.4 20.7 0.1 100 
1999 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.3 15.3 54.8 2 0.9 6.4 19 0.1 100 
2000 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.3 14.3 58.7 2 0.8 6.3 16.5 0.1 100 
2001 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.3 15 59.3 1.8 0.7 6.5 15.4 0.1 100 
2002 0.2 0 0.6 0.3 16.4 58.3 2 0.7 6.5 14.9 0.1 100 
2003 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.3 17.9 54.1 2.9 0.8 7.2 15.9 0.1 100 
2004 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.3 18.8 53 3.1 0.8 7 15.7 0.1 100 
2005 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.4 16.5 53.6 3.1 0.8 7.4 17.1 0.1 100 
2006 0.2 0.2 1 0.7 17.8 50 4 1.1 8.2 16.7 0.1 100 
2007 0.2 0.4 1.1 0.7 19.1 47 4.6 1.5 8.8 16.5 0.1 100 
2008 0.3 0.6 1.1 0.8 18.3 44.9 4.5 2 9.8 17.8 0.1 100 
2009 0.2 0.7 0.9 0.8 19.6 42.4 5.4 2.7 10.7 16.4 0.1 100 
2010 0.3 0.9 0.9 0.8 19.2 42.1 5.6 2.7 11.6 15.7 0.2 100 
2011 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.8 20.8 40 6.4 3.6 12.4 14 0.1 100 
Table A.6:  Percentage distribution of landed immigrants by province of destination, Canada, 1981 to 
2011 





Immigrants admitted, and number planned by category- Canada 2009-12 
 Category Planned Observed 
2009 
Economic 140,300 to 156,600 153,491 
Family 68,000 to 71,000 65,208 
Protected persons 23,600 to 27,200 22,850 
Others Note 1 8,100 to 10,200 10,623 
Total 240,000 to 265,000 252,172 
2010 
Economic 156,300 to 166,800 186,918 
Family 57,000 to 63,000 60,230 
Protected persons 19,600 to 26,000 24,697 
Others Note 1 7,100 to 9,200 8,846 
Total 240,000 to 265,000 280,691 
2011 
Economic 150,600 to 161,300 156,118 
Family 58,500 to 65,500 56,451 
Protected persons 23,200 to 29,000 27,873 
Others Note 1 7,700 to 9,200 8,305 
Total 240,000 to 265,000 248,747 
2012 
Economic 150,000 to 161,000 - 
Family 59,800 to 69,000 - 
Protected persons 22,500 to 27,000 - 
Others Note 1 7,700 to 8,000 - 
Total 240,000 to 265,000 - 
Table A.7: Immigrants admitted, and number planned by category according to the immigration plan, 
Canada, 2009-12:                                                                                                                      
Sources: Paul Trujillo Jácome From Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Annual Report to Parliament 
on Immigration, 2009 to 2012: Note 1: Includes deferred removal order class, post-determination refugee 











































Federal Economic – Skilled 54,000 59,000 59,999 28,340 31,657 
Federal Economic – 
Caregivers 20,000 22,000 18,467 10,525 7,941 
Federal Economic – Business 500 900 867 402 465 
Provincial Nominee 46,000 48,000 46,170 22,139 24,031 
Quebec Skilled Workers 25,500 27,000 25,857 12,476 13,381 
Quebec Business Immigrants 5,200 5,500 4,634 2,274 2,360 
Total Economic 151,200 162,400 155,994 76,156 79,835 
Spouses, Partners and 
Children 57,000 62,000 60,588 35,314 25,271 
Parents and Grandparents 18,000 20,000 17,041 9,832 7,203 
Family-Other - - 375 211 164 
Total Family 75,000 82,000 78,004 45,357 32,638 
Protected Persons in Canada 
and Dependants Abroad 10,000 11,000 12,116 6,026 6,089 
Government-Assisted 
Refugees 24,000 25,000 23,523 11,535 11,988 
Blended Visa Office-
Referred Refugees 2,000 3,000 4,434 2,168 2,266 
Privately Sponsored 
Refugees 15,000 18,000 18,362 8,734 9,628 
Total Protected Persons and 
Refugees 51,000 57,000 58,435 28,463 29,971 
Humanitarian and Other 2,800 3,600 3,913 2,055 1,858 
Total Humanitarian 2,800 3,600 3,913 2,055 1,858 
TOTAL 280,000 305,000 296,346 152,031 144,302 
Table A.8: Canada New Permanent Residents Admitted in 2016                                                                                                                                                             





Table A.9: Immigrants distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010-11 
 
















Immigrants  distribution by province of destination and class,  Canada, 2010-11 
P/T 
2010 2011 
Econ Fam Pp Other Total Econ Fam Pp Other Total 
NL 
420 115 160 19 714 393 129 146 17 685 
PE 
2,487 47 56 — 2,593 1,607 47 79 5 1,738 
NS 1,674 449 218 56 2,397 1,409 432 225 70 2,136 
NB 1,727 211 157 30 2,125 1,473 283 179 32 1,967 
QC 37,917 9,630 4,711 1,724 53,982 36,097 9,044 5,020 1,577 51,738 
ON 69,498 29,346 13,914 5,353 118,111 51,402 27,374 15,921 4,761 99,458 
MB 13,275 1,377 1,032 124 15,808 13,152 1,400 1,303 108 15,963 
SK 6,243 726 574 72 7,615 7,658 689 547 61 8,955 
AB 22,404 7,372 2,205 669 32,650 20,758 6,845 2,638 721 30,962 
BC 30,877 10,868 1,667 776 44,188 21,903 10,128 1,810 944 34,785 
YT 310 34 — — 350 207 25 — 5 237 
NT 74 48 — 15 137 43 36 — — 85 
NU 12 7 — — 19 8 15 — — 24 
Unkno
wn — — — — — 8 — — — 14 
Total 
186,91
8 60,230 24,697 8,846 280,691 156,118 56,451 27,873 8,305 248,747 
Table A.9:  Immigrants  distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010-11:                                                                                                                                                                                             
Source: CIC Report 2012: Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration: Notes: Due to privacy 
considerations, some cells in the table have been suppressed and replaced with the notation “—”: As a 





Table A.10: Percentage of Immigrants distribution by province of destination and class,                                      
















Percentage of Immigrants distribution by province of destination and class,                                      
Canada, 2010 and 2011 - Distribution by province  
P/T 
2010 2011 
Econ Fam Pp Other Total Eco Fam Pp Others  Total 
NL 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 
PE 1.3 0.1 0.2 — 0.9 1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.7 
NS 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 
NB 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.8 
QC 20.3 16 19.1 19.5 19.2 23.1 16 18 19 20.8 
ON 37.2 48.7 56.3 60.5 42.1 32.9 48.5 57.1 57.3 40 
MB 7.1 2.3 4.2 1.4 5.6 8.4 2.5 4.7 1.3 6.4 
SK 3.3 1.2 2.3 0.8 2.7 4.9 1.2 2 0.7 3.6 
AB 12 12.2 8.9 7.6 11.6 13.3 12.1 9.5 8.7 12.4 
BC 16.5 18 6.7 8.8 15.7 14 17.9 6.5 11.4 14 
YT 0.2 0.1 — — 0.1 0.1 0 — 0.1 0.1 
NT 0 0.1 — 0.2 0 0 0.1 — — 0 
NU 0 0 — — 0 0 0 — — 0 
Unknow
n — — — — — 0 — — — 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table A.10:  Percentage of Immigrants distribution by province of destination and class,                                      
Canada, 2010 and 2011 - Distribution by province                                                                                                                                                                                      
Source: CIC Report 2012: Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration: Notes: Due to privacy 
considerations, some cells in the table have been suppressed and replaced with the notation “—”: As a 





Table A.11: Immigration distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010 and 











Immigration distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010 and 2011 - 
Distribution by province 
P/T 
2010 2011 
Econ Fam Pp Others Total Econ Fam Pp Others  Total 
NL 58.8 16.1 22.4 2.7 100 57.4 18.8 21.3 2.5 100 
PE 95.9 1.8 2.2 — 100 92.5 2.7 4.5 0.3 100 
NS 69.8 18.7 9.1 2.3 100 66 20.2 10.5 3.3 100 
NB 81.3 9.9 7.4 1.4 100 74.9 14.4 9.1 1.6 100 
QC 70.2 17.8 8.7 3.2 100 69.8 17.5 9.7 3 100 
ON 58.8 24.8 11.8 4.5 100 51.7 27.5 16 4.8 100 
MB 84 8.7 6.5 0.8 100 82.4 8.8 8.2 0.7 100 
SK 82 9.5 7.5 0.9 100 85.5 7.7 6.1 0.7 100 
AB 68.6 22.6 6.8 2 100 67 22.1 8.5 2.3 100 
BC 69.9 24.6 3.8 1.8 100 63 29.1 5.2 2.7 100 
YT 88.6 9.7 — — 100 87.3 10.5 — 2.1 100 
NT 54 35 — 10.9 100 50.6 42.4 — — 100 
NU 63.2 36.8 — — 100 33.3 62.5 — — 100 
Unknow
n — — — — 100 57.1 — — — 100 
Total 66.6 21.5 8.8 3.2 100 62.8 22.7 11.2 3.3 100 
Table A.11:  Immigration distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010 and 2011 - 
Distribution by province  
Source:  CIC Report 2012: Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration: Notes: Due to privacy 
considerations, some cells in the table have been suppressed and replaced with the notation “—”: As a 











Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2011 
Immigration Category 
NL PE NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NT NU YT N/S Total 
Skilled Workers 
104 31 500 180 31,490 36,943 618 524 8,333 10,031 12 11 3 6 88,786 
Business Immigrants 
4 1 60 12 3,960 3,301 41 8 166 4,088 0 0 0 0 11,641 
Provincial and 
Territorial Nominees 
274 1,565 779 1,230 58 1,708 12,342 6,959 8,998 4,306 189 12 0 0 38,420 
Live–in Caregivers 
2 2 28 10 564 6,029 116 118 1,895 2,458 4 15 4 2 11,247 
Canadian Experience 
Class 
8 2 44 42 30 3,422 34 49 1,367 1,021 2 5 1 0 6,027 
Total Economic Class 
(including dependants) 
392 1601 1411 1,474 36,102 51,403 13,151 7,658 20,759 21,904 207 43 8 8 156,121 
Table A.12: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2011 

















Table A.13: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2012 
Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2012  
Immigration Category 
NL PE NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NT NU YT N/S Total 
Skilled Workers 115 43 520 149 34,256 35,439 663 580 9,748 9,939 3 12 1 1 91,469 
Business Immigrants 0 0 41 8 4,634 2,403 8 6 166 2,813 0 0 0 1 10,080 
Provincial and 
Territorial Nominees 365 896 957 1,580 86 1,957 9,531 9,019 10,287 5,943 225 46 4 3 40,899 
Live-in Caregivers 2 1 20 19 645 4,724 87 89 1,591 1,807 7 20 0 0 9,012 
Canadian Experience 
Class  23 11 85 43 25 4,663 48 40 2,783 1,613 1 20 4 0 9,359 
Total Economic Class 
(including dependants) 505 951 1,623 1,799 39,646 49,186 10,337 9,734 24,575 22,115 236 98 9 5 160,819 
Table A.13: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2012 














Table A.14: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2013 
Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2013 
Immigration Category 
NL PE NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NT NU YT N/S Total 
Federal Skilled Workers 90 38 414 139 - 33,906 618 512 9,661 7,490 7 2 0 0 52,877 
Federal Business 0 3 20 8 - 2,547 20 11 101 2,387 0 0 0 1 5,098 
Canadian Experience 
Class 7 10 32 29 14 3,895 39 39 2,132 1,005 7 7 0 0 7,216 
Live-in Caregivers 8 6 12 23 517 4,759 71 68 1,607 1,698 3 23 2 0 8,797 
Provincial and Territorial 
Nominees 440 775 1,202 1,330 13 2,516 8,854 8,182 9,144 7,155 249 54 1 0 39,915 
Quebec-selected Skilled 
Workers - - - -- 30,284 - - - - - - - - - 30,284 
Quebec-selected Business - - - - 3,994 - - - - - - - - - 3,994 
Total Economic Class 
(including dependants) 545 832 1,680 1,529 34,822 47,623 9,602 8,812 22,645 19,735 266 86 3 1 148,181 
Table A.14:  Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2013 













Table A.15: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2014 
Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2014 
Immigration Category 




Federal Skilled Workers 101 25 284 92 0 23,932 389 492 7,960 5,279 3 5 1 0 38,563 
Federal Business  0 13 41 10 0 1,846 21 9 172 2,352 0 0 0 0 4,464 
Canadian Experience 
Class  31 25 172 125 51 12,932 150 364 6,693 3,208 10 24 1 0 23,786 
Caregiver Footnote 1 16 3 49 42 549 9,410 102 224 3,537 3,728 12 13 7 0 17,692 
Provincial and 
Territorial Nominees 454 1,432 1,399 2,107 19 2,727 12,188 8,789 11,171 7,042 227 70 3 0 47,628 
Quebec-selected Skilled 
Workers Footnote  - - - - 28,922 - - - - - - - - - 28,922 
Quebec-selected 
Business  - - - - 3,896 - - - - - - - - - 3,896 
Total Economic 603 1,502 1,952 2,376 33,437 50,888 12,850 9,889 29,591 21,625 252 112 12 0 165,089 
Table A.15: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2014 
Source:  IRCC Report 2015: Notes: Includes Federal Skilled Tradespersons: Caregiver category includes admissions in all streams of the 
Caregiver Program: The permanent residents in the Ministerial Instruction Economic Programs category include people who are admitted through 











Permanent Residents Admitted in 2015 by Destination and Immigration: Economic Category 
Immigration Category 





Workers Footnote  107 39 835 116 0 28,926 720 721 10,558 6,691 15 15 1 0 48,744 
Canadian Experience 
Class  25 7 180 71 1 9,541 116 370 7,007 2,701 15 16 9 0 20,059 
Caregivers Footnote  17 3 65 78 1,107 14,434 146 287 5,385 5,620 14 55 14 0 27,225 
Federal Business 
Footnote  0 4 7 0 0 547 7 8 55 346 0 0 0 0 974 
Quebec-selected 
Business  0 0 0 0 5,417 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,417 
Quebec-selected 
Skilled Workers 0 0 0 0 23,370 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23,370 
Provincial and 
Territorial Nominees 533 953 1,394 1,765 3 3,550 10,262 8,663 10,411 6,785 153 61 0 0 44,533 
Ministerial Instruction 
Economic Program 0 0 4 0 0 42 0 0 5 11 0 0 0 0 62 
Total Economic 682 1,006 2,485 2,030 29,898 57,040 11,251 10,049 33,421 22,154 197 147 24 0 170,384 
Table A.16: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2015 
Source:  IRCC  Report 2016: Notes: Includes Federal Skilled Tradespersons: Caregiver category includes admissions in all streams of the 
Caregiver Program: The permanent residents in the Ministerial Instruction Economic Programs category include people who are admitted through 










Table A.17: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2016 
Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2016 
Immigration 
Category 
NL PE NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NT NU YT N/S 
Total 
Federal Economic – 
Skilled  171 25 720 163 0 31,363 624 848 16,510 9,517 29 9 22 
0 
60,001 
Federal Economic – 
Caregivers 
Footnote 28 0 59 29 1,110 9,324 96 222 3,828 3,736 26 10 8 
0 
18,476 
Federal Economic – 













Immigrants 0 0 0 0 4,634 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 
4,634 
Total Economic 656 1,966 3,384 2,640 31,602 45,112 10,689 10,972 28,425 20,307 118 19 119 0 156,009 
Table A.17: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2016 
Source:  IRCC Report 2017. Notes: Includes admissions in the Federal Skilled Worker Program, Federal Skilled Trades Program and Canadian 
Experience Class. Admissions include applicants who applied prior to the launch of Express Entry on January 1, 2015 (i.e., applications on 
inventory), as well as those who made an application using Express Entry. Levels targets and ranges have not been established for each 
individual program as almost half of admissions in 2016 are expected to come from Express Entry. This approach reflects the new ways federal 
economic immigrants are selected under the Express Entry system. The Express Entry system determines which programs foreign nationals 
qualify for based on the information they provide and awards them points under the Comprehensive Ranking System for their ability to 





Table A.18: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2017 
 
Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2017 
Immigration 
Category 
NL PE NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NT NU YT N/S Total 
Federal Economic - 
Skilled Footnote  222 83 487 197 0 34,896 552 779 9,903 9,997 23 8 18 0 57,165 
Federal Economic - 
Caregivers Footnote  37 0 74 25 811 11,133 75 335 5,246 4,463 47 3 4 0 22,253 
Federal Economic – 
Business Footnote  0 17 6 6 0 310 3 2 15 228 0 0 0 0 587 
Atlantic Immigration 
Pilot Programs 0 20 15 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 
Provincial and 
Territorial Nominees  2,051 2,735 2,583 0 6,982 9,427 10,528 7,194 7,565 104 0 122 0 49,724 
Quebec Skilled 
Workers 0 0 0 0 24,862 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24,862 
Quebec Business 
Immigrations 0 0 0 0 4,589 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,589 
Total Economic 692 2,171 3,317 2,858 30,262 53,321 10,057 11,644 22,358 22,253 174 11 144 0 159,262 
Table A.18: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2017 
Source: IRCC Report 2018. Notes: Includes admissions in the Federal Skilled Worker Program, Federal Skilled Trades Program and Canadian 
Experience Class. Admissions include applicants who applied prior to the launch of Express Entry on January 1, 2015 (i.e., applications in 
inventory), as well as those who made an application using Express Entry.  This category also includes admissions resulting from a small number 
















Table A.19: Australia General Migration Program 1989-90 to 2010-11       
Australia General Migration Program 1986-87 to 2010-11 
Year Family Skill Special Eligibility Total 
1989–90 66,600 52,700 900 120,200 
1990–91 61,300 49,800 1,200 112,200 
1991–92 55,900 41,400 1,700 98,900 
1992–93 43,500 21,300 1,400 67,900 
1993–94 43,200 18,300 1,300 62,800 
1994–95 44,500 30,400 1,600 76,500 
1995–96 56,700 24,100 1,700 82,500 
1996–97 44,580 27,550 1,730 73,900 
1997–98 31,310 34,670 1,110 67,100 
1998–99 32,040 35,000 890 67,900 
1999–00 32,000 35,330 2,850 70,200 
2000–01 33,470 44,730 2,420 80,610 
2001–02 38,090 53,520 1,480 93,080 
2002–03 40,790 66,050 1,230 108,070 
2003–04 42,230 71,240 890 114,360 
2004–05 41,740 77,880 450 120,060 
2005–06 45,290 97,340 310 142,930 
2006–07 50,080 97,920 200 148,200 
2007–08 49,870 108,540 220 158,630 
2008–09 56,366 114,777 175 171,318 
2009–10 60,254 107,868 501 168,623 
2010–11(planned) 54,550 113,850 300 168,700 
Table A.19: Australia Migration Program 1986-87 to 2010-11                                             
 Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Migration Program: DIAC advice supplied to the Parliamentary 
Library in July 2010 taken from Population flows: immigration aspects  various editions since 1992; 
Migration Program Statistics web page; Report on Migration Program  2007–08 to 2009–10; and C 
Evans (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship)  Budget: Migration Program  media release  11 
May 2010 for the planning figures:; Humanitarian Program: DIAC  Population flows: immigration 
aspects 2008–09   source data  chapter 4  2010; and C Bowen (Minister for Immigration and 





Australia Migration Program 1989-90 to 2010-11 (Percentage)  




1989–90 66,600 55% 52,700 44% 900 120,200 
1990–91 61,300 55% 49,800 44% 1,200 112,200 
1991–92 55,900 57% 41,400 42% 1,700 98,900 
1992–93 43,500 64% 21,300 31% 1,400 67,900 
1993–94 43,200 69% 18,300 29% 1,300 62,800 
1994–95 44,500 58% 30,400 40% 1,600 76,500 
1995–96 56,700 69% 24,100 29% 1,700 82,500 
1996–97 44,580 60% 27,550 37% 1,730 73,900 
1997–98 31,310 47% 34,670 52% 1,110 67,100 
1998–99 32,040 47% 35,000 52% 890 67,900 
1999–00 32,000 46% 35,330 50% 2,850 70,200 
2000–01 33,470 42% 44,730 55% 2,420 80,610 
2001–02 38,090 41% 53,520 57% 1,480 93,080 
2002–03 40,790 38% 66,050 61% 1,230 108,070 
2003–04 42,230 37% 71,240 62% 890 114,360 
2004–05 41,740 35% 77,880 65% 450 120,060 
2005–06 45,290 32% 97,340 68% 310 142,930 
2006–07 50,080 34% 97,920 66% 200 148,200 
2007–08 49,870 31% 108,540 68% 220 158,630 
2008–09 56,366 33% 114,777 67% 175 171,318 
2009–10 60,254 36% 107,868 64% 501 168,623 
2010–11  (planned) 54550:00   113,850   300 168,700 
Table A.20: Australia Migration Program (Percentage) 1989-90 to 2010-11 (Percentage)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Migration Program: DIAC advice supplied to the Parliamentary 
Library in July 2010 taken from Population flows: immigration aspects  various editions since 1992; 
Migration Program Statistics web page; Report on Migration Program  2007–08 to 2009–10; and C 
Evans (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship)  Budget: Migration Program  media release  11 May 















































Australia: distribution of population between states and territories, 1881-2001 
Year 1881 1901 1921 1947 1961 1976 1996 2001 
New South Wales 33.3 35.9 38.6 39.4 37.3 35.3 33.9 33.8 
Victoria 38.3 31.8 28.2 27.1 27.9 26.9 24.9 24.7 
Queensland 9.5 13.2 13.9 14.6 14.4 15.2 18.2 18.7 
South Australia 12.3 9.5 9.1 8.5 9.2 9.1 8.1 7.8 
Western Australia 1.3 4.9 6.1 6.6 7 8.4 9.6 9.8 
Tasmania 5.1 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.4 
Northern Territory 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 1 1 
Australian Capital Territory 0 0 0 0.2 0.6 1.5 1.7 1.6 
Total percentage 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total number (million) 2.2 3.8 5.4 7.6 10.5 13.9 18.3 19.4 
Table A.21: Australia: distribution of population between states and territories, 1881-2001                                                                                                                                                                     
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from DT Rowland, Population growth and distribution, 1982, p: 25; 





Table A.22: Australia Temporary Skilled Immigrants 2000-01 to 2008-09 
 
 




Temporary business (long stay) 457 
visas 
2002–03 162,575 36,800 
2003–04 171,616 39,500 
2004–05 174,786 49,590 
2005–06 190,674 71,150 
2006–07 228,592 87,310 
2007–08 278,180 110,570 
2008–09 320,368 101,280 
Table A.22: Australia Migration Program (Percentage)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Source: DIAC, various years of annual reports, population flows publications and migration statistics 
web pages; and Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, Migration Legislation Amendment 




























Table A.23: Australia General Streams on Immigration - Outcome against planning level (%)   
2010-11 
Australia General Streams on Immigration - Outcome against planning level (%) 2010-11 
 Family Skill Special Eligibility Total 
Planning Level 54,550 113,850 300 168,700 
Total Outcome 54,543 113,725 417 168,685 
% Variation -0,01% -0,11% 39,0% -0,009% 
Table A.23: Australia General Streams on Immigration - Outcome against planning level (%) 
2010-11 








































































Table A.24: Comparison of Australia General Skilled Migration (GSM) 2008-09 to 2009-10 
Comparison of Australia General Skilled Migration (GSM) 2008-09 to 2009-10 
Components Skilled Immigrants Comparison 2008-09 
Skilled Independent 37,315 16,3 % decrease of 2008-09 
State Territory Sponsored 
(STS) 
18,889 34,4 increase of 2008-09 
Skilled Australian Sponsored 
(SAS) 
3,688 64,9 decrease of 2008-09 
Table A.24: Comparison of Australia General Skilled Migration (GSM) 2008-09 to 2009-10 





Table A.25: Australia Skill Migration Program visa grants 2009–10 and 2010–11 
 
Australia Skill Migration Program visa grants 2009–10 and 2010–11 
Skill 2009-10 
% of  
Program  
2010-12 % of Program 
Employer Sponsored 40,987 24.3 44,345 26.3 
Business Skills** 6,789 4 7,796 4.6 
Distinguished Talent 199 0.1 125 0.1 
General Skilled Migration     
   * Skilled Independent 37,315 22.1 36,167 21.4 
   * State/Territory Sponsored  18,889 11.2 16,175 9.6 
   * Skilled Australian Sponsored 3,688 2.2 9,117 5.4 
Total Skill 107,868 63.9 113,725 67.4 
Table A.25: Australia Skill Migration Program visa grants 2009–10 and 2010–11 
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Trends in Migration: Australia 2010–11 Annual submission to the 



























Table A.26: – Comparison of Australia State-Specific Regional Migration (SSRM) 2008-09 to      
2011-12 
Comparison of Australia State-Specific Regional Migration (SSRM) 2008-09 to 2011-12 
Components Skilled Immigrants Comparison 2008-09 to 2011-12 
State-Specific Regional 
Migration (SSRM) 
36,568 9.2 % increase of 2008-09 
State-Specific Regional 
Migration (SSRM) 
47,733 27.6 % increase of 2010-11 
Table A.26: Comparison of State-Specific Regional Migration (SSRM) 2008-09-2011-12 
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border 





































Migration Program visa grants 2010–11: offshore and onshore 
Skill Offshore Onshore Total 
Employer Sponsored 5,284 39,061 44,345 
Business Skills** 7,538 258 7,796 
Distinguished Talent 55 70 125 
General Skilled Migration (GSM)    
* Skilled Independent 16,938 19,229 36,167 
* State/Territory Sponsored  12,817 3,358 16,175 
* Skilled Australian Sponsored 3,984 5,133 9,117 
Total Skill 46,616 67,109 113,725 
Table A.27: Migration Program visa grants 2010–11: offshore and onshore  
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Trends in Migration: Australia 2010–11 Annual submission to 








































































Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS) 16,538 13.5 
Employer Nomination Scheme (ENS) 30,912 25.3 
State and Territory Government Nominated category 24,656 20.18 
Skilled Independent category 44,984 36.81 
Skilled Regional category 5,100 4.17 
Table A.28:  Migration Program Skill stream 2013–14 
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and 





Table A.29:  Temporary Business Entrants (subclass 457) and Permanent Arrivals in the Skill 
Visa Categories Compared 
 
Temporary Business Entrants (subclass 457) and Permanent Arrivals in the 
Skill Visa Categories Compared 
Year 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 
Type Temporary Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary Permanent 
Total Number   11,932 25,985 11,894 27,931 10,823 32,350 
Intended Residence Comparison 
NSW 47.7 43.4 48.8 43.7 52.3 42.7 
VI 21 17.5 25.3 17.5 25.5 19.6 
QSL 10.9 13.8 9 13 9 12.1 
SA 2.5 4.4 2.1 4.5 2.5 3.8 
WA 16.2 19.1 10.9 19.5 7.4 20.1 
TA 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.3 
NT 0.3 0.6 2 0.6 1.1 0.5 
Table A.29:  Temporary Business Entrants (subclass 457) and Permanent Arrivals in the 
Skill Visa Categories Compared  
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Khoo, Voight-Graf and Hugo, Temporary skilled migration 
to Australia, 2003: Includes primary migrants and dependents: Skill visa categories include 
Independent, Employer Nomination Scheme, Business skills and (from 1997/98) Skilled Australian-





























Table A.30: Australia State of intended residence 2003-13  
 
Australia State of intended Residence 2003-13 
State 2003-2004 2012-2013 
New South Wales 38.4% 30.2% 
Victoria 27.2% 24.4% 
Western Australia 7.3% 19.3% 
South Australia 5.9% 7.5% 

































Table A.30: Australia State of intended residence 2003-13  






Table A.31: Australian states and territories: percentage distribution of the population by 






















Australian states and territories: percentage distribution of the population by birthplace and 
overseas-born  1996 -01 
Australia-Born Overseas Born Persons Arriving in Last 5 Years 
(percent) (percent) (percent) 
S/T 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 
NSW 33.22 32.65 35.54 35.93 41.21 40.81 
Vic 23.96 24.04 26.61 26.31 24.4 23.6 
Qld 19.96 20.44 14.25 15.01 15.11 17.33 
SA 8.15 8.07 7.74 7.22 4.52 4.1 
WA 8.91 9.11 12.18 12.06 11.61 11.28 
TAS 2.98 2.83 1.19 1.11 0.78 0.69 
NT 1.13 1.16 0.75 0.72 0.73 0.72 
ACT 1.68 1.68 1.71 1.63 1.61 1.47 
Other Territories 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table A.31:   Australian states and territories: percentage distribution of the population by birthplace 
and overseas-born arriving in the last five years, 1996-01                                                                                                                                                         
Source. Paul Trujillo Jácome from ABS 1996 and 2001 Censuses in Implications for Migration 





Table A.32: Australian states and territories natural increase, net overseas migration, net 


















Australian states and territories natural increase, net overseas migration, net interstate 
migration and total population growth, financial years 1996-01 
Natural Increase 
Net Overseas Net Interstate 
Total Population Growth No. Migration Migration 
No. % of Growth No. % of Growth No. 
% of 
Growth     
NSW 244.414 60.9 243.869 60.8 -86.925 -21.7 401,358 
Vic 166.298 53.6 141.572 45.6 2.332 0.8 310,202 
Qld 149.510 41 88.129 24.2 126.659 34.8 364,298 
SA 39.745 118.9 19.621 58.7 -25.950 -77.7 33,416 
WA 84.107 47.6 79.144 44.8 13.361 7.6 176,612 
Tas 14.184 385.1 1550 42.1 -19.417 -527.2 -3683 
NT 16.662 87.4 4172 21.9 -1.773 -9.3 19,061 
ACT 17.510 199.7 -453 -5.2 -8.287 -94.5 8770 
Australia* 732.649 56 576.221 44 - - 1,308,870 
Table A.32: Australian states and territories natural increase, net overseas migration, net interstate 
migration and total population growth, financial years 1996-01 
Source. Paul Trujillo Jácome from ABS, Australian Demographic Statistics June Quarter 2002. 





Table A.33:  Permanent residents, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2003 grouped by visa category and 











Permanent residents, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2003 grouped by visa category and location 















Sydney 52,421 8 5 38 38 37 
NSW Remainder 3,969 5 2 2 4 3 
Melbourne 35,011 21 67 21 26 25 
Vic Remainder 1875 5 2 1 2 1 
Brisbane 12,739 2 2 11 8 9 
QLD Remainder 5,610 7 3 4 4 4 
Adelaide 6,444 22 8 3 5 5 
SA Remainder 374 3 0 0 0 0 
Perth 18,063 9 3 18 9 13 
WA Remainder 1181 6 2 1 1 1 
Hobart 760 5 1 0 1 1 
Tas Remainder 571 2 1 0 1 0 
Darwin 643 1 1 0 1 0 
NT Remainder 196 1 0 0 0 0 
Canberra 1989 3 3 1 1 1 
ACT Remainder 22 0 0 0 0 0 
City total 128,071 70 90 93 88 90 
Remainder total 13,797 30 10 7 12 10 
 Percentage  100 100 100 100 100 
State total 141,868 1,937 3617 65,025 71,289 141,868 
Not stated other 9178 238 160 7300 1480 9178 
Total in category 151,046 2175 3777 72,325 72,769 151,046 
Table A.33:   Permanent residents, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2003 grouped by visa category and location 
in Australia. Per cent by Migration Category                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

















States/Territories nominated vs RSMS Subprogram 
Year outcomes % outcomes % 
2008-2009 14,055 7.32 8,811 7.43 
2009-2010 18,889 9.83 10,213 8.62 
2010-2011 - - - 9.38 
2011-2012 22,247 11.58 16,471 13.90 
2012-2013 21,637 11.26 20,510 17.31 
2013-2014 24,656 12.83 16,538 13.95 
2014-2015 26,050 13.56 12,380 10.45 
2015-2016 24,650 12.83 12,269 10.35 
2016-2017 23,765 12.37 10,198 8.61 
Total 192,124 100 118,510 100 
Table A.34: States/Territories nominated vs RSMS Subprogram 2008-09 to 2016-17                                                                                                               
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and 






















Australia Skill Stream in Detail (Places) 2012-13 to 2016-17 
Immigration Skilled Programs and Sub-Programs 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 Total 
*State, Territory  Nominated 21,637 24,656 26,050 24,650 23,765 120,758 
*Skilled Independent Category 44,251 44,984 43,990 43,994 42,422 219,641 
*Skilled Regional Category 8,132 5,100 2,800 4,196 1,670 21,898 
General Skilled Migration Program 74,020 74,740 72,840 72,840 67,857 362,297 
*Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS) 20,510 16,538 12,380 12,269 10,198 71,895 
*Employer Nomination Scheme (ENS) 27,230 30,912 35,870 35,981 38,052 168,045 
Employer Sponsored Program 47,740 47,450 48,250 48,250 48,250 239,940 
Business Innovation and Investment Programme (BIIP) _ _ 6,484 7,260 7,260 21,004 
Distinguished Talent Program _ _ 200 200 200 600 
Table A.35: Australia Skill Stream in Detail (Places) 2012-13 to 2016-17 
Source. Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2012-13 to 2016-17 





























WA- States/ Territories  RSMS Outcome (In absolute terms and percentage) 
Year State/ Territory Outcome % State/Territory Outcome % State/Territory Outcome % 
2009-10 South Australia 9540 26.1 Victoria 8513 23.3 Western Australia 7895 21.6 
2010-11 Victoria 
 
9210 24.7 Western Australia 8310 22.3 South Australia 7456 20 
2011-12 Western Australia - 23.2 - - - - - - 
Table A.36:  WA- States/ Territories  RSMS Outcome (In absolute terms and percentage) 







Table A.37:  State Specific Regional Migration (SSRM) Outcomes 2012-13 to 2016-17 
 
State Specific Regional Migration (SSRM) Outcomes 2012-13 to 2016-17 
States or Regional Programmes 2012-13 % 2013-14 % 2014-5 % 2015-16 % 2016-17 % 
State, Territory  Nominated  21,637 41.67 24,656 49.4 26,050 61.8 24,650 61.5 23,765 65.12 
Regional Skilled Migration Scheme 20,510 39.50 16,538 33.13 12,380 29.3 12,269 30.6 10,198 27.94 
Business Innovation and Investment 6,596 12.70 3,628 7.27 1,490 3.5 696 1.7 943 2.58 
Skilled Regional  3,181 6.13 5,100 10.22 2,263 5.4 2486 6.2 1,588 4.35 
SSRM Outcomes  51,924 100 49,922 100 42,183 100 40,101 100 36,494 100 
Table A.37:  State Specific Regional Migration (SSRM) Outcomes 2012-13 to 2016-17 
Source. Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2012-13 to 2016-








































States and Territories attracted largest number of migrants  2015-16 
State / Territory Migrants % 
New South Wales 61,742 32.5 
Victoria 47,516 25 
Western Australia 22,488 11.9 
Queensland 21,860 11.5 
Table A.38: States and Territories attracted largest number of migrants (2015-16)                                                                                                                 
Source. Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection 2015-16 Migration Programme Report 






Table A.39: State of intended residence 2017-18 
 
State of intended residence 2017-18 
State of intended residence Outcome numbers % of the total program 
New South Wales 52, 251 32.2 
Victoria 41,005 25.2 
Queensland 17,870 11 
Western Australia 13,480 8.3 
South Australia 12,017 7.4 
Australian Capital Territory 3277 2.0 
Tasmania 2775 1.7 
Northern Territory 2483 1.5 
Not Specified 17,259 10.6 
Table 39: State of intended residence 2017-2018 
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection 2017-18 Migration Programme Report 
